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[T]he law cannot hope to sustain [its] compound burden of stability, flexibility, and transparency unless it pays scrupulous attention to
its own taxonomy . . . . [T]he understanding of the natural world has
depended on patient, self-critical classification. Lawyers deceive themselves if they think they are exempt from the same elementary intellectual burden. This was already obvious to Gaius in the second century
and still obvious to Blackstone in the 18th. The law simply could not be
understood unless it took care to classify itself ‘methodically.’ If it did
not properly understand itself, its decision-making would be erratic and
1
doomed to ridicule.

INTRODUCTION

F

OR generations, American constitutional theorists and judges have
struggled with problems of constitutional interpretation, exploring
how meaning is properly derived from the Constitution and, insofar as
the answer may be different, how courts ought to derive such meaning.
Recent years, however, have seen an upsurge in scholarship addressed to
a related but distinct subject. Without entirely abandoning debates over
constitutional interpretation, constitutional theorists have started increasingly to wonder about those judicial outputs that feature in the enterprise
of constitutional adjudication and yet are something other than a court’s
determination as to what any given provision of the Constitution means.
Theorists have turned their attention from constitutional meaning to
what we may call, at least on a first pass, constitutional doctrine.
Obviously, constitutional scholars have always been interested in doctrine in the sense of caring to elucidate, clarify, rationalize, or propose revisions to the rules governing some area of constitutional law. This describes the dominant mode of constitutional scholarship for most of the
history of the field. And although arguably endangered, it is far from extinct. Think of, say, Douglas Laycock, Donald Regan, David Shapiro,
and, in much of his work, Laurence Tribe.2 But the previous paragraph
aims to draw attention to a different genre of scholarship. The growing
genre that I will contrast with scholarship dedicated to methods of
constitutional interpretation examines, not any given body of doctrine
(such as First Amendment doctrine or Commerce Clause doctrine), but
some of the potentialities and challenges that arise from the claimed exis1

Peter Birks, Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 3 (2000).
To name names in this context is perilous, of course, because the scholars who could with
equal or even greater justice be included on such a list must number in the dozens. I provide
these illustrations simply to make clearer the nature of the contrasts I wish to draw.
2
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the potentialities and challenges that arise from the claimed existence of
doctrine, conceived as a category of judicial work product—
interpretations, reasons, mediating principles, and implementing frameworks—more comprehensive than judge-interpreted constitutional meaning.3 Insofar as this strain of scholarship concerns itself with the fact of
doctrine but not with its particular content, we may fairly term it metadoctrinal.
Especially notable early examples of metadoctrinalism were Henry
Monaghan’s 1975 Harvard Law Review Foreword, “Constitutional Common Law,”4 and, following two volumes later in the same journal, Larry
Sager’s “Fair Measure.”5 Monaghan’s Foreword had two basic objectives: to
draw attention to the fact “that a surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of
a quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required
by, various constitutional provisions;”6 and to argue for this body’s legitimacy.7 Sager brought a different focus to essentially the same phenomenon
by examining what is entailed by the existence of “underenforced constitutional norms”—the fact that judge-made constitutional doctrine could be
less extensive than constitutional meaning.8 Yet, despite the wide audiences
that these articles deservedly won, for many years the field that they combined to help mark attracted little sustained attention from constitutional
3

See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 79 (2000) (“Article III proclaims that the Constitution
is to be enforced as justiciable law in ordinary lawsuits. The document thus envisions that in
deciding cases arising under it, judges will offer interpretations of its meaning, give reasons for
those interpretations, develop mediating principles, and craft implementing frameworks enabling the document to work as in-court law. These interpretations, reasons, principles, and
frameworks are, in a word, doctrine.”) (internal citations omitted); Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1140, 1140 (1994) (describing “constitutional doctrine” as
the “rules and principles of constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement and that generally guide the decisions of courts, the conduct of government officials, and the arguments
and counsel of lawyers”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883 (1996) (defining “doctrine” as “an elaborate structure of precedents
built up over time by the courts”).
4
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
5
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
6
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2–3.
7
Id.
8
Sager, supra note 5, at 1213. For a contemporary exploration in a similar vein see Paul
Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
585 (1975).
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theorists who continued to struggle principally with problems of interpretation as debates raged under such broad banners as “interpretivism,”
“originalism,” “textualism,” and “representation-reinforcement.”
Seeds of change may be in the air, for much of the most provocative
recent work in constitutional theory is centrally concerned with problematics of constitutional doctrine—what it is, how it compares to constitutional meaning, whether it is legitimate, how it should be employed, and
what consequences follow. Though this is not a claim that could be substantiated in short order, even a cursory review of recent Harvard Law
Review Forewords9 suggests metadoctrinal ascendance. No doubt the
most conspicuous example is Richard Fallon’s 1997 Foreword, “Implementing the Constitution,” subsequently developed into a book of the
same name.10 “[T]he central focus” of Fallon’s Foreword is to draw attention to the fact that “[i]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the Constitution is not
the Court’s only function. A crucial mission of the Court is to implement
the Constitution successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect
the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”11 But if Fallon’s article is a particularly clear instance of metadoctrinalism, it is not a lonely one. Metadoctrinalism is close to the surface of Cass Sunstein’s 1996 Foreword, “Leaving Things Undecided,”12 which introduced and defended the concept of
judicial “minimalism” (“the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided”13);
Michael Dorf’s 1998 contribution, arguing that the Court should “worry
less about finding the ‘true’ meaning of authoritative texts [statutes and

9

“Within the community of scholars of constitutional law the ‘Forewords’ are widely taken
to be good indications of the state of the field. The Foreword project defines a vision of the
field of constitutional scholarship.” Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 Const. Comment. 463, 463 (1994–95).
This is not inconsistent with the authors’ further observation that “[t]he constraints of the selection process and of time mean that Forewords are systematically likely to be disappointing.” Id. at 470.
10
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Harvard Foreword]; Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (2001) [hereinafter Fallon, Implementing the Constitution].
11
Fallon, Harvard Foreword, supra note 10, at 57.
12
Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. This was
developed into Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
Court (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism].
13
Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 12, at 6.
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the Constitution], and instead—while sensitive to its own institutional
limitations— . . . focus on finding provisional, workable solutions to the
complex and rapidly changing legal problems of our age”;14 and “The
Document and the Doctrine,”15 Akhil Amar’s 1999 exhortation that
scholars and judges shift their focus from the body of judicial precedent
construing and implementing the Constitution back to the Constitution
itself.16
Moreover, heightened sensitivity to the complexities of the relationship between constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine has not
been limited to the academy. To the contrary, the United States Supreme
Court has divided precisely over issues that can best be understood as
metadoctrinal in several important and seemingly disparate recent decisions. In Dickerson v. United States,17 for example, the Court reaf18
firmed Miranda v. Arizona’s warnings requirement19 over Justice
Scalia’s passionate charge that Miranda had announced an illegitimate
“prophylactic” rule, instead of having engaged in bona fide constitutional
interpretation.20 In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett the Court held that Congress lacked power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Americans with Disabilities Act,21
over Justice Breyer’s insistence that the Court misapplied the congruence
and proportionality test of City of Boerne v. Flores22 because it confused
equal protection doctrine for equal protection meaning.23 And in Atwater

14

Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 9 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
15
Amar, supra note 3.
16
This is a representative but far from exhaustive list of influential recent works that exhibit
significant concern with the fact that the judicial work product in constitutional law is much
more complex and multifaceted than references to constitutional interpretation would indicate. For an additional example of this interest among recent Harvard Law Review Forewords, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 26 (1992) (attributing divisions on the Court to, in
substantial part, varying preferences among the Reagan and Bush appointees for rules versus
standards, and particularly observing that the debate over rules versus standards “occurred at
three levels: first, what force to give constitutional precedent; second, how to read the Constitution; and third, how to fashion the operative constitutional doctrines, tests, and formulas
that guide the lower courts and the Court itself in future cases”); id. at 83–95.
17
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
18
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432.
20
Id. at 445–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21
531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
22
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
23
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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v. City of Lago Vista, Justice O’Connor’s dissent accused the majority of
inappropriately employing doctrine to underenforce the Fourth Amendment’s correct meaning.24
This growing attention to the judicial creation and manipulation of
constitutional “doctrine” provides a much-needed corrective to an attimes obsessional focus on the judicial production of constitutional
“meaning” precisely because, as Fallon has persuasively argued, courts
are engaged in a project of constitutional implementation broader than
what references to constitutional interpretation seem to signify.25 And
yet, constitutional scholars’ collective understanding of the taxonomy, or
conceptual structure, of constitutional doctrine has been little advanced.
Monaghan, as we have seen, described constitutional common law in
terms of “substantive, procedural, and remedial rules,”26 but this was
plainly just a way of gesturing toward the breadth of what he considered
constitutional common law. He made no effort to explain what principles
distinguished one sort of rule from another or why the distinctions might
matter.27 Fallon sorted constitutional doctrine into a large number of
24

532 U.S. 318, 360–62 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
To see the point in another light, consider Laurence Tribe and Michael Dorf’s valuable
book, now more than a decade old, On Reading the Constitution (1991). Tribe and Dorf begin
by asking: “What does it mean to read this Constitution? What is it that we do when we interpret it? Why is there so much controversy over how it should be interpreted[?]” Id. at 3.
Those are appropriate questions. Sensitivity to constitutional doctrine spurs us to raise an additional question, however: How should the Court create doctrine to implement its interpretation of the Constitution?
26
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2–3.
27
Future work did not make attention to this trichotomy look like a promising way to conceptualize constitutional doctrine. Is the exclusionary rule substantive or remedial? Are the
standing doctrines substantive or procedural? What about rebuttable presumptions? While
some commentators pay little attention to these difficulties, others try to resolve them by proposing their own idiosyncratic definitions. Thus Daryl Levinson defines “[r]emedies” simply
and expansively “as rules for implementing constitutional rights and preventing or punishing
their violation,” Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1999) (internal citation omitted), a definition that would seem to
moot any other categories of constitutional common law. See also id. at 869 n.47 (reiterating
that “‘remedy’ . . . encompass[es] the implementation, detection, and prevention of constitutional violations (as distinct from identifying the scope of the constitutional right at stake)”).
Dan Coenen, to take another example, would label a rule “substantive” if it “foreclose[s] to
the government a substantive policy choice” rather than allowing (as a “structural” rule would
do) that the government try again so long as it exhibits the proper sort of deliberation and
clarity. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575, 1596 (2001).
The difficulties that the substance/procedure distinction have posed for operationalizing the
doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), hardly require mention. See
generally 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
25
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categories—balancing tests, “suspect-content” tests, purpose tests, and
the like28—but candidly acknowledged that his laundry list was “a bit of a
hodgepodge” of no particular conceptual significance.29
This Article is animated by the belief that, now that scholars and courts
have come increasingly to appreciate that judge-created constitutional
doctrine is not identical to judge-interpreted constitutional meaning (or
at least may not be), it is high time to concentrate on developing a functional taxonomy of that doctrine.30 Let me caution at the outset, however,
that this Article does not purport to have accomplished that imposing
task—in part because the job is immense, and in part because taxonomies
are always, in any event, works in progress. A taxonomy is a tool. Its utility, and therefore its truth, is a function of, among other things, the needs
of its consumers, the features of the phenomenon being taxonomized,
and the characteristics of its social and institutional context. No taxonomy of a subject as complex and vibrant as constitutional law, then, can
hope to survive unchanged for very long. For this reason alone (although
surely there are others), contributions to a taxonomy of constitutional
doctrine may well prove valuable even if piecemeal. With the hope this
will prove true, this Article will offer a first cut.
That cut will dissever constitutional doctrines that are simply judicial
determinations of what the Constitution means from those conceptually
distinct doctrinal rules that direct how courts—faced, as they inevitably
are, with epistemic uncertainty—are to determine whether the constitutional meaning has been complied with. To coin some terms, let us call
constitutional doctrines that represent the judiciary’s understanding of
the proper meaning of a constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of
provision “constitutional operative propositions”; doctrines that direct
courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is
satisfied I will term “constitutional decision rules.”31

Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters §§ 4508–10 (2d ed. 1996) (summarizing the cases
in which the Court has dealt with and developed the Erie doctrine).
28
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at ch. 5.
29
Id. at 77.
30
Cf. Michael Conant, Constitutional Structure and Purposes: Critical Commentary 6 (2001)
(arguing that “the progress characteristic of the natural and physical sciences in the last 100
years could not occur in legal reasoning, because of its epistemic inadequacies,” and attributing those inadequacies, in part, to the paucity of discussion in legal scholarship “on the meaning of basic terms and primary relationships that is necessary for one generation of scholars to
build on the published learning of previous generations”).
31
There are reasons for this vocabulary. See infra note 192. For the moment it is enough to
caution that what I will call a “constitutional decision rule” is not the same as a “rule of deci-
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An example will help. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”32 The courts are called upon, in the process of adjudication, to determine what this provision means. In performing that task, the
courts may rely on any number of interpretive considerations, including
such “modalities” as text, history, precedent, structure, moral judgment,
and the like.33 Suppose the federal judiciary interprets the provision to
mean that government may not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest. Such, then, is the constitutional operative proposition.34 But that is not the whole of judgemade constitutional doctrine. A court cannot implement this operative
proposition without some sort of procedure (perhaps implicit) for determining whether to adjudge the operative proposition satisfied when, as
will always be the case, the court lacks unmediated access to the true fact
of the matter.35 It needs, that is to say, a constitutional decision rule.
The most obvious decision rule—indeed so obvious as to be almost invisible—is simply the preponderance of the evidence standard of review.36
sion” for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act, The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat.
73, 92.
32
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
33
See generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate]. The term “modality” is introduced in Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation 11 (1991).
34
As is true in this example, the constitutional operative proposition is very rarely identical
to the constitutional text—at least outside the Constitution’s housekeeping provisions. Where,
for instance, the Constitution itself provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion,” U.S. Const. amend. I, the constitutional operative proposition will
necessarily furnish some elaboration of what a “law respecting an establishment of religion”
means. I will therefore treat “constitutional operative proposition” and “judge-interpreted
constitutional meaning” synonymously.
35
A caution: It is the fact of epistemic uncertainty that makes decision rules (or something
functionally equivalent) unavoidable. But it does not follow that decision rules must be designed for the sole purpose of minimizing the total adjudicatory errors that epistemic uncertainty produces. Whether courts should have legitimate authority to consider values other
than error minimization when crafting decision rules is a matter I take up later. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. Even if the better answer to that question is “no,” however, that answer must
be supported by argument; it does not flow as a mere logical entailment of the conditions that
necessarily produce decision rules in the first place.
36
The preponderance of the evidence standard is, of course, directed to fact finders. As we
will see, though, the questions that must be answered in order to apply judicially interpreted
constitutional meanings are very often matters resolved by courts as though they were matters
of law. I would say that they are “constitutional facts,” except that that term is generally used
to refer to circumstances in which appellate courts ought not accord deference in their review
of trial court findings. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985) (exploring such situations).

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

11

Applied to this imagined judicial determination of the meaning of the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection, such a standard would
amount to a direction that courts should conclude that the challenged action classifies individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a
legitimate state interest if and only if they believe it more likely than not
that the action classifies individuals in ways not reasonably designed to
promote a legitimate state interest. But—and this is the crucial point—it
is not conceptually necessary that the constitutional decision rule must be
the simple preponderance standard. Moreover, even if the preponderance standard does serve as a general default decision rule, it is possible
for the courts (most notably the Supreme Court) to displace this default
decision rule with a different decision rule crafted for a particular context. To return to our example, the decision rule of equal protection doctrine could direct courts to conclude that a challenged action classifies individuals in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state
interest if and only if persuaded of this by clear and convincing evidence.
Or, to make matters still more interesting, the decision rule could correspond to the operative proposition in a rather different way. Instead of
simply announcing the amount of confidence a court need have before it
may conclude that the operative proposition is satisfied (or violated), the
decision rule could articulate some different proposition that, if adjudged
satisfied by a specified degree of confidence, will permit or require a particular conclusion with respect to the operative proposition. Suppose, for
example, that the Court believes each of the following: (1) that racial
classifications are often designed—that is, actually intended—to promote
illegitimate interests; (2) that such classifications will nonetheless almost
always further some conceivable legitimate interest too; and that (3) reviewing courts are generally unable on a case-by-case basis to determine
when the permissible interest to which the classification reasonably relates was the real one. Under such circumstances, the Court might direct,
as a decision rule, that courts conclude that the equal protection operative proposition is violated (i.e., that the state has discriminated among
individuals in a manner not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate
state interest) if persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence either (a)
that this is so, or (b) that the challenged action contains a facial racial
classification which is not narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
governmental interest.37
37

This, of course, was Ely’s rationalization of equal protection doctrine. See John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 145–48 (1980). Unlike Ely, however, I mean to express no views at
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As this example illustrates, we should resist the temptation to naturalize the preponderance standard as an inevitable constitutional decision
rule. As a conceptual matter, the number and variety of options in the
making of constitutional decision rules is limited only by judicial imagination and by the (ever-changing) constraining norms of professional practice. And as a positive matter, I will argue, this imagination has indeed
been exercised: Much of existing constitutional doctrine is better understood not as judicial statements of constitutional meaning (i.e., as constitutional operative propositions) but rather as judicial directions regarding
how courts should decide whether such operative propositions have been
satisfied (i.e., as constitutional decision rules).
This distinction between operative propositions and decision rules
would not, I reiterate, comprise the whole of a useful taxonomy of constitutional doctrine. The dichotomy is likely to be supplemented, at the
least, by remedial rules that direct what a court should do when application of a decision rule yields the conclusion that the operative proposition
has been, or will be, violated. And the taxonomy could become a great
deal bushier or more nuanced. It is not necessary to speculate along these
lines now, however, for this single conceptual distinction—between oppresent regarding whether strict scrutiny is best understood as the conjunction of the particular operative proposition and decision rule hypothesized in the text. The discussion in the text
assumes a posture of forward-engineering: It shows how the Court could come to create different sorts of decision rules as part of its constitutional doctrine. The point, in other words, is
that if the Court were to interpret the Equal Protection Clause to mean that government may
not classify persons in ways not reasonably designed to promote a legitimate state interest, it
could implement that operative proposition by means of a decision rule markedly different
from the simple preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule. But determining how existing
doctrine is best unpacked is an exercise in reverse-engineering. It is undeniable both that the
present judge-announced equal protection doctrine could be unpacked in ways different from
those described in the text and that the Court has in fact sent conflicting signals. See Amar,
supra note 3, at 46 n.64. For example, even if the strict scrutiny that current doctrine commands for racial classifications is best understood as a decision rule, it could be in service of
somewhat different operative propositions. Ely seems to assume, for example, that (what I am
calling) the equal protection operative proposition demands merely that every classification
have been rationally chosen to promote a legitimate state interest. But the operative proposition could itself demand that every classification be justified on the strength of an end, and a
fit, commensurate with the social harm that it imposes—which is essentially Justice Stevens’s
long-standing position. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). And I am not prepared even to rule out that strict scrutiny for racial classifications is
itself part of the operative proposition. I will revisit the strict scrutiny component of equal
protection doctrine, infra notes 252–55 and accompanying text. For now, readers would do
well to keep in mind the difference between forward- and reverse-engineering; a taxonomy of
constitutional doctrine might prove useful going forward even if correct classification of any
existing doctrine according to that proposed taxonomy remains contested.
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erative propositions and decision rules—is likely to lie at the core of any
sensible taxonomy of constitutional doctrine drawn on functional principles, and is of sufficient importance alone to warrant careful elaboration
and defense. Or so I will maintain. Put another way, I will argue that
judges, scholars, and litigators should make greater efforts to distinguish
whether a constitutional rule is an announcement of constitutional meaning (i.e., a constitutional operative proposition) or, instead, is a constitutional decision rule, and should pay attention, in the making of constitutional decision rules, to the particular considerations that might justify its
construction.
This argument does not reflect a mere fetish for conceptualism. Attention to the distinction promises substantially to improve the project of
constitutional adjudication and can richly enhance our understanding of
it. For example, courts will be enabled to more sensibly revise and refine
their own doctrines if they pay attention to the respects in which such
doctrines communicate a decision rule as opposed to an operative proposition. Moreover, the scope of legitimate action for legislators and executive agents should depend not so much on judge-announced constitutional doctrine full stop, but on the particular content of one component
of that doctrine, namely the judge-announced operative propositions.
As the preceding remarks may suggest, the ambition of this Article is
to integrate theory and practice, the abstract and the concrete. The structure of argument, however, is neither simply top-down nor bottom-up.
Part I will seek to motivate the inquiry into doctrinal conceptualization
in a very concrete fashion by introducing what is, jurisprudentially, very
possibly the single most important constitutional decision in a generation.
That decision is Dickerson. Miranda itself had a claim to being among the
most important decisions of a prior generation. Although the debate over
Miranda’s legitimacy had proceeded along a variety of argumentative
lines, battle had been joined most relentlessly on the question of whether
Miranda announced a “prophylactic rule” in lieu of having engaged in
constitutional interpretation. By the time of Dickerson, many constitutional theorists had become persuaded by David Strauss’s careful and
powerful argument that prophylactic rules indistinguishable from
Miranda are ubiquitous and legitimate.38 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia
(joined by Justice Thomas) objected, saying that prophylactic rules were
unconstitutional. Justice Scalia, it is true, wrote in dissent. But the major38

David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988). See
infra note 76.
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ity conspicuously failed to defend prophylactic rules as such, choosing instead to reaffirm Miranda solely on grounds of stare decisis. Dickerson
thereby left open a question of profound importance. If Miranda announced a prophylactic rule and if prophylactic rules are both prevalent
and illegitimate, a potential ocean of constitutional doctrine was at risk.
To resolve the debate left hanging from Dickerson, we need to know,
of course, what prophylactic rules are, a question that will be explored in
Part II. Because the term is susceptible to a great many interpretations, a
clarification is needed at the outset. We will not be searching for the
“true” meaning of “prophylactic rules,” or even the most common or
most useful definition. We need to know what a “prophylactic rule”
means to those—Justices Scalia and Thomas among them—who believe
that to properly classify particular constitutional doctrine as a prophylactic rule is inconsistent with its legitimacy.
Happily, discovering what Justice Scalia meant by the term is not difficult. He seemed to understand prophylactic rules as a species of what
Monaghan had dubbed “constitutional common law” (in contradistinction to a “constitutional interpretation”), or what Sager had termed a
“constitutional rule” (in contradistinction to a “constitutional norm”), or
what Fallon had called “constitutional doctrine” (in contradistinction to
“constitutional meaning”). In particular, Justice Scalia seemed to treat
prophylactic rules as that species of constitutional common law or constitutional rule or constitutional doctrine that overprotects or “overenforces” judge-interpreted constitutional meaning. For Strauss and his followers, however, the basic conceptual distinction upon which the Scalia
position rested—a distinction that would divide the universe of “constitutional doctrine” into “constitutional meaning” and something else of a
materially different character—was itself illusory. Because “constitutional interpretation” was shot through with judicial attention to practical, policy-oriented, and interest-balancing sorts of considerations, they
seemed to argue, no important conceptual distinctions could be drawn
within the general domain of constitutional doctrine. The upshot of Part
II, then, is that the debate over prophylactic rules is as much conceptual
as normative. It is, in the first instance, a debate over the logical structure
of constitutional adjudication or, put another way, over the taxonomy of
constitutional doctrine—whether that doctrine consists of meaningfully
different sorts of judge-announced rules.
The core insight of this Article, which will be introduced, developed
and defended in Parts III and IV, is that we can resolve this taxonomic
challenge by carving constitutional doctrine at a new joint—the joint that
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separates constitutional operative propositions (judicial statements of
what the Constitution means) from constitutional decision rules (judicial
statements of how courts should decide whether the operative propositions have been complied with). Put another way, my central claim is that
taxonomists like Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon were on the right track in
seeking to disaggregate “constitutional doctrine” into conceptually distinct components, but that the great value of doing so will become apparent only once we execute that disaggregation in a somewhat different
way. In brief, these two Parts will show: first, that constitutional decision
rules are a ubiquitous feature of constitutional doctrine; second, that to
recognize the distinction between operative propositions and decision
rules does not depend upon (though is not incompatible with) an assumption that courts derive “constitutional meaning” in a fashion uninfluenced
by pragmatic or instrumental calculations; and third, that the classificatory exercise has substantial—though of course limited39 —practical
value.
Perhaps the most obvious dividend of my proposed distinction—yet far
from the only one—is that intelligent extra-judicial discussions about constitutional governance will be much advanced by separating out from the
great complex mass of judge-announced constitutional doctrine those
doctrines—the operative propositions—that embody what the courts
think the Constitution means. Of course, persons anticipating litigation,
be they citizens, legislators, or executive agents, need to know how courts
will resolve the constitutional disputes that reach them. So they need to
know the full doctrines—the operative propositions and the decision
rules (and any other sorts of doctrine, such as the remedial rules). But
given the singular role that the Constitution plays in our political culture,
collective interest in constitutional meaning is not limited to predictions
about the outcome of litigation. That is, we do not want the actual, predicted, or imagined outcome of litigation to be conclusive of our arguments about whether any particular, actual, or proposed course of governmental action conforms to constitutional demands. And yet, many
people might think they can benefit from, and maybe even defer to, the
courts’ expert judgments on constitutional meaning. If that is so, we
might find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate
39

This point merits emphasis lest the reader conclude that I think the conceptualization advanced in this Article is a hammer and the world of constitutional law a nail. I do not. I will
strive to demonstrate that the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is illuminating
and useful. But when an attempt to categorize any particular doctrine in these terms appears
unilluminating and/or useless, I do not recommend that anyone persist in the effort.
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constitutional operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitutional decision rules which are designed solely to govern litigation.
What about constitutional doctrine even as it operates in the courts? In
a variety of ways, distinguishing operative propositions from decision
rules can help here too. Consider, for one thing, the perpetual debate
over how much the courts ought to defer to constitutional judgments
reached by the coordinate branches. Outside of a few limited contexts,
the Court has tended to accord little or no deference to other branches’
constitutional interpretations, and has made clear that it will not give effect to legislation “which alters the meaning” of a constitutional provision, as the Court has construed it.40 But this stance, whether right or
wrong, does not resolve the separate questions of whether, and under
what circumstances, Congress should be entitled to substitute its judgment for the courts’ regarding how best to implement court-interpreted
meaning. Perhaps judicial judgments about the shape of constitutional
decision rules ought to be congressionally defeasible in ways that the operative propositions are not. To carefully separate judge-announced constitutional doctrine into operative propositions and decision rules, then, is
a first step toward identifying the full latitude that Congress should
rightly enjoy in the shaping of in-court doctrine.
Furthermore, courts should reasonably care whether particular aspects
of doctrine are better understood in operative or decisional terms even
when not contemplating inter-branch dialogue and cooperation. This
matter is complex. To note just one example, however, it is plausible
(though admittedly not inevitable) for courts to come to think it appropriate to accord differential stare decisis weight to the two sorts of doctrine.
Part V will return to the beginning by showing that the Dickerson majority could have responded to Justice Scalia’s dissent by dividing the
complex doctrine announced by the Miranda Court into an operative
proposition to be administered via a decision rule: The operative proposition providing that courts may not admit extra-judicial statements that
state agents had compelled from the criminal defendant, the decision rule
directing that courts must presume unwarned statements made during
custodial interrogation to have been compelled (in the constitutionally

40

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
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relevant sense).41 Although Miranda contains too many ambiguous and
even contradictory elements to permit us ever to be certain just what
Chief Justice Warren intended to convey,42 this characterization of
Miranda is, I will argue, more faithful to that decision than are any other
of the other leading contenders. Additionally, this characterization has
cash value. To understand Miranda in this way both buttresses its legitimacy (which is not to say its wisdom) and bears upon various of
Miranda’s progeny, such as cases that address the admissibility of “fruits
of a Miranda violation”43—an issue that the Court will revisit, in light of
Dickerson, this upcoming Term44—and that announce an emergency exception.45 By journeying in this roundabout fashion, from the concrete
problem presented by Miranda and Dickerson, to the theoretical or abstract, and back to the concrete, this Article hopes both to reinforce the
general importance of conceptualizing constitutional doctrine taxonomically and to demonstrate some of the value of beginning such a taxonomy
by distinguishing operative propositions from decision rules.
I. DICKERSON, MIRANDA, AND THE PROPHYLACTIC RULES DEBATE
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.46 The case held
that a criminal defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation
could not be admitted into evidence against him unless police officers issued
47
48
the now-famous Miranda warnings. Like Brown v. Board of Education
49
before it and like Roe v. Wade to follow, Miranda excited passionate political and social criticism. Also like Brown and Roe, Miranda presented a
41

It is true, but not directly relevant, that the Court specified that a different decision rule
could apply if Congress or a given state took other steps to reduce the possibility that courts
would admit compelled statements into evidence. See infra note 324.
42
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to
Remain Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2629 (1996) (“No one really knows what Miranda
means.”).
43
E.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445
(1974).
44
United States v Patane, 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Dickerson overturns
the Elstad-Tucker doctrine on fruits of un-Mirandized interrogations), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
1788 (2003); Missouri v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted 123 S. Ct.
2091 (2003) (holding that a deliberate failure to issue Miranda warnings requires suppression
of statements elicited during a second interrogation that was preceded by warnings).
45
See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
46
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47
Id. at 444–45.
48
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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jurisprudential puzzle, even for its sympathizers. Much as Herbert Wechsler
questioned the neutrality of Brown50 and John Hart Ely was to challenge the
legitimacy of Roe,51 even political liberals like Judge Henry Friendly doubted
the propriety of Miranda.52 This Part sketches the jurisprudential debate and
demonstrates that despite the Court’s reaffirmance of Miranda in Dickerson
53
v. United States, the case for Miranda’s legitimacy remains surprisingly unclear. In effect, this Part employs Dickerson as a particularly salient illustration of Peter Birks’s claim that constitutional doctrine “simply [can] not be
understood unless it [takes] care to classify itself ‘methodically.’”54
A. The Miranda Controversy in a Nutshell
As we will see in Part V, the Miranda decision is rife with ambiguity.
For present purposes, it is enough to observe that Miranda announced a
new rule governing the admissibility of statements made during custodial
interrogation. Before initiating any such interrogation, the Court declared, police should warn the suspect,
[T]hat he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be ap55
pointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

If the police failed to issue these warnings, or if the protections they
announced were not validly waived, the Court held, the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination would render any statements the suspect thereafter made inadmissible against him at his subsequent trial.56
The decision provoked a hailstorm of protest from law enforcement
officials who predicted that the rule would “handcuff the police,” and
50

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
31–34 (1959).
51
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920
(1973).
52
Henry J. Friendly, A Postscript on Miranda, in Benchmarks 266 (1967).
53
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
54
Birks, supra note 1, at 3.
55
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
56
Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself”). The Court had made the privilege applicable against
the states just two years earlier in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), thereby overruling two
earlier refusals to do so. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1947); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908).

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

19

from academic critics who charged that the decision was a wholly illegitimate exercise of judicial power. This is not constitutional interpretation, opponents decried, but legislation from the bench.57 In almost
immediate response,58 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. Section 3501, which
provided that, in federal criminal prosecutions, a confession shall be admissible if voluntary and that “[t]he trial judge in determining the issue of
voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession.”59 But Section 3501 was widely perceived as an effort to legislatively overrule Miranda, hence invalid under
60
Marbury v. Madison, and was therefore disavowed by the Department
of Justice and ignored by the courts.
Without the benefit of Section 3501, law enforcement concerns were
accommodated in two ways. First, police were surprised to learn that they
could live with Miranda, for a great many suspects confessed notwithstanding having been warned of their rights to remain silent and to an attorney.61 Second, the Burger and then Rehnquist Courts pared down
Miranda’s scope or curbed its potential. For instance, the Court held that
custodial statements taken without warnings could be used by the state

57

Justice Harlan had pressed this view in his Miranda dissent. See 384 U.S. at 504–14
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Other especially prominent assaults included Fred P. Graham, The
Self-Inflicted Wound (1970); Sam J. Erwin, Jr., Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary Solicitude for the Accused, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 125, 128 (1967)
(“Miranda has left the police handcuffed.”); Raymond L. Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Escobedo, Miranda, and the New 5th Amendment, 6 Washburn L.J. 428, 442 (1967) (“[T]he court
has allowed its moral judgment to force it beyond interpretation of the Constitution and into
the realm of amendment.”).
58
For a good discussion of the context and legislative history, see Yale Kamisar, Can (Did)
Congress “Overrule” Miranda, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 883, 887–906 (2000).
59
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (2000). The statute proceeded to offer a nonexhaustive list of factors
that warranted consideration, and emphasized that this was an all-things-considered analysis
by concluding that “[t]he presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors . . . need
not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.” Id.
60
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61
One careful study found that seventy-eight percent of suspects waived their rights. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 266, 276 (1996).
This is not to assert, however, that Miranda was socially costless, a question that has been vigorously debated, and with respect to which this Article takes no position. Compare, e.g., Paul
G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055 (1998), and Paul G.
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1084 (1996), with Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500 (1996).
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for impeachment purposes;62 grafted a “public safety” exception onto the
requirement that warnings be given as a precondition to admissibility;63
and strongly suggested (without squarely holding) that the fruits of unwarned custodial statements were generally admissible.64
Of course, these decisions were not greeted everywhere with approval.
But it was not only the results that dismayed Miranda supporters.
Equally or more inflammatory was the language these cases used to describe Miranda. For example, when holding admissible the testimony of a
witness whose identity was discovered as a result of an unwarned custodial statement, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, per then-Justice
Rehnquist, deemed it critical that “the police conduct at issue here did
not abridge respondent’s constitutional privilege against selfincrimination, but departed only from the prophylactic standards later
laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.”65 And
Justice O’Connor observed for the Oregon v. Elstad Court that “[t]he
Miranda exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”66
Partisans on both sides seemed to recognize that the language of prophylaxis threatened Miranda’s legitimacy. For example, Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Tucker, rejected the majority’s characterization of Miranda
as having announced “prophylactic standards,” insisting instead that
“[t]he Court is not free to prescribe preferred modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis.”67 Justice Stevens similarly denied in his Elstad
dissent that Miranda sweeps more broadly than the Constitution:
62

Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975) (holding statements given in response to police questioning after suspect had received warnings and had asserted right to lawyer admissible for impeachment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding statements
made after receipt of defective Miranda warnings admissible for impeachment).
63
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
64
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317–18 (1985) (holding that fact of a first custodial statement given without warnings does not render inadmissible subsequent statement given after
Miranda warnings properly administered); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–51 (1974)
(holding that poisonous fruits doctrine does not bar testimony of witness whose identity was
discovered as result of custodial statement obtained without warnings, where the custodial
interrogation had occurred prior to the Miranda decision).
65
417 U.S. at 445–46.
66
470 U.S. at 306. These are not isolated examples. Others are canvassed in Richard H.W.
Maloy, Can a Rule Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 2465,
2471–74 (2001).
67
417 U.S. at 462 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 465–66 (“Miranda’s purpose was
not promulgation of judicially preferred standards for police interrogation, a function we are
quite powerless to perform; the decision enunciated ‘constitutional standards for protection of
the privilege’ against self-incrimination.”) (internal citation omitted).
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This Court’s power to require state courts to exclude probative selfincriminatory statements rests entirely on the premise that the use of
such evidence violates the Federal Constitution . . . . If the Court does
not accept that premise, it must regard the holding in the Miranda case
itself, as well as all of the federal jurisprudence that has evolved from
that decision, as nothing more than an illegitimate exercise of raw judi68
cial power.

Echoing this sentiment, academic defenders of the warnings requirement
complained that the language of prophylaxis “cut the doctrinal heart out
of Miranda.”69 For long-time Miranda critic Joseph Grano, by contrast,
the prophylactic characterization of Miranda was both correct and fatal.70
The general consensus that viewing Miranda in prophylactic terms was
inconsistent with its legitimacy was challenged fifteen years ago by David
Strauss. In “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,”71 Strauss accepted that
Miranda announced a prophylactic rule but denied that it mattered.
“‘[P]rophylactic’ rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy,” he argued, “but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law. Indeed, constitutional law consists, to a significant degree, in
the elaboration of doctrines that are universally accepted as legitimate,
but that have the same ‘prophylactic’ character as the Miranda rule.”72
“‘Prophylactic’ rules are, in an important sense, the norm, not the exception,” Strauss explained, because the intensely practical considerations
upon which they are thought to rely undergird all of constitutional doctrine.73 “As a theoretical exercise, one could try to identify what the real,
noumenal Constitution would require if governments had different tendencies or the courts had different capacities. But usually that would be a
68

470 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days
of Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 740 (1987); see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in
The Burger Years 143, 152–57 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987) (arguing that language in Tucker,
Quarles, and Elstad may have paved the way for overruling Miranda); Larry J. Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court’s Definition, 61 Minn. L. Rev.
383, 417–18 (1977) (arguing that Harris v. New York and Tucker can be seen as cautious steps
toward overruling Miranda); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 119–20, 123 (describing Tucker as laying the groundwork for overruling
Miranda).
70
See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article
III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985).
71
Strauss, supra note 38.
72
Id. at 190.
73
Id. at 195.
69
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pointless task.”74 In short, “in deciding constitutional cases, the courts
constantly consider institutional capacities and propensities. That is, to a
large extent, what constitutional law consists of: courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional realities.”75
B. Dickerson’s Failure to Resolve Miranda’s Status and Legitimacy
Strauss’s argument won an enthusiastic reception,76 but did not persuade everyone.77 Thirty years after Miranda, accordingly, doubts about
that decision’s legitimacy had found themselves on the back burner but
not fully resolved. They were revived four years ago in Dickerson.78 In
1999, in an otherwise insignificant case, the Fourth Circuit dusted off Section 3501 to hold a defendant’s confession admissible despite the district
court’s finding that the police had elicited the confession during custodial
interrogation without having first issued the warnings required by
79
Miranda. The panel held that the confession was nonetheless “voluntary,” all things considered, and hence admissible under Section 3501.80

74

Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
76
For a sampling of scholars who appeared to have become persuaded of the prevalence and
legitimacy of “prophylactic rules,” see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10,
at 141 n.34; David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 31, 55–56; Dorf, supra note
14, at 71; David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the
Fifth Amendment, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 261, 263–64 (2000); John C. Jeffries, The RightRemedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 113 n.98 (1999); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure, and the Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L. Rev. 465, 471 (1999); Levinson, supra note 27, at 904.
77
Grano, for one, remained unconvinced. See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the
Law 173 (1993) [hereinafter Grano, Confessions]; Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional
Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 174, 187 (1988) [hereinafter
Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties].
78
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
79
Id.
80
Dickerson himself had not mentioned § 3501, and the United States, following longstanding practice, contended that the statute was unconstitutional. The Fourth Circuit granted
the motion of amicus curiae Professor Paul Cassell, a long-time critic of Miranda, to share
oral argument time with the government for the purpose of defending the statute’s constitutionality. See 166 F.3d at 680 n.14. For one debate over whether the Fourth Circuit, and then
the Supreme Court, acted appropriately in considering § 3501, compare Neal Devins, Asking
the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored the Separation of Powers By Reconsidering
Miranda, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251 (2000), with Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have
75
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In the last week of the 1999 Term, the Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit by the surprisingly wide margin of 7-2.81 In a further surprise, Chief Justice Rehnquist, long a critic of Miranda, wrote the majority opinion. The case, he wrote, raises the question “whether Congress
has constitutional authority to . . . supersede Miranda.”82 And the answer
“turns on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or
merely exercised its supervisory authority [over the federal courts] to
regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction.”83 Section
3501 is valid law if the latter because supervisory rules are subject to ultimate control by Congress. But if the former, then Section 3501 runs
afoul of Marbury.
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that language from Miranda could
be found to support either view. The decisive factor demonstrating “that
Miranda is a constitutional decision,” however, “is that both Miranda and
two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state
courts.”84 Furthermore, the Court had consistently applied Miranda’s rule
to state courts thereafter, both on direct review and on habeas.85 Deeming
it “beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the
courts of the several States,”86 the majority felt compelled to conclude
“that Miranda is constitutionally based.”87 Congress, therefore, lacked
constitutional power to supersede it by legislation. Section 3501 was invalid.
Writing for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia dissented.
Whereas the majority essentially presumed that Miranda was legitimate
and then concluded, by process of eliminating the possibility that it was a
supervisory rule over the federal courts, that it must be a “constitutional
rule,” Justice Scalia worked from the ground up. The first question, he
said, was whether the Miranda warnings are true Marbury-shielded constitutional interpretation.

Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 287 (2000).
81
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 430.
82
Id. at 437.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 438.
85
Id. at 438, 439 n.3.
86
Id. at 438.
87
Id. at 440. In the Fourth Circuit, Judge Michael had made the same point in dissent.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 697 (Michael, J., dissenting in part). The panel majority, however, had
brushed it away with the observation that it raised “an interesting academic question.” Id. at
691 n.21.
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The Court today insists that the decision in Miranda is a “constitutional” one; that it has “constitutional underpinnings”; a “constitutional
basis” and a “constitutional origin”; that it was “constitutionally based”;
and that it announced a “constitutional rule.” It is fine to play these
word games; but what makes a decision “constitutional” in the only
sense relevant here—in the sense that renders it impervious to supersession by congressional legislation such as § 3501—is the determination that the Constitution requires the result that the decision an88
nounces and the statute ignores.

Justice Scalia concluded that the majority does not say that Miranda was
“constitutional” in that sense because they do not believe it.89 That, at
least, was a good thing, for “the decision in Miranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitution requires is preposterous.”90
If Miranda is not constitutional interpretation (even wrong constitutional interpretation), the next question is whether it is otherwise supportable. But if it is, Justice Scalia asserted, “the only thing that can possibly mean in the context of this case is that this Court has the power, not
merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful ‘prophylactic’ restrictions upon Congress and the States.”91
In response to the Straussian contention advanced by Dickerson and by
the United States “that there is nothing at all exceptional, much less unconstitutional, about the Court’s adopting prophylactic rules to buttress
constitutional rights, and enforcing them against Congress and the
States,”92 Justice Scalia concluded that it was both exceptional and unconstitutional: “That is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power,
and it does not exist.”93
Unfortunately, the majority did not engage Justice Scalia’s attack.94 After noting the dissent’s argument “that it is judicial overreaching for this
88

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90
Id. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 457 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia thereby goes further than did the Fourth
Circuit. Under his view, Miranda’s warnings requirement is not merely “overrulable” by statute, but invalid ab initio—at least as applied against the states.
94
This is a wholly unoriginal observation, one frequently expressed by those who applaud,
as well as by those who decry, the outcome in Dickerson. See, for example, most of the contributions to Symposium: Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law, 99 Mich.
L. Rev. 879–1247 (2001). Donald Dripps archly captured the frustration of many commentators: “Once the Court granted the petition in December of 1999, court-watchers knew the
89
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Court to hold Section 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the
Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that
nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements,” the majority rejoined lamely that they “need not go further than Miranda to decide this case.”95 Noting more candidly than the Fourth Circuit had done96
that Section 3501 merely reinstated the totality test for voluntariness that
Miranda had rejected as inadequate, the majority concluded that the
statute “cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.”97 And
whether Miranda is to remain the law presented, for the majority, simply
a question of stare decisis. “Whether or not we would agree with
Miranda’s reasoning and its resulting rule,” Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it
now.”98
But the force of stare decisis in this case is debatable. Agreeing with
the majority’s view that precedents are properly overruled when “interhour had come. At long last the Court would have to either repudiate Miranda, repudiate the
prophylactic-rule cases, or offer some ingenious reconciliation of the two lines of precedent.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, doesn’t “have to” do anything, as the decision in Dickerson once again reminds us.” Donald Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1, 33 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reticence was especially noteworthy because he had previously been among the most aggressive of the Justices in characterizing
Miranda as a prophylactic rule. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993);
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989);
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638–41
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653–54, 657 (1984);
Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers on application for
stay); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
95
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
96
To be sure, the Fourth Circuit majority did frankly (and fairly) deem it “perfectly clear
that Congress enacted § 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and
restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court.” Dickerson, 530
F.3d at 686. But that court’s further assertions that “Congress did not completely abandon the
central holding of Miranda, i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,” id. at 686–87, and “that Congress . . .
acted in response to the Court’s invitation,” id. at 691, are hard to take seriously, as was the
court’s claimed inability to “say that Congress’s decision to eliminate the irrebuttable presumption created by Miranda lessens the protections afforded by the privilege.” Id. Indeed,
given the Fourth Circuit’s plain intimation that § 3501 was the product of a constitutionally
responsible Congress, I hope it not too parochial to note that “not a single constitutional law
professor or criminal law professor had been given an opportunity to testify [at the subcommittee hearings on the Crime Bill of which § 3501 was a part] on the wisdom or constitutionality of this proposal.” Kamisar, supra note 58, at 901. Whether this fact has any bearing on the
likely constitutionality of § 3501 I leave to the reader’s unbiased judgment.
97
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
98
Id.
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vening development of the law . . . ha[s] removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision,”99 Justice Scalia argued
that the insistence by Miranda’s progeny that Miranda was not constitutional interpretation worked precisely such a change.100 Furthermore, although Justice Scalia does not explicitly develop this argument, one implication of his interpretation of Miranda might present a more profound
challenge to the majority’s reliance on stare decisis. After all, Justice
Scalia had not merely challenged Miranda’s reasoning. He had insisted
that the Miranda Court had lacked constitutional power to announce its
rule (at least once the true nature of that rule as extraconstitutional is acknowledged). And if that Court had acted ultra vires, its rule might be
deemed invalid ab initio, rendering stare decisis analysis consequently inappropriate.101
99

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (cited by the majority in
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443).
100
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 462–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Grano, Confessions, supra
note 77, at 204–06. As Joseph Grano argues, the prophylactic interpretation of Miranda contradicts the many cases that have disclaimed supervisory authority over the state courts. Because the Court is therefore “in a position where it must choose between two lines of authority,” overruling Miranda is as consistent with stare decisis as is maintaining it. Id. at 206
(internal quotation omitted).
101
Justice Scalia does not develop this point as clearly as he might have. His argument with
respect to stare decisis seems to be essentially this: Because Miranda presented itself as
engaging in constitutional interpretation, not as crafting a prophylactic rule, that critical “conceptual underpinning” has been removed by the many progeny that recharacterized Miranda
in prophylactic as opposed to constitutional terms. Yet this is not wholly persuasive for at
least two reasons. First, the claim that Miranda itself purported to derive its rule regarding
warnings as an exercise of constitutional interpretation, as opposed to prophylactic rulemaking (loosely understood), is highly contestable. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
306 n.1 (1985) (contending that “[t]he Miranda Court itself recognized [the prophylactic character of its ruling] when it disclaimed any intent to create a ‘constitutional straitjacket’ and
invited Congress and the States to suggest ‘potential alternatives for protecting the privilege’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467). Indeed, in a slight concession, even Justice Scalia
describes that reading of Miranda as merely “the fairest reading,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 447
(Scalia, J., dissenting), not the explicit or unambiguous one. Second, it is far from clear that
Justice Scalia’s vision of what constitutes a requisite “conceptual underpinning” in the relevant sense is the right one. That is, even were the majority to concede that Miranda is most
fairly read as conceiving of itself as engaged in constitutional interpretation, it is not at all obvious why it should not frankly construe Miranda as announcing a prophylactic rule and then
afford it stare decisis deference on that rationale. This question cannot be answered without
elaborating the justifications for stare decisis in the first place.
Given these difficulties with what seems at first blush to be Justice Scalia’s reason for not
retaining Miranda as a matter of stare decisis, we might expect him to rely on additional arguments for overruling that case. Some predictable ones are that if Miranda is understood as
announcing a prophylactic rule either it cannot warrant stare decisis deference at all because
it is invalid as opposed to wrong, or that whatever stare decisis deference it can enjoy is over-
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For these reasons, the majority’s failure to address whether Miranda
engaged in a legitimate exercise of judicial power in the first instance is
profoundly frustrating. By ignoring Justice Scalia’s arguments, the majority leaves open a series of questions that would seem to demand an answer: Was Miranda a prophylactic rule or not? If so, what makes it legitimate? If not, why is it not a prophylactic rule? That is, once we strip
away the majority’s hazy references to the “constitutional dimension” or
“constitutional basis” for Miranda, what is the precise nature of the warnings requirement, and how does that differ from a prophylactic rule?
Most importantly, what makes this type of rule legitimate if a prophylactic rule is not (or may not be)?102 If, as Strauss had argued, prophylactic
rules are ubiquitous, the potential magnitude of these questions can
hardly be overemphasized. Yet not only was there no response in the
Court’s opinion, not a single member of the seven-Justice majority wrote
separately to rehabilitate prophylactic rules from Justice Scalia’s attack—
a striking silence given the much-noted penchant of modern Justices to
pen separate concurrences.103 Grano found his champion in Justice Scalia.
Why did Strauss find none? Could all seven Justices have thought Justice
Scalia’s condemnation of prophylactic rules not important enough to
warrant rebuttal? Or could they find nothing persuasive to say?104
ridden by the wrongness of that decision. In fact, arguments of this sort are suggested by Justice Scalia’s conclusion:
In imposing its Court-made code upon the States, the original [Miranda] opinion at
least asserted that it was demanded by the Constitution. Today’s decision does not pretend that it is—and yet still asserts the right to impose it against the will of the people’s
representatives in Congress. Far from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I
believe we cannot allow to remain on the books even a celebrated decision—especially
a celebrated decision—that has come to stand for the proposition that the Supreme
Court has power to impose extraconstitutional constraints upon Congress and the
States.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102
For a similar criticism leveled at the Court’s treatment of Miranda a quarter century ago,
see Stone, supra note 69, at 123 (noting that Tucker “deprived Miranda of a constitutional basis but did not explain what other basis for it there might be”).
103
See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 133,
147 (1990); Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and Judicial Incoherence, 55 Ohio St. L.J.
79, 124 nn.153–54 (1994); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of Concurrences by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 777 (1990).
104
Yale Kamisar suggests, without significant elaboration, that nobody wrote separately out
of concern that doing so would have caused a chain reaction “and the 7-2 majority would have
splintered badly.” Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . . , 99
Mich. L. Rev. 879, 893 (2001). It is not at all apparent, however, why the existence of a separate concurrence that advanced a Straussian argument for the legitimacy of prophylactic rules
would have undermined whatever reasons the other members of the majority must have had
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II. THE PROPHYLACTIC RULES DEBATE
To resolve questions regarding the prevalence and legitimacy of prophylactic rules we need, of course, a fair grasp on just what they are.105
But our need to nail down the meaning of prophylactic rules might provoke concern, for commentators have proposed a wealth of sometimes
widely divergent definitions.106 In fact, though, the variety of extant definitions should not trouble us, for we are not looking for the best definition, or the modal definition; we only need to know what a prophylactic
rule is in the minds of those—Justice Scalia and Professor Grano most
vocally—who employ the term with a normative edge. What makes a
judge-announced rule “prophylactic” in a sense that is supposed to render it illegitimate?
The core idea from Justice Scalia’s Dickerson v. United States dissent,
as well as from progeny of Miranda v. Arizona that had preceded
Dickerson,107 seems to have two components, a genus and a differentia.
First, a prophylactic rule is a judicial work product somehow distinguishable from judicial interpretation of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia

for joining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, even if some of them then felt compelled to
write a concurrence too. To be sure, the Chief Justice, along with Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy, might have agreed in large measure with Justices Scalia and Thomas, and voted as
they did for essentially pragmatic reasons. Justice Ginsburg’s silence might be explained at
least in part by a prejudice against concurrence-writing. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1191 (1992) (criticizing “too frequent
resort to separate opinions”). And Justice Stevens had previously denied that the Court had
authority to announce prophylactic rules. See supra text accompanying note 68. The heart of
the question thus becomes why neither Justice Souter nor Justice Breyer took Justice Scalia’s
bait. One possibility (suggested by Professor Kamisar in a personal communication) is that a
concurrence defending prophylactic rules might have provoked others in the majority to have
foregrounded what Rehnquist’s opinion left in the background, namely that although § 3501
was invalid, Congress remained free to propose other alternatives to the specific warning requirement.
105
I am speaking here only of definitions of prophylactic rules as they function in constitutional adjudication. Many commentators recognize that the phrase or close synonyms are
used in a wide variety of ways in other contexts.
106
For one extraordinarily expansive definition of the term, see Michael Abramowicz,
Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 43 (2001) (defining a prophylactic rule as “a
rule of law beyond what the text of the Constitution explicitly requires”); see also id. at 8
(calling a rule prophylactic if it is “more expansive than what the Constitution would seem on
an original reading to say”). On this view, every judge-announced constitutional rule that
rests on interpretive modalities other than text—original meaning or intent, structure,
precedent, etc.—is a prophylactic rule. Plainly, most scholars do not use the term so broadly.
See infra note 115 (collecting more standard definitions). Still, this should convey a quick and
dirty sense of the wide range of ways the phrase is understood.
107
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 64–66.
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emphasized, a prophylactic rule is something other than “an explication
of what the Constitution requires.”108 Second, it is that sort of extraconstitutional rule that overenforces what the Constitution, as judicially interpreted, would itself require; it “expand[s]”109 or “sweeps more broadly
than”110 the constitutional constraints that do or would emerge from
straightforward judicial interpretation. Grano, the leading theorist among
Miranda’s critics,111 conveys this same two-part idea when explaining that
what “distinguishes a prophylactic rule from a true constitutional rule”112
is that “[a] prophylactic rule . . . is a court-created rule that can be violated without violating the Constitution itself”113 and “that functions as a
preventive safeguard to insure that constitutional violations will not occur.”114
This definition, or something much like it, appears widely in the scholarly literature on prophylactic rules,115 and is probably clear enough to
108

See supra text accompanying note 90.
See supra text accompanying note 91.
110
See supra text accompanying note 66.
111
Yale Kamisar, the preeminent academic defender of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, has lauded Grano’s work on Miranda as “brilliant,” and conceded that
Grano has made “a plausible doctrinal case against Miranda and a better case than anyone
else had made up to that time. A better case than I thought anyone could make.” Yale
Kamisar, Joe Grano: The “Kid from South Philly” Who Educated Us All, 46 Wayne L. Rev.
1231, 1255 (2000). For confirmation of Grano’s status among his fellow Miranda critics, see,
for example, Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 175 (1999); Paul G. Cassell, A Tribute to Joe Grano:
He Kept the Flame Alive, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1219 (2000); Michael Edmond O’Neill, Undoing
Miranda, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 185, 265 (2000).
112
Grano, supra note 70, at 105 & n.23.
113
Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 176–77.
114
Grano, supra note 70, at 105 & n.23.
115
See, e.g., 1 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 2.9(e), at 673–74 (2d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure] (defining prophylactic rule as a rule that
“does not announce a requirement mandated by the underlying constitutional provision, but a
requirement adopted in the Court’s exercise of its authority to draft remedies and procedures
that facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility”) (internal citation omitted); Evan H. Caminker,
Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 1 n.2 & 28 n.93
(2001) (defining the term—only to urge its retirement—“to refer to doctrinal rules selfconsciously crafted by courts for the instrumental purpose of improving the detection of
and/or otherwise safeguarding against the violation of constitutional norms”); Susan Klein,
Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1030, 1032 (2001) (“A ‘constitutional
prophylactic rule’ is a judicially-created doctrinal rule or legal requirement determined by the
Court as appropriate for deciding whether an explicit or ‘true’ federal constitutional rule is
applicable.”); Wayne R. LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A Matter of Style, 41 Syracuse L. Rev. 849, 856 (1990) [hereinafter LaFave, Constitutional Rules] (describing prophylactic rules as “procedural safeguards to protect a certain constitutional interest, even though
109
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most readers. Still, we will be enabled to more fully grasp the Straussian
defense of prophylactic rules against the Scalian critique if we pause to
situate this conception of prophylactic rules within more general explorations of the taxonomic or conceptual structure of constitutional doctrine.
A. Background: Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication
The “power of judicial review,” as Alexander Bickel described it, is the
judicial “authority to determine the meaning and application of a written
constitution.”116 From this conventional perspective,117 judicial review is
that interest is not inevitably compromised when the prescribed procedure is absent”); Brian
K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic
Rules, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 925, 926 (1999) (defining as prophylactic “risk-avoidance rules that
are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure
that the government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules”).
Despite variations in language, one constant among these definitions is plain: Prophylactic
rules issue, in some sense, from an exercise of judicial creativity distinguishable in character
from the courts’ familiar power to interpret the Constitution. That is, the definitions recognize
a distinction between “true constitutional rules” and “judicially-created doctrinal rules.” Beyond this core of agreement lie differences. The most conspicuous is that the LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure, supra, at 673–74, would apparently allow that a court-adopted rule could
“facilitate its adjudicatory responsibility,” hence qualifying as prophylactic, even if the consequence is a slight underenforcement of the rule’s “underlying constitutional provision,” accord
Strauss, supra note 38, at 207, whereas most other commentators believe that prophylactic
rules can overenforce the Constitution but not underenforce it. See, e.g., Landsberg, supra, at
927 (specifying that “prophylactic rules build a fence around the Constitution”). A second
variation is whether prophylactic rules can include deterrent remedies like the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. They can in Caminker’s definition, but not for Klein or Grano.
In Klein’s vocabulary, the exclusionary rule is an example not of a prophylactic rule, but of “a
‘constitutional incidental right,’ a judicially-created procedure determined by the Court as the
appropriate relief for the violation of an explicit or ‘true’ constitutional rule or a prophylactic
rule.” Klein, supra, at 1033; cf. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 1027 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a contingent consequence of the Constitution); Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule be Saved?, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 310 (1993) (developing Kaplan’s argument into a theory of “contingent constitutional obligations”).
116
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 1 (1962).
117
See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, Free in the World: American Slavery and Constitutional
Failure 89 (1998) (describing judicial review as the process through which courts “identify law,
interpret it, apply it to facts presented in cases, and offer reasons for the result in a case”);
Shelly L. Dowling & Mary C. Custy, The Jurisprudence of United States Constitutional Interpretation: An Annotated Bibliography 3 (1999) (labeling the process of American constitutionalism “the jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation”); Kermit L. Hall, The Supreme
Court and Judicial Review in American History 1 (1985) (“Judicial review is the practice by
which the Supreme Court scrutinizes state and federal legislation and the acts of state and
federal executive officers and courts in order to determine whether they are in conflict with
the Constitution.”); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 213 (3d ed. 2000) (defining judicial review as “the power of federal courts independently to interpret and apply the
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essentially a two-step process: First, a court interprets the Constitution;
second, it applies that interpretation to the facts of the case to reach a
constitutional holding.118 Thus, for example, the Supreme Court (1) interprets Article I, Section 8 to provide that Congress has constitutional authority to regulate intrastate activity if it would be rational to believe that
the activity, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce,
and then (2) applies that rule by determining whether Congress could rationally conclude that the farming of wheat for personal consumption has
the requisite effect.119 Or, the Court (1) interprets the Equal Protection
Clause to forbid departures from only a certain sort of formal equality,
and then (2) applies that understanding to hold (a) that a Louisiana statute requiring railroad companies to provide “equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races” affords such equal protec-

Constitution”). It is characteristic of the extent to which this image has seeped unexamined
into our consciousness, I think, that a book subtitled The Supreme Court and the Process of
Adjudication would be titled Interpreting the Constitution as though the Supreme Court’s role
in the process of constitutional adjudication is just one of interpretation. Harry H. Wellington,
Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication (1990).
118
This description of judicial review is agnostic with respect to a host of corollary matters
(often intertwined) such as how much deference courts should give the interpretive judgments
reached by the coordinate branches of the federal government or by the states, and whether
constitutional judgments announced by the courts (deferential or not) should be understood
to bind these other governmental actors. The literature on these issues—under headings like
“extrajudicial constitutional interpretation” and “judicial supremacy”—is already vast and, in
this year of Marbury’s bicentennial, seemingly growing by the day. For one recent contribution that usefully summarizes some of the debates, see Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773 (2002).
These are normative questions. In the past fifteen years, historians have made substantial
progress on the related question of how our present understanding of judicial review compares to the conception of the power as announced in Marbury. Path-breaking works were
Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (1989) and Sylvia Snowiss,
Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (1990). As Michael Klarman helpfully summarizes:
[T]he judicial review power first exercised by the Supreme Court in Marbury was far
more restricted in scope than is our modern understanding of the practice. Most people
who contemplated judicial review in the early years of the republic understood it to be
cabined by two important qualifications. Courts were empowered to strike down only
“clearly unconstitutional” laws; if reasonable people could differ, courts had to sustain
the statute. Moreover, courts could invalidate only those laws that fell within the special
purview of the judiciary—for example, a law restricting access to jury trials—and not
any old piece of legislation.
Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev.
1111, 1120–21 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
119
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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tion,120 or (b) that Texas’s establishment of separate all-white and allblack law schools does not.121
Of course, the actual practice of constitutional adjudication is far more
complicated than this austere view contemplates.122 For one thing, the
proverbial Martian could not make full sense of our practice without
some understanding of the relevant institutional and socio-legal context—matters like the organization of the federal judiciary and the special role of the Supreme Court, the politics of judicial nomination, and
Congress’s influence, actual and latent, on federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, and of much greater relevance for the present study, courts employ
a very large number of rules, principles, and customs when actually carrying out constitutional adjudication. Matters that function internal to the
adjudicatory practice include the accepted methods of constitutional interpretation, the principle of stare decisis, the rules of justiciability and
certiorari, canons of constitutional avoidance, customs to resolve decisional paradoxes that can arise on multimember bodies, a court’s authority to remedy what it determines to be constitutional violations, and
surely much more besides. All this is meaningfully part of the “practice”
or “institution” of judicial review.
This Article is not the place to attempt to catalogue all relevant features of the practice, let alone to model their workings.123 Here I should
like only to emphasize the single most conspicuous respect in which the
actual practice of judicial review, or the actual structure of constitutional
adjudication, has been claimed to be more complicated than the two-step
model suggests. According to this view, the conventional picture ignores

120

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
122
Gadamerians might object that the actual structure is less complicated insofar as
“[u]nderstanding . . . is always application.” Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 275
(Garnett Barden & John Cumming eds., Sheed and Ward trans., The Seabury Press 1975)
(1965). True, to understand what a provision means is to understand how it would apply to at
least some hypothetical set of facts. It is not, however, to understand how it applies in the actual factual circumstances of the given case. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, We the People: the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court 34–35 (1999). Interestingly, for jurists from
Justice Holmes to Judge Posner who emphasize a judge’s tendency to intuit the “right” result
before intuiting the legal rule under which that result falls, the converse might seem more
nearly true: Application is always understanding.
123
The literature on such matters as those mentioned in the previous paragraph are too large
and diverse to justify citation to representative contributions. For one recent discussion that
ambitiously canvasses a large number of the features relevant to the practice of judicial review, see, Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Foreword: A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 (2002).
121
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that the application of constitutional meaning to the facts of a given “case
or controversy” is often mediated by judge-made tests of constitutional
law that are not most fairly understood as themselves products of judicial
constitutional interpretation. For many years, this claim was perhaps
most widely associated with Monaghan’s distinction between “Marburyshielded constitutional exegesis” and “constitutional common law.”124 But
it appears as well in Sager’s demonstration that, in lieu of applying what
they take as the interpreted meaning of constitutional norms, courts often
interpose judge-announced “institutional constructs” that do not fully enforce those presumed norms.125 More recently, Fallon has developed a detailed critique of the simple two-step model of constitutional adjudication
in urging judges and commentators to think of judicial review in terms of
constitutional “implementation” because “‘implementation’ is a more
aptly encompassing term than ‘interpretation,’ capable of subsuming two
conceptually distinctive functions: one of identifying constitutional norms
and specifying their meaning and another of crafting doctrine or developing standards of review.”126
124

See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 31.
I think that the distinction between judge-created constitutional tests and judgeinterpreted constitutional meaning may be more easily missed in Sager’s work than in Monaghan’s because of the many subtle distinctions that Sager introduces—distinctions between
“constitutional norms” and “constitutional rules,” concepts and conceptions, “analytical constructs” and “institutional constructs.” His core insight, though, is that constitutional norms
(concepts) get worked out during adjudication into court-announced constructs (rules or conceptions), which are of two different sorts: analytical (“based upon an understanding of the
concept itself”) and institutional (“based upon questions of propriety or capacity”). Sager, supra note 5, at 1217–18. Although a cursory reading might suggest that these are simply alternative ways to implement the constitutional norm, it is more perspicuous, I believe, to view
analytical constructs as always logically prior to institutional ones. That is, even if the judicially announced constitutional doctrine consists of an institutional construct, not an analytical
one, that institutional construct is based on at least an implicit understanding of the analytical
construct—what, in the court’s view, the constitutional norm means. Thus, when Sager refers
to the underenforcement of constitutional norms, he does not mean to include those judgeannounced analytical constructs that underenforce the “true” or ideally understood constitutional norms; he refers only to those judge-announced institutional constructs that underenforce the (perhaps implicit) judicial view of the constitutional norm, i.e., the (actual or hypothetical) judge-announced analytical construct. Were the case otherwise, the
underenforcement thesis would be far less novel and important than it is, for it would amount,
in large measure, to the prosaic argument that non-judicial actors should adhere to their own
interpretation of the Constitution when they conclude that the courts’ interpretation is too
generous to state power. See infra note 133.
126
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 38. Although, as here, Fallon
usually defines constitutional doctrine in contradistinction to constitutional meaning, in places
he seems to employ the phrase in the broader sense we have been using thus far, as signifying
the universe of judicial outputs broad enough to include meaning. See id. at 41 (defining
125
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It would be mistaken to suppose that Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon
were endeavoring to communicate the very same vision, just with different words. Still, a detailed study of the similarities and differences among
these three accounts of the constitutional adjudicatory practice ought not
detain us. The essential point at present is that each would break down
the broad and otherwise undifferentiated mass of judge-announced constitutional law into two conceptually distinct components—constitutional
interpretation and constitutional common law, or analytical constructs
and institutional constructs, or constitutional meaning and constitutional
doctrine.
In an effort to keep attention fixed on the commonality uniting these
accounts—that there exists a conceptual distinction between two sorts of
judicial work product each of which is integral to the functioning of constitutional adjudication—and not on the singularity of any one,127 let us
not adopt whole hog the particular vocabulary advanced by any one these
theorists. Instead, let us distinguish between “constitutional meanings”
and “constitutional rules,” where meanings and rules are two different
types of “constitutional doctrine.”128 That is to say, judge-announced con“constitutional doctrine . . . to embrace not only the holdings of cases, but also the analytical
frameworks and tests that precedents establish”) (internal citation omitted).
127
Not only might it hamper appreciation of the unifying thread to privilege language that
readers are apt to strongly associate with just one or another of these visions, but there are
independent reasons to be dissatisfied with the nomenclature just offered. I explore some of
these considerations in the next footnote.
128
Insofar as Sager would split the universe of constitutional doctrine into “norms” and
“rules” of constitutional law, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Symposium: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (1985), and Fallon distinguishes between
“constitutional meaning” and “constitutional doctrine,” see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 38, my proposed nomenclature is a compromise between the two. In
my view, “constitutional meanings” is a more auspicious term than is “constitutional norms”
for the first judicial output because the notion of “constitutional norms” might imply those
norms of political morality that the Constitution endorses, and thus would be an ingredient of
the constitutional meaning, not the judge-determined meaning itself. Take, for example, Article II’s dictate that no person is eligible to be President “who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty five Years.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Were the Court to determine that a
challenge to the election of a thirty-year-old was justiciable, and then to declare the candidate
ineligible on the ground that she had not “attained to the Age of thirty five Years,” it would
be applying straightforward constitutional “meaning.” Yet Sager’s norm/rule distinction might
treat this as the application of a constitutional “rule” designed to effectuate an underlying
“norm” that Presidents should have a requisite degree of maturity and life experience. Put
another way, the norm/rule distinction might suggest that the relevant distinction to be drawn
distinguishes between what is, and what is not, “law” in some meaningful sense: The judgecreated constitutional “rule” fashions a constitutional “norm” of political morality into recognizable law. But this is not the distinction that I mean to capture.
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stitutional doctrine (what most lawyers have in mind when they speak of
“constitutional law”) consists of judge-interpreted constitutional meanings supplemented or supplanted by judge-made constitutional rules.
Conspicuous (and oft-commented upon) illustrations of the latter are
likely to include the complex tiers of First Amendment and Equal Protection jurisprudence, the Miranda rule, and Roe v. Wade’s trimester framework. But, as many scholars have observed, constitutional rules in this
sense are ubiquitous.129 Of course, this is a positive claim that need not
concede their legitimacy.
Merely recognizing the mediating function that constitutional rules
play between the logically prior judicial announcement of constitutional
meaning and the logically subsequent application of law to facts suggests
the following schematic vision of the practice: A court interprets the
I prefer “constitutional rule” to Fallon’s use of “constitutional doctrine” as a label for the
second output because, as noted earlier, see supra note 3, the phrase “constitutional doctrine”
is already in broad use to signify the entire range of judicial work products that operate in the
practice of constitutional adjudication. In short, what Fallon calls “constitutional doctrine” to
be distinguished from “constitutional meaning,” and to refer to a specific step in the conceptual logic of constitutional adjudication, is only one element of what most scholars think of as
“constitutional doctrine.” Indeed, common parlance is plainly on the side of a broader usage.
A reference, say, to “existing free exercise doctrine” is not, customarily, intended or taken as
prejudging whether the rules of constitutional law that currently govern the Free Exercise
Clause are better classified as “doctrine” as opposed to (mere) “constitutional meaning.” Although it is familiar enough to use the same term to refer both to a given genus and to one
species within that genus (as just noted, rules are sometimes subdivided into rules and standards), taxonomic synecdoche of this sort predictably invites confusion and therefore should
not be adopted complacently.
I have eschewed Monaghan’s vocabulary. “Constitutional common law” is, for one thing,
cumbersome. More importantly, Monaghan treats it as “subject to amendment, modification,
or even reversal by Congress” by definition. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 3; see also, e.g., id. at
31 (distinguishing between “Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis and congressionally reversible constitutional law”). This vision of what is necessarily entailed by the “common law”
appellation resonates broadly. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment codified a “common law” conception of state
sovereign immunity and therefore is necessarily subject to congressional override). But, as a
necessary characteristic of what I will call “constitutional rules,” that is something I very much
wish to deny. See infra Section IV.A.2.c; see also, e.g., Sager, supra, at 966 n.19 (arguing that
judicially recognized strategic rights are “products of a pervasive, legitimate aspect of federal
constitutional decisionmaking,” which should not be wholly subordinated to the legislature).
For similar reasons, I refrain from calling the outputs that I have labeled “meanings” and
“rules,” respectively, “constitutional law” and extraconstitutional or subconstitutional law.
Each of the latter terms might be read to connote (as Monaghan assumed) defeasibility by
Congress. Additionally, they might be thought to imply eliminability whereas Fallon, at least,
is keen to insist that the construction of what he calls “constitutional doctrine” is as essential a
part of judicial review, as is the divination of “constitutional meaning.”
129
In addition to the authorities discussed, see, for example, Fried, supra note 3.
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Constitution to yield a (judicial) statement of constitutional meaning, on
the back of which it may construct a constitutional rule, which rule it then
applies to the facts to yield a constitutional holding, by which I mean,
quintessentially, a declaration that challenged governmental conduct is,
or is not, constitutionally permissible.130 In this picture, two distinct judicial outputs function logically prior to the announcement of holdings:
constitutional meanings and constitutional rules.131 This is contrasted with
the simple model in which there exists only a single mediating output.
(See Figure 1.)

130

See also Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 199, 199–200 (1971) (suggesting a similar image).
131
Following standard conventions, the ovals represent the starting and ending points, rectangles represent processes, and parallelograms represent the intermediate outputs.
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The Logical Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: Two Models
(Figure 1)
The Simple Model

The Complex Model
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B. Prophylactic Rules and Overprotection
Many questions and challenges can be raised against this more complex model, but as it is not my goal to defend it, we need not address
them now. A rough picture is sufficient for our purpose.132 If this image is
approximately correct, then “prophylactic rules” (as conceived of by
most scholars) reside among what we have designated “constitutional
rules.” This is what Grano means in claiming that they are “courtcreated,” not “true constitutional rules.”133 “Prophylactic rules” and “constitutional rules” are not simply synonyms, however. If we can speak sensibly about the extensional relation that obtains between any given constitutional rule and its supporting or generating (court-interpreted)
constitutional meaning,134 three sorts of relationships can exist: (1) the
constitutional rule can overenforce meaning; (2) it can underenforce
meaning; and (3) it can overenforce in some parts while underenforcing
in others.135 (See Figure 2.)
132

That purpose, to reiterate, is to appreciate as fully as possible the contending positions in
the debate over the legitimacy of prophylactic rules. To preview what is to come, I will argue
that our collective understanding of the nature and (il)legitimacy of prophylactic rules is infirm because neither the simple two-step model of judicial review nor the more complex
three-step model—as currently conceived—faithfully captures the logic of constitutional adjudication.
133
Surely Grano misspeaks when distinguishing violations of a prophylactic rule from violations of “the Constitution itself.” See supra text accompanying note 113. Any rule of constitutional law can be violated without violating the Constitution itself insofar as the rule can mistakenly interpret a constitutional restraint on state power more broadly than a “correct” (or
better) interpretation would warrant. See, e.g., Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 184. By
distinguishing “constitutional rules” from “the Constitution,” we see that Grano must mean
that prophylactic rules can be violated without one’s having violated the Constitution as judicially interpreted (even if that interpretation is only implicit). Translated into our stipulated
vocabulary, Grano and Justice Scalia are condemning, as “prophylactic,” those “constitutional
rules” that overenforce judge-interpreted constitutional meanings.
134
One of the insights gained from carving doctrine into operative propositions and decision
rules is that this predicate (that it makes sense to think in terms of extensional relationships)
is more vexed than the standard conceptualizations of constitutional doctrine would suggest.
As a consequence, determining whether given doctrine overprotects what the Court takes the
Constitution to mean is often more complicated than contributors to the prophylaxis literature have appreciated. See infra Section V.B.
135
Actually, five relationships are theoretically possible. In the fourth, all that the rule prohibits the Constitution (as interpreted) allows, and all that the Constitution (as interpreted)
prohibits, the rule allows. In the fifth, the constitutional rule and the constitutional meaning
are perfectly coextensive. Both of these possibilities, however, are of only theoretical interest.
When a constitutional rule and its corresponding constitutional meaning share no content at
all it is hard to see in what sense the governing rule could be classified as constitutional doctrine at all. When rule and meaning are extensionally identical, they qualify as different things
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Extensional Relationships Between Constitutional Rule and Constitutional Meaning
(Figure 2136)
(1)

Meaning

(2)

Rule

Meaning

Rule

(3)

Meaning

Rule

only where their intensional meanings differ, which, in this context, is not likely to be a real
prospect.
136
Different but analogous representations appear in Klein, supra note 115, at 1079–80.
Also, for roughly comparable arguments about the ways that remedies can overenforce or
underenforce a right, see Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 279–89 (3d ed.
2002); David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing
the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 627 (1988).
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It is definitional of prophylactic rules—at least for Grano and Justice
Scalia—that they overenforce judge-determined constitutional meaning.137 As far as the three images contained in Figure 2 are concerned,
then, only image (1) represents a prophylactic rule.138 (Let us say that image (2) depicts an “underenforcement rule”139 and image (3) an “overlapping rule.”)
C. Prophylactic Rules Defended (or Denied)
To this point we have expended some effort clarifying what, in the estimation of their critics, prophylactic rules are, without yet exploring what

137

See, e.g., Grano, supra note 70, at 104 (“While prophylactic rules also may be intended, at
least in part, to prevent future constitutional violations, they result in suppression of evidence
or appellate reversal even when the Constitution has not actually been violated. By contrast,
deterrent remedies, such as the exclusionary rule, apply only after an actual constitutional violation has occurred.”) (internal citation omitted). As noted earlier, see supra note 115,
Grano’s claim that it is definitional of prophylactic rules that they have this particular extensional relationship to what courts view as the true constitutional rule is not as widely accepted
as is the proposition that prophylactic rules are something other than judge-interpreted constitutional meaning.
138
Paul Cassell contends that “[r]ules required by the Constitution, and rules beyond those
required by the Constitution together exhaust the universe of rules.” Paul G. Cassell, The
Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 898, 906
(2001). This proposition is correct, if “beyond those required by the Constitution” means
merely “other than those required by the Constitution.” But an alternative reading would take
“beyond” to refer to the rule’s extensional scope. Indeed, that is the reading Cassell seems to
have in mind, as he distinguishes rules required by the Constitution from rules that afford
“protection beyond what the Constitution requires.” Id. at 905. Rules required by the Constitution and rules that overprotect what is required by the Constitution do not exhaust the universe of rules. As Sager taught a quarter century ago, courts also create rules that underprotect what is required by the Constitution. Sager, supra note 5.
139
Scholars have proposed varying language for this sort of constitutional doctrine. Stephen
Schulhofer calls it a “reverse prophylactic rule[],” Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 449 (1987), a construction that has some undeniable merit
but unfortunately privileges overprotection relative to underprotection, and also implies that
constitutional rules are of only two sorts, not three. Susan Klein calls it a “safe harbor” rule.
Klein, supra note 115. This terminology has value too. I think it is potentially misleading,
though, insofar as it implies not only that there exists a particular extensional relationship between constitutional rule and constitutional meaning but also that that relationship was
adopted for a particular purpose. It may connote, that is, that the doctrine was adopted for
what I have termed “preventive” considerations. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. (Of course, calling the reverse of this sort of rule “prophylactic” instead of “overinclusive” or “overenforcement” might bear a similar connotation—in this case, that the rule was adopted for “deterrent” purposes. See infra Section IV.A.2.a. So even if “safe harbor rule” is less apt than
“underenforcement rule,” it is arguably on closer par with “prophylactic rule.”) In any event,
given the importance and widespread familiarity of Sager’s “underenforcement” vocabulary,
“underenforcement rule” seems especially appropriate.
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is supposed to make them illegitimate. Most generally, the question will
be whether it is the fact of overprotection itself that is thought to render
them illegitimate (in which case underenforcing constitutional rules
would be legitimate and overlapping constitutional rules might be too)
or, alternatively, whether their illegitimacy is just entailed by the supposed illegitimacy of all constitutional rules.140 Let us bracket this question, though, and turn attention instead to the arguments of those who
defend prophylactic rules, most notably David Strauss. If Strauss’s view
of prophylactic rules mirrored that of his opponents, the ubiquity thesis
must be that constitutional doctrine consists in substantial part of constitutional rules that overenforce judge-interpreted constitutional meaning.
In fact, though, that is not his claim. And to understand why it is not will
be to see what is most centrally at issue in the dispute over prophylactic
rules.
As the graphic representation of the complex model of constitutional
adjudication in Figure 1 indicates, the difference between constitutional
rules (of which prophylactic rules are one variety) and constitutional
meanings rests upon differences in the modes of production. Judgeinterpreted constitutional meaning is a product of “constitutional interpretation,” whereas constitutional rules are the product of “constitutional
rule-making.” The labels, of course, are unimportant.141 What is impor140

It seems late in the day to contend that constitutional rules are categorically illegitimate,
that constitutional adjudication must always apply constitutional meaning unmediated to the
facts of the case to reach a holding. In any event, if Justice Scalia means to denounce constitutional rules full stop, we can fairly demand a more sustained and straightforward argument
against it than is supplied merely by inferences from his rejection of prophylactic rules alone.
If Justice Scalia is not willing to declare illegitimate all judge-announced constitutional doctrine that is nonidentical to judicially interpreted constitutional meaning, perhaps his blanket
denunciation of prophylactic rules is predicated on the view that doctrine must always underenforce meaning. As applied to doctrine implementing individual rights, this position systematically favors majoritarianism over individual liberty. It says, for example, that the Court may
underenforce the rights of speech, or religious exercise or equal protection, but may not overenforce them—even though such underenforcement doctrines are at least as illiberal as prophylactic rules are antidemocratic. This is peculiar. Furthermore, the hypothetical proposition
that underenforcement rules are permissible while prophylactic rules are not becomes even
more puzzling when applied to paradigmatically structural provisions governing the allocation
of powers between state governments and the federal government or between Congress and
the President. What neutral, constitutionally mandated principle would produce the asymmetry that the federal judiciary may underenforce limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, but
not overenforce them?
141
Indeed, what Figure 1 designates as constitutional interpretation may be even more faithfully understood as consisting of discrete subprocesses, a claim suggested, for example, by
Keith Whittington’s recent contrast between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction.” See generally Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

42

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 90:1

tant, at least in Strauss’s account, is that the existence of two conceptually
distinct outputs—which, recall, is a logically necessary predicate for there
being such things as “prophylactic rules” in the normatively loaded sense
endorsed by Grano and Justice Scalia—depends upon there existing conceptually distinct processes of output-creation.142 That is, the processes
that our diagram (arbitrarily) labels “interpretation” and “rule-making”
must themselves be distinguishable. But, Strauss argues, this distinction is
false: “[I]n deciding constitutional cases, the courts constantly consider
institutional capacities and propensities. That is, to a large extent, what
constitutional law consists of: courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant
constitutional provisions and institutional realities.”143 If the processes of
interpretation and its putative sibling are indistinguishable, the argument
appears to run, it is meaningless to distinguish judge-interpreted constituPowers and Constitutional Meaning (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional Construction]; Keith Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999) [hereinafter Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation]; cf.
Chester James Antieau, Constitutional Construction xxiii (1982) (defining “construction . . . to
embrace both the task of ascertaining meaning of words employed by those responsible for
the constitutions, and the far larger and more important duty of assigning the appropriate legal significances to clauses and words used in the basic laws”). As Whittington puts it:
Although the clauses and structures that make up the [constitutional] text cannot be
simply empty of meaning, . . . the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules. This is not so
much a problem of a given clause possessing absolutely no judicially formalizable meaning as it is the inability of the judiciary to define exhaustively the meaning of the text.
Regardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of certain aspects of the Constitution,
there will remain an impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered.
The judiciary may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the possibilities, but
after all judgments have been rendered specifying discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain. The specification of a single governing meaning from these
possibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation. . . . This additional step
is the construction of meaning.
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra, at 7. For Whittington, then, construction is
a second step in the identification of what I term “meaning”: Construction specifies a particular meaning from among the range of possibilities that other forms of interpretation have left
available. For a broadly similar argument, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (2003) (discussing founding-era expectations that subsequent interpretations would “fix” the meaning of vague or ambiguous constitutional provisions).
142
But see Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 41 (contending that it is
“misleading to suggest that the Court’s function consists exclusively in the search for constitutional ‘meaning,’” but observing as well that his “central claims . . . could be accepted even by
someone whose conception of ‘interpretation’ was broad enough to subsume the varied elements of what I call ‘implementation’”).
143
Strauss, supra note 38, at 207.
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tional meanings and judge-created constitutional rules because the very
same sorts of pragmatic, institution-sensitive considerations are always
potentially at work. In sum, Strauss rebuts the charge that prophylactic
rules like the Miranda doctrine are illegitimate by denying the underlying
premise that there exist two analytically discrete outputs. Prophylactic
rules are ubiquitous, he says, not because court-announced doctrine consists of lots of outputs that overprotect court-interpreted constitutional
meaning, but because there is only one sort of output—“constitutional
doctrine”—much of which has the same “prophylactic” relationship to
“the real, noumenal Constitution”144 as does Miranda.145 Viewed in this

144

Id. at 207–08.
Michael Dorf and Barry Friedman misunderstand Strauss’s analysis when they describe
his position on prophylactic rules as an effort “to understand Miranda in . . . subconstitutional
terms.” Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 61, 64–65 (2001). Instead, they argue, “[T]he case can be explained equally effectively without raising the legitimacy concerns that prophylaxis and constitutional common law
trigger: Miranda can be justified purely in terms of the Court’s incontestable power to interpret the Constitution.” Id. Perhaps so. But this is not an alternative to Strauss’s argument; it is
Strauss’s argument. Or, to put the point another way, Dorf and Friedman err when criticizing
Strauss on the grounds “that the analytic value of the concept of prophylaxis is limited because ultimately it asks the wrong question.” Id. at 75. The question the concept of prophylaxis asks, Dorf and Friedman think, is “how to justify judicial rulings that go beyond what the
text and history of the Constitution strictly require.” Id. at 75–76. And that is mistaken, they
maintain, because “[i]n a post-Realist world, there is no shortage of justifications for courts
making law.” Id. at 76. Yet this, of course, was precisely Strauss’s point. Recall that Strauss
did not originate prophylaxis talk; he responded to it. And his response, in essence, was that
the vocabulary, along with the normative claims that rode upon it, foundered on the mistaken
assumption that there existed any meaningful category of nonprophylactic constitutional interpretation.
Dorf and Friedman may have been misled by Strauss’s 1996 article “Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,” supra note 3, which is, in an important sense, a companion piece to
“The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,” supra note 38. One might anticipate, given the similarity in titles, that Strauss would be arguing along the lines set out by Monaghan twenty years
earlier in “Constitutional Common Law,” supra note 4. If so, one would be mistaken. Strauss
appropriated the phrase “constitutional common law” to signify, not a particular output in the
logical structure of constitutional adjudication (as Monaghan had used the term), but rather a
method of deriving those outputs. As he explains it, common law constitutional interpretation
is the process of deriving constitutional meaning not “from some authoritative source,” but
“instead in understandings that evolve over time,” especially in the steady accretion of judicial
precedent. Strauss, supra note 3, at 879. Strauss very rarely uses the phrase “constitutional
common law” to describe either his favored interpretive method or the body of law it produces, opting instead for such formulations as “common law constitutional interpretation,”
“the common law approach to constitutional interpretation,” and “common law constitutionalism.” See id.
145
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light, then, Strauss’s contention is not so much that prophylactic rules (in
Grano’s sense) are ubiquitous, but that they are nonexistent.146
Daryl Levinson pressed this Straussian argument with vigor in a highly
regarded recent article, criticizing what, he dubbed “rights essentialism,”
and identified as the dominant vision of constitutional adjudication. “The
rights-essentialist picture, in which courts begin with the pure, Platonic
ideal of a constitutional right and only then pragmatically apply the right
through the vehicles of implementation and remediation, bears little resemblance to the actual practice of rights-construction,” Levinson argued.147 The attempt to carve constitutional doctrine into (what I have labeled) constitutional meanings and constitutional rules “assume[s] that
constitutional rights have ‘true’ scopes which, while often lost in the undifferentiated judicial doctrine that courts produce in the course of deciding actual cases, comprise what the Constitution really means, as opposed
to how it is used in constitutional adjudication.”148 This, he contends, is
just wrong. “Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”149
The truth—“remedial equilibration”—is that “constitutional rights are
inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns. Constitutional

146

Revealingly, Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent relies on just the distinction that Strauss
denies when responding to examples marshaled in the government’s brief offered to support
the ubiquity thesis. Translated into our vocabulary, his argument, in effect, is that many of
these purported prophylactic rules are really examples of judge-announced constitutional
meanings that are prophylactic relative to their animating norms of political morality, not
constitutional rules that are prophylactic relative to constitutional meanings. See, e.g.,
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that in various First Amendment
contexts, “the Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee that protected speech is not
‘chilled’ and thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive
rules a ‘measure of strategic protection,’” but explaining “that is because the Court has
viewed the importation of ‘chill’ as itself a violation of the First Amendment—not because the
Court thought it could go beyond what the First Amendment demanded in order to provide
some prophylaxis”); see also, e.g., Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77,
at 189 (arguing “the first amendment may prohibit standardless licensing discretion not as an
evil in itself but because of a concern that such discretion too easily will permit license denials
for the ‘wrong’ reasons”). Perhaps because Strauss resists dividing constitutional doctrine into
conceptually distinct sorts—what I have thus far called “constitutional meanings” and “constitutional rules”—he appears in a post-Dickerson article not fully to appreciate Justice Scalia’s
argument. See David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 Mich. L. Rev.
958, 965–66 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress].
147
Levinson, supra note 27, at 873. But see id. at 861 n.9 (“The ‘essentialism’ in rights essentialism alludes to the qualitative distinction between rights and remedies, not to any claim that
rights are objective, ahistorical Platonic Forms.”).
148
Id. at 869–70.
149
Id. at 858.
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adjudication is functional not just at the level of remedies, but all the way
up.”150
Do not fixate on the right/remedy vocabulary. It takes no imagination
to translate Levinson’s argument to the supposed distinction between
constitutional meanings and constitutional rules,151 for rights in Levinson’s
view just are those things that are supposed to reside in constitutional
meaning, “while remedies are consigned to the banausic sphere of policy,
pragmatism, and politics”152—the sphere of constitutional rule-making. In
short, Levinson is advancing a two-part claim: first, that the distinction
between judge-determined “constitutional meanings” and judge-made
“constitutional rules” has become dominant in constitutional theory; and
second, that the distinction is misguided because it assumes that pragmatic judgments about how meaning can be implemented most effectively in the real world are not inescapably part of constitutional interpretation, and thus can be relegated or reserved to a conceptually distinct,
logically subsequent, or less valued, dimension.
Strauss and Levinson are not, I want to make clear, isolated voices.153
They represent a phalanx of scholars challenging the effort to subdivide
“constitutional doctrine” along conceptual lines. Indeed, the challenge
had been mounted even prior to “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,”
in forceful works questioning the coherence of Monaghan’s distinction
between constitutional exegesis and constitutional common law.154 It also
150

Id. at 873.
See id. at 860 (identifying Monaghan’s theory of constitutional common law and Sager’s
underenforcement analysis as leading examples of rights-essentialism); id. at 866–70 (discussing Monaghan and Sager in more detail).
152
Id. at 857.
153
For further confirmation of the tight link between them, however, see id. at 904 (“Constitutional doctrine, in order to have any useful meaning in governing the primary behavior of
government, must be more rule-like than any of the most abstract standards that might be put
forward as the basic principle of any given constitutional right. Consequently, like all legal
rules (as opposed to standards), constitutional law will be both overinclusive (i.e., prophylactic) and underinclusive relative to an ultimate purpose. The degree of over- and underinclusiveness of any given constitutional rule will depend on such factors as the administrability
and expense of a more precise rule and the error costs of false negatives and false positives.
Nothing in the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, and no amount of philosophizing
about values or principles, will help courts to balance such remedial concerns. Yet every constitutional rule takes account of them.”).
154
The leading examples, appearing a year apart, were by Martha Field and Thomas Merrill.
See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev.
881, 890 (1986) (defining “federal common law” as “any rule of federal law created by a court
(usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments—constitutional or congressional”) (internal citation omitted); id.
at 892, 895 (acknowledging that “[s]ome will believe that the proposed definition is so broad
151
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undergirds Evan Caminker’s recommendation “that we jettison the
phrase ‘prophylactic rule’ from our vocabulary, because there really isn’t
any such thing as a distinctively prophylactic rule that is in any important
way distinguishable from the more run-of-the-mill doctrine that courts
routinely establish and implement regarding every constitutional
norm.”155 In language that could have been penned just as easily by
Strauss or Levinson, Caminker argued:
The terminology misleadingly suggests that so-called prophylactic rules
differ in kind from so-called “ordinary” doctrinal rules. But if the argument is that prophylactic rules are different because they rest on
some institutional judgments concerning the capacity of courts to enforce constitutional norms, rather than merely on some “pure” interpretation of those norms, this is just wrong—such institutional judg156
ments are precisely the stuff of which most constitutional law is made.

Rick Hills sought to capture this burgeoning attitude in a recent manifesto attacking what he calls “anti-Pragmatist” constitutional theory—
“any constitutional theory that rests on a dichotomy between ‘principle’
and ‘policy,’ where the former category is the locus of abstract armchair
reasoning about value and the latter is the site of messy, empirical analysis of causal relationships and instrumental rationality.”157 Notwithstanding the prevalence of anti-Pragmatism, Hills argues, “the most promising
legal scholarship since roughly the late 1980s has discredited” it.158 That
promising scholarship, as Hills describes it, starts with Strauss’s “Ubiquity
of Prophylactic Rules,” and reaches its apogee in Levinson’s “Rights Esas to make meaningless the whole concept of federal common law; it includes too much that is
clearly ‘just interpretation’”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1985) (cautioning against the “danger of assuming away important questions at the definitional stage,” while proposing to define “federal common law”
to “mean[] any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative
federal text” and acknowledging that, under this definition, “most modern constitutional law
is indistinguishable from what courts call federal common law”).
The Field and Merrill lines of argument should not be confused with those critiques of
Monaghan that accepted the conceptual distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional common law only to deny the latter’s legitimacy. See, e.g., Thomas S. Schrock
& Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117
(1978).
155
Evan H. Caminker, Lecture, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2001).
156
Id.
157
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcizing Anti-Pragmatism from Constitutional Theory 1 (Mar.
23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
158
Id. at 4.
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sentialism.”159 Surely the claimed distinction between judge-interpreted
constitutional meaning and judge-made constitutional rules lies at the
heart of anti-Pragmatist constitutional theory. If so, “[t]he most promising and important trend in constitutional theory over the last two decades,” writes Hills, has been to demonstrate that the distinction presents
“a false and incoherent picture of constitutional law.”160
The point, in short, is that the debate over prophylactic rules is parasitic upon a more fundamental contest over the logical structure of constitutional adjudication. The terms of the debate are ever-shifting: from
“constitutional common law” to “constitutional doctrine,” from norms
and rules to rights and remedies. No matter what the terminology,
though, the central question is whether it is meaningful to carve the universe of constitutional doctrine into conceptually distinct pieces. It is a
debate that pits “Taxonomists” (like Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon) who
advocate something like the “complex” model of constitutional adjudication against “Pragmatists”161 (like Strauss, Levinson, Caminker, and Hills)
who insist that constitutional adjudication is instrumental “all the way
162
up.”
III. A DIFFERENT WAY TO DIVIDE THE TERRAIN:
CARVING DOCTRINE INTO OPERATIVE PROPOSITIONS
AND DECISION RULES
The instant question (keeping, for the moment, the debate over “prophylactic” constitutional rules in the background) is whether we can have
Taxonomy and Pragmatism too. Can we offer coherent dividing lines
within the sprawling sphere of constitutional doctrine—a domain thought

159

See id. at 4–5. Hills also identifies work by Fred Schauer, Daniel Halberstam, and John
Garvey. Id. at 5.
160
Id. at 1.
161
The “Pragmatist” label is notoriously slippery and contested. I use the term here to signal
a stance that rejects distinctions of the sort—for example, between principle and policy, values and facts—on which the taxonomic enterprise is thought by some to rely. This sense of the
term is distinct from (though not incompatible with) the sense associated today with Judge
Richard Posner, who defines “pragmatic adjudication” as “adjudication guided by a comparison of the consequences of alternative resolutions of the case rather than by an algorithm,”
and as “a practical tool of social ordering” which prefers “the decision that has the better consequences for society.” Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, the
Constitution, and the Courts 186 (2001); see also, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law
4–15 (1995) (describing the pragmatic approach to law as, inter alia, instrumental, experimental, forward-looking, activist, antiessentialist, and antidogmatic).
162
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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to encompass interpretations, reasons, mediating principles, and implementing frameworks163—in a way that does not depend upon the antiPragmatist assumption that a meaningful sort of constitutional interpretation exists which does not involve “practical” or “instrumental” considerations? And, if so, is there a point to the enterprise? The central aim of
the remainder of this Article is to demonstrate that the answer to each
question is “yes.”
Relying on Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,164
a much commented-upon case decided the Term following Dickerson v.
United States, this Part introduces a conceptual distinction between constitutional operative propositions (essentially, judge-interpreted constitutional meaning) and constitutional decision rules (rules that direct courts
how to decide whether a given operative proposition has been, or will be,
complied with). It then elucidates the distinction by applying it to a variety of doctrines that range across constitutional law. Defense of the distinction’s utility is reserved for the next two Parts. Part IV offers exploratory arguments about the distinction’s likely value. Part V presents a
concrete demonstration of the distinction’s coherence and utility by dividing one intensively scrutinized nugget of constitutional law—the
Miranda doctrine—into its operative-proposition and decision-rule components, and by showing that the exercise advances debates about that
decision’s legitimacy and proper scope.
A. Garrett and the Distinction Between Operative Propositions and
Decision Rules
The facts of Garrett could not be much further afield from those of
Dickerson. The case arose after Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse who
was being treated for cancer, was removed from her position as Director of Nursing at the University of Alabama’s Birmingham Hospital because of her substantial leaves of absence for medical treatment.165
Garrett sued the University of Alabama, alleging that her demotion violated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which requires that employers, including states, provide “reasonable accommodations” for their disabled employees.166 Consistent with the ADA’s
163

See supra note 3 (quoting formulations by Amar, Fried, and Strauss).
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
165
Id. at 362.
166
See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (requiring specified categories of employers to
“mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth164
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explicit authorization,167 she sought money damages. The University of
Alabama moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress from making states liable for money damages in
suits alleging violations of the ADA.
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”168
Notwithstanding this plain language, however, the Supreme Court had
held over a century ago that the Amendment confers state sovereign immunity even from federal question suits brought by its own citizens.169
Alabama would therefore prevail against Garrett unless the Constitution
authorized Congress to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from
damages suits under the ADA. Analysis of this question, in turn, was
shaped by the Court’s 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.170
Seminole Tribe had held that Congress has no authority under Article I
of the Constitution to subject states to suits for money damages.171 At the
same time, though, the Court reaffirmed its earlier holding172 that Congress could abrogate a state’s immunity when validly exercising its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.173 Beerwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the [employer’s] business”). This is Title I of the Act. The Court reserved comment on whether Title II, which concerns the “services, programs, or activities of a public entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000), can also cover claims of employment discrimination. Garrett,
531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
167
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (allowing victims of employment discrimination under the
ADA the same relief granted to victims of employment discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5); 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000) (abrogating state sovereign immunity).
168
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
169
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
170
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
171
Id.
172
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
173
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Section 5 provides: “The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
It is not entirely clear just why Congress has abrogation power under § 5 but not under Article I. Some possibilities are briefly canvassed in Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese &
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To
“Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1037, 1049–50 (2001). Whether this
distinction—or any other aspect of present sovereign immunity jurisprudence—is sensible is
irrelevant for present purposes.
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cause Congress had invoked Section 5 as one of its bases for enacting the
ADA,174 Garrett turned upon whether the ADA was valid Section 5 legislation.
Applying the test it had announced four years earlier in City of Boerne
v. Flores,175 a slim majority of the Supreme Court held that it was not.
Boerne had emphasized that it was the responsibility of the Court, not
Congress, to interpret the substantive reach of constitutional provisions.176
Accordingly, the Court must be vigilant to ensure that Congress did not
engage in substantive constitutional (re)interpretation under the guise of
“enforcing” the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees. To this end,
Boerne announced a two-part test governing legislation purporting to rest
upon Section 5: First, the legislation must be designed to prevent or remedy actual constitutional violations; and second, it must exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.”177 The Garrett majority, in an opinion again written by the Chief Justice, concluded that, if designed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that no State “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” the ADA
failed the Boerne test.178
The crux of the Court’s reasoning is straightforward. Because the
Court had already determined that the disabled are not a suspect or
quasi-suspect group,179 any state classification that serves to disadvantage
them “‘cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a ra174

See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
176
Id. at 519–24.
177
Id. at 520. Neither Boerne itself nor the several cases that have applied its test have specified how, if at all, the “congruence” and “proportionality” requirements differ, nor have the
decisions made clear just what function or functions the test is designed to perform. Does it
serve, in an evidentiary manner, to flush out whether given legislation really was intended to
“enforce” the Amendment’s substantive provisions, and not to reinterpret them, or does it
give effect to the § 5 requirement that any legislation actually designed to enforce the substantive provisions adopt “appropriate” means? See Berman, Reese, & Young, supra note 173, at
1160 n.565. These questions have attracted significant scholarly comment. See, e.g., J. Randy
Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-Ends Relationships, 36 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 407 (2003); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127 (2001); Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for
Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 Ind. L.J. 567
(2003). We need not resolve these questions to understand Garrett (though answers to them
would help determine how the Boerne doctrine itself could best be redescribed in operativeproposition and decision-rule terms).
178
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
179
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
175
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tional relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’”180 Furthermore, the Court explained, in accord with well-settled precedent,181 “the State need not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the burden is
upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”182
The ADA was constitutionally infirm, the Court concluded, because
Congress failed to identify a pattern of employment discrimination
against disabled persons by the states that violated this test. While acknowledging that Congress had identified “[s]everal . . . incidents [that]
undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to
make the sort of accommodations for the disabled required by the
ADA,” the Court insisted that “these incidents taken together fall far
short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on
which § 5 legislation must be based.”183 Moreover, “even were it possible
to squeeze out of [the legislative record] a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States,” the ADA-imposed duty of reasonable accommodation too far exceeded what the Fourteenth Amendment would
of its own force require of the states to satisfy Boerne’s requirements of
congruence and proportionality.184 For these reasons, the statute could
not be predicated upon Section 5.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented. According to the dissent, the majority understated the extent of
state employment practices disadvantaging the disabled that Congress
could have found to violate the Equal Protection Clause and, as a consequence, overstated the extent to which the prohibitions and duties of the
ADA exceed what the Constitution independently requires of the states.
The dissent’s complex argument is not, in all respects, a model of clarity.
From a metadoctrinal perspective, however, we need understand only the
dissent’s core reason for concluding that Congress could have concluded
that far more state practices violate the Constitution than the majority
was willing to credit.
180

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
The precedent was well-settled by the time of Garrett, but long controversial. For a cogent summary of the history of the rational basis test, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 651–63 (2d ed. 2002). For a more detailed analysis, if dated in
some respects, see Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1049 (1979).
182
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
183
Id. at 370.
184
Id. at 372.
181
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The heart of Justice Breyer’s argument is that the majority erred in
“hold[ing] Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary standard.”185
At a minimum, he explained, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection forbids economic or social legislation that is in fact motivated by
“negative attitudes, fear, or irrational prejudice.”186 But this is not the test
that courts directly or straightforwardly apply. Instead, “‘if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain’ challenged legislation, then ‘there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts,
and one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing
that the action is arbitrary.’”187 That is to say, the party challenging a classification in court does not prevail by simply persuading the reviewing
court that, more likely than not, the classification was in fact adopted because of irrational prejudice; instead, she must demonstrate that no “conceivable state of facts . . . could provide a rational basis for the classification.”188 The consequence, Justice Breyer explains, is to increase the
possibility (which, concededly, cannot be avoided) that a given classification would, because motivated only by irrational prejudice or because
failing to promote any legitimate state interest, actually violate the Equal
189
Protection Clause, yet not be judicially invalidated.

185

Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 379–80 (“As the Court notes, those who
presented instances of discrimination [to Congress] rarely provided additional, independent
evidence sufficient to prove in court that, in each instance, the discrimination they suffered
lacked justification from a judicial standpoint. . . . But a legislature is not a court of law.”).
186
Id. at 381 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This view of what the Equal Protection Clause commands seems to be shared by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor—in Garrett
itself, see 531 U.S. at 374–75 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that “[p]rejudice . . . may
result . . . from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection” and that
“persons with mental or physical impairments are confronted with prejudice which can stem
from indifference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will”); id. at 375–76 (seeming to
acknowledge that “the States [would] transgress[] the Fourteenth Amendment by . . . lack of
concern for those with impairments”); and elsewhere, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634
(1996) (asserting that treatment “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected” denies equal protection). The Garrett majority opinion—which, oddly, both Justice Kennedy
and Justice O’Connor joined—apparently rejects this view. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (contending that classifications reflecting “negative attitudes” or “fear” do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause so long as they are rationally related to furthering the purpose claimed by
the state).
187
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382–83 (quoting Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176,
185 (1935)) (quotation internal to Pac. States Box omitted).
188
FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
189
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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If this looks much like the now-familiar claim that the Court’s equal
protection doctrine underenforces the relevant constitutional norm,190
that is no accident. Plainly, Justice Breyer throws his lot in with the Taxonomists. He is not merely claiming, after all, that Congress should be
free to decide for itself what equal protection means. He is saying that the
Court has determined what the constitutional guarantee means and has
190

Indeed, Sager had specifically employed equal protection doctrine to illustrate his underenforcement thesis more than two decades earlier, see Sager, supra note 5, at 1215–17, and
the argument had since been developed at length by Stephen Ross. Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 311 (1987); see also, e.g., Strauss, supra note 38, at 204–07.
Several years prior to Sager’s influential work, Justice Brennan had provided this especially
clear judicial articulation of the rational basis test in underenforcement terms:
As we have often indicated, questions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last
analysis on questions of fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion of state
power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For although equal protection requires that all persons “under like circumstances and
conditions” be treated alike, such a formulation merely raises, but does not answer the
question whether a legislative classification has resulted in different treatment of persons who are in fact “under like circumstances and conditions.”
Legislatures, as well as courts, are bound by the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When a state legislative classification is subjected to judicial challenge as
violating the Equal Protection Clause, it comes before the courts cloaked by the presumption that the legislature has, as it should, acted within constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, “[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal
protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”
But, as we have consistently held, this limitation on judicial review of state legislative
classifications is a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but
from the nature of judicial review. It is simply a “salutary principle of judicial decision,”
one of the “self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Court] and the state against
irresponsible exercise of [the Court’s] unappealable power.” The nature of the judicial
process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will
overturn a legislative determination of a factual question only if the legislature’s finding
is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as “arbitrary,” “irrational,” or “unreasonable.” Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have
no application to Congress. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.” Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in
order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable
men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its
own determination on the matter. It should hardly be necessary to add that if the asserted factual basis necessary to support a given state discrimination does not exist, § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with power to remove the discrimination
by appropriate means.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 246–48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
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determined what the in-court doctrine should be and that these are not,
and need not be, the same thing.191 With the Taxonomists, then, Justice
Breyer is arguing that court-announced constitutional doctrine can consist of two analytically distinct outputs. But the particular principle of division upon which he implicitly relies seems new. Justice Breyer’s line is
drawn between judicial determinations of the meaning of a constitutional
provision and announcements of the rule courts should apply when called
upon to decide whether the judicially interpreted meaning is complied
with. For ease of exposition, let us coin some terms. Call the courts’ determination of constitutional meaning a “constitutional operative proposition,” and call the judicial direction regarding how courts are to decide
whether an operative proposition has been complied with a “constitutional decision rule.”192

191

This is my reading of Justice Breyer’s Garrett dissent. Other critics of the decision, however, construe it as an argument that the Constitution lacks a univocal or invariant meaning,
and therefore that Congress and the courts should share interpretive authority. See, e.g., id. at
18 n.83 (arguing that Justice Breyer’s dissent “persuasively attacked” the majority’s erroneous
“assum[ption] that the Fourteenth Amendment has a singular and universal meaning”). See
generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind. L.J. 1 (2003) (examining the constitutional theory that underlies the Court’s claim to exclusive interpretive authority). In contrast,
to be clear, I read Justice Breyer’s dissent to claim not that constitutional meaning differs depending upon the vantage point from which it is viewed (though this could be true) but that,
even insofar as courts can stake a claim to being the privileged expositors of invariant constitutional meaning, the constitutional doctrine that they announce consists of devices additional
to any such supposed interpreted meanings. Ultimately, of course, the taxonomic distinction
between operative propositions and decision rules that this Article develops and defends does
not stand or fall on one’s preferred reading of the opinions in Garrett.
192
A few words about this nomenclature. I am taking the term “constitutional operative
proposition” to signify the same thing as “judge-interpreted constitutional meaning,” where
“meaning” is agnostic regarding the means of deriving meaning, or the particular conception
of meaning that the judge employs (original meaning, plain meaning, judicially constructed
meaning, etc.). A constitutional decision rule is the judicially announced rule that directs
courts how to “decide” whether the operative proposition is satisfied. Although this usage of
the term “decision rule” should be clear enough to one who comes to the term fresh, federal
courts scholars are apt to confuse “constitutional decision rules” with the “rules of decision”
as that term is used in the Rules of Decision Act, which provided that “the laws of the several
states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply.” The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. A
“rule of decision” for purposes of that Act means nothing more than “the governing law.” It is
not what I mean by “constitutional decision rule.” Instead of trying to figure out how “rules of
decision” map onto my proposed distinction between operative propositions and decision
rules, it would be best, I think, for readers to try to put that former phrase entirely out of
mind. If you are unable to do so, feel free to substitute mentally the phrase “application rule”
wherever you see “decision rule.”
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The significance of this way of carving the doctrine lies in its implicit
response to the Pragmatists. The reason the distinction is important, for
Justice Breyer, is not because these two species of doctrine are supposed
to rest on different sorts of considerations. The importance, rather, is that
they serve different sorts of functions. Notice that Justice Breyer is happy
to endorse the equal protection decision rule as a “paradigm of judicial
restraint.”193 But decision rules are designed to bind courts, not the political branches.194 In Garrett itself, Justice Breyer deemed it important to
Readers who are comfortable with my usage of the term “constitutional decision rule”
might nonetheless wonder about pairing that phrase with the neologism “constitutional operative propositions” when the familiar distinction between decision rules and conduct rules,
see, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984), would seem so handy. For two reasons, however,
an “operative proposition” is not more felicitously described as a “conduct rule” for our purposes.
Most importantly, it is generally thought that decision rules are addressed to judges while
constitutional conduct rules are addressed to other governmental actors. See, e.g., Carol S.
Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?: Two Audiences, Two
Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2469–70 (1996). It is true that, under my proposed taxonomic
division, decision rules are addressed to judges alone, but some of what I am calling operative
propositions are likewise addressed to them, not to any other governmental actor. (As we will
see, the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause is an example. The operative proposition is that judges must not admit into evidence statements that have been compelled from
the defendant.) The fact that judge-interpreted constitutional meaning will on occasion apply
directly to judges will be obscured if we divide doctrine into decision rules and conduct rules.
The conduct rule/decision rule distinction is unpromising, additionally, insofar as it might be
read to import Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation gloss. I do not propose that judges, scholars,
and lawyers classify doctrine as operative or decisional by trying to imagine where it would be
classified in a hypothetical regime in which decision rules were kept invisible to non-judicial
actors. Perfectly good decision rules can be predicated upon the assumption that non-judicial
actors are aware of them and will alter their behavior in light of them. See infra Section IV.B.
Of course, the unsatisfactoriness of adopting the term “conduct rules” as a contrast to “decision rules” cannot itself make a case for the unlovely term “operative propositions.” I would
be happy to consider other labels. To readers who might be disposed to come forward with
friendly (or even not-so-friendly) amendments, however, let me add two final thoughts. First,
the obvious alternative of “substantive rules” is undesirable because it risks implying a contrast with “procedural” and “remedial” rules. Viewed through the lens of this common
trichotomy, many “operative propositions” would not be “substantive rules.” Second, I think
it is somewhat more apt (if even less catchy) to describe judicial interpretations of constitutional meaning as operative propositions than as operative rules because such interpretations
can assume very un-rule-like shape; it might look more like a standard or perhaps even a
principle. (I am indebted to Larry Sager for persuading me on this last point.)
193
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993)) (emphasis in Garrett).
194
For indirect confirmation that Justice Breyer was right, consider the Court’s own explanation in Beach Communications for crediting any post hoc rationale for a statutory classification: “[B]ecause we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,
it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the chal-
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separate the operative proposition from the decision rule not for the reason the Pragmatists charge and reject—namely, that the former necessarily reflects “pure principle”—but because proper application of Boerne
requires courts to assess the fit between challenged legislation and the
constitutional operative proposition, not between the statute and the decision rule. That is, Congress is not obligated to accord any deferential
presumptions contained in the decision rule when ascertaining how often
the states violate the Equal Protection Clause, and thus, how pressing the
need for federal enforcement legislation. Consequently, when determining whether a statute designed to enforce the substantive guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment is “appropriate legislation,” a court must focus on how well that legislation promotes the constitutional operative
proposition—a rule, recall, that is itself a judicial product—not the decision rule adopted to facilitate judicial implementation of the constitutional operative proposition. Because they believed that Congress could
reasonably have concluded, based on the record before it, that states engaged in substantial conduct that violated the operative proposition of
equal protection doctrine (and not merely Congress’s own understanding
of what equal protection means), the dissenters would have upheld the
ADA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power.
To be sure, merely to appreciate the distinction between operative
propositions and decision rules is not necessarily to resolve the issue presented in Garrett. One could, after all, agree with the dissent that application of the Boerne “congruence and proportionality” test must measure
challenged legislation against the constitutional operative proposition,
yet nonetheless conclude, with the majority, that too much of what the
ADA prohibits is constitutional under that rule to render the statute appropriate enforcement legislation. But the constitutionality of the ADA’s
remedial provisions is not our concern. The lesson from Justice Breyer’s
Garrett dissent is only that we can carve up constitutional doctrine into
two sorts of rules—what we have termed, respectively, operative propositions and decision rules—even while conceding the legitimacy of each,
and without staking ourselves to any claims about the sorts of considera-

lenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” 508 U.S. at 315. This would be a non
sequitur if the Court meant that, because the judiciary does not “require a legislature to articulate its reasons,” the true reasons for a legislature’s actions are irrelevant to whether it has
in fact violated the Constitution. All the Court can sensibly mean is that a legislature’s actual
reasons are, under deferential rational basis scrutiny, irrelevant for purposes of the constitutional decision rule.
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tions upon which courts might rely in the derivation and formulation of
either.195
B. The Ubiquity of Constitutional Decision Rules
Garrett highlights in especially stark fashion that constitutional doctrine can consist of “operative propositions” that constitute judicial determinations of constitutional meaning, as well as analytically distinct devices—“decision rules”—that establish the particular inquiry that courts
should undertake when applying an operative proposition in the course
of constitutional adjudication. But the “any conceivable purpose” gloss
on equal protection doctrine is not exceptional. To the contrary, I will argue, constitutional decision rules are a ubiquitous component of constitutional doctrine. Of course, because this terminology is new and the underlying taxonomic distinction is at best inchoate, whether any given
constitutional doctrine is better conceptualized as an operative proposition or a decision rule (or something else entirely) will often be contestable. What difficulties—or opportunities—this fact presents are explored
in Part IV. This Section seeks only to solidify the basic distinction by offering a few additional illustrations of doctrine whose proper conceptualization in decision rule terms should appear particularly plausible
(though not, it bears emphasis, incontrovertible).196
195

Unfortunately, this lesson seemed all but lost by last Term’s decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O’Connor joined the four Garrett dissenters to uphold, as a valid exercise of Congress’s § 5 power, application of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) against the
states. In relevant part, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of
annual unpaid leave to care for family members with serious health problems. This, the Court
said in an opinion by the Chief Justice, was a congruent and proportional means to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause. Distinguishing Garrett, among other cases, Rehnquist explained
that in the FMLA,
Congress directed its attention to state gender discrimination, which triggers a heightened level of scrutiny. . . . Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . .
it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.
Id. at 1982 (internal citations omitted). This is not an understanding of the significance of the
tiers of scrutiny in equal protection doctrine that should have been acceptable to the Garrett
dissenters, three of whom nonetheless joined the majority opinion while signaling their disquiet on this score in a brief and somewhat cryptic concurrence. See id. at 1984 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
196
Innumerable additional illustrations could be chosen. But whatever defects this Article
may have, that it’s “not long enough” is probably not among them. For my own analysis of
how the operative proposition/decision rule distinction can help make sense of the Court’s
current struggles over Commerce Clause doctrine, see Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gul-
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To start, though, it may be useful to have in mind a graphic image of
this model of constitutional adjudication. Accordingly, Figure 3 offers
one possible representation of the way that operative propositions and
decision rules function in adjudication, contrasting this vision with the
complex model that had been introduced in Figure 1. The critical lesson
to take away from this rendering is that the operative proposition and the
decision rule are jointly necessary for “constitutional doctrine” to be applied. As a consequence, the decision-rule model escapes the principal
objection to other complex three-step models of constitutional adjudication—namely, that courts have no warrant to replace judge-interpreted
“constitutional meaning” with something else when applying the Constitution.

libility: Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming
2004). For penetrating analyses of voting rights laws whose potential for profitable reinterpretation in decision rule terms will be evident, compare Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering
and Political Cartels, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (2002) (advocating broader use of what the author
calls “prophylactic rules” in election law jurisprudence), with Melissa L. Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 Yale L.J. 1603 (2000) (identifying Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) as setting forth a Miranda-like “prophylactic rule” but
criticizing the particular rule as not workable). Worthwhile examinations of criminal procedure doctrines that likewise map easily onto the operative proposition/decision rule distinction appear in Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Majority
and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 412–21 (2001); Klein, supra note
115.
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The Logical Structure of Constitutional Adjudication Reprised
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1. The Due Process “Some Evidence” Rule
An apt illustration of a constitutional decision rule—one closely resembling the rational basis “any conceivable purpose” decision rule—is
the due process “some evidence” rule that the Court has applied in a
range of administrative contexts for nearly ninety years.197 As explained in
one 1985 prison case:
[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time
credits. . . . Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record . . . . Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support
198
the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

This may or may not be sound constitutional doctrine. But surely, as
Fallon has explained:
If viewed as a measure of the “meaning” of due process, the “some evidence” standard would make no sense. An official who maliciously deprived an inmate of liberty or property, knowing that this was a wrongful decision in light of all the properly presented evidence, would fail to
provide “due process of law” in the most basic sense. . . . Rather than
furnishing an interpretive judgment about the Constitution’s meaning,
the “some evidence” test is a standard of review that largely trusts administrative officials to follow the Constitution and provides for judicial
199
redress only in relatively egregious circumstances.

Put in our terms, insofar as a deprivation of a protected liberty or
property interest will be presumed to provide constitutionally adequate
process so long as “some” or “any” evidence in the record supports it,200
the doctrine is a constitutional decision rule.
197

See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence,”
25 San Diego L. Rev. 631, 663–64 (1988) (arguing that the “some evidence” requirement is a
standard of review, not a procedural requirement applicable to the original tribunal).
198
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985).
199
Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 6; see also id. at 38 (arguing that
“the ‘some evidence’ test is an ususually stark example of a standard of review that is distinct
from the constitutional norms it is crafted to enforce”).
200
In fact, though, this may no longer be an entirely accurate statement of existing doctrine.
The Court recently explained that the some evidence rule applies only “when the basis for attacking the judgment is . . . insufficiency of the evidence,” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
648 (1997), indicating that where an inmate alleges that an adverse decision stemmed from
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2. The Pearce Resentencing Rule
Although he does not speak directly to the question, Fallon seems to
view “standards of review,” like the “some evidence” rule, as representing a fairly narrow category of the constitutional doctrine that is something other than a judicial statement of constitutional meaning.201 A key
thrust of my argument, in contrast, will be that an ocean of constitutional
doctrine is conceptually indistinguishable from what Fallon calls “standards of review.”
Consider, for example, North Carolina v. Pearce,202 one of the cases
most frequently appearing in academic and judicial discussions of “constitutional common law,” “prophylactic rules,” or “incidental powers.”
Pearce raised a simple question: “When at the behest of the defendant a
criminal conviction has been set aside and a new trial ordered, to what
extent does the Constitution limit the imposition of a harsher sentence
after conviction upon retrial?”203 The Court answered that imposition of a
harsher sentence is not itself unconstitutional, but that imposing such a
sentence for the “purpose of punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside” would be.204 The following statement, accordingly, was the Court’s interpretation of constitutional meaning: “Due process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.”205

bias, malice or vindictiveness, the mere presence of some evidence in the record to support
that decision is not enough to defeat the constitutional claim.
201
See generally Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 32–41.
202
395 U.S. 711 (1969).
203
Id. at 713.
204
Id. at 723–24.
205
Id. at 725. This is no more than the specific application of a more general principle that, I
have argued elsewhere, applies to all constitutional rights. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo. L.J. 1, 32–36
(2001) [hereinafter Berman, Coercion Without Baselines]. As I have previously summarized
the proposition:
Every constitutional right entails a claim-right that the state not penalize the exercise
(or nonwaiver) of the constitutional right itself in the sense of imposing (or allowing to
obtain) consequences upon the right-holder that are adverse relative to the consequences
that the state would impose (or allow to obtain) but for the state’s purpose in having the
right-holder experience the consequences as disagreeable. That is largely what it means to
have a constitutional right.
Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A
Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55 Vand. L. Rev. 693, 732–33 (2002)
[hereinafter Berman, Commercial Speech].
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The Court did not stop there, though. “In order to assure the absence
of such a motivation,” the majority announced, “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.”206 This, Justice Black
complained in a lone dissent, was not constitutional interpretation.207
“This is pure legislation if there ever was legislation.”208 Whether or not
the majority had engaged in “pure legislation,” however (a charge impossible to answer without more in the way of definition209), that the presumption it announced was not quite constitutional meaning seems all
but indisputable. Surely the majority itself did not dispute it. Pearce announced a decision rule to adjudicate constitutional meaning. Of course,
the Court’s choice was not between using this particular decision rule or
doing without. A reviewing court would always need to know how to rule
when faced with epistemic uncertainty regarding whether a sentencing
judge had in fact imposed a more severe sentence for vindictive reasons.
Preponderance of the evidence, presumably, would supply the default.
But this was not an ideal solution. Recognizing that “[t]he existence of a
retaliatory motivation would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in
any individual case,”210 the majority evidently believed that requiring a
statement of reasons to appear in the new sentencing order would make
it easier for reviewing courts to identify such motivation when it did exist.
Moreover, it is hard to read the majority opinion without getting the impression that the Justices thought the incidence of retaliatory motivation

206

Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. As announced by Pearce, the rule appears to be absolute. Put another way, it is a conclusive presumption: A sentencing order that imposes a more severe sentence than the defendant had previously received will be adjudged unconstitutional unless the
reasons for the increase are stated in the order itself. The Court later converted this into a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness that could be overcome by any objective information
that might justify the increased sentence. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986); U.S. v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); see also, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (holding
that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply to increased sentences imposed
after trial when defendant was initially sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea).
207
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 741 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that
“courts must of course set aside the punishment if they find, by the normal judicial process of
fact-finding, that such a [vindictive] motivation exists,” but objecting that “the courts are not
vested with any general power to prescribe particular devices ‘[i]n order to assure the absence
of such a motivation’”).
208
Id. (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209
Clearly it was “legislation” in that it involved “formulation of rules for the future.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 899 (6th ed. 1990). But just as clearly that definition of legislation
proves far too much.
210
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 n.20.
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alarmingly high,211 and hoped that imposing a requirement of reasongiving would reduce it. For these reasons, the Court crafted a decision
rule in the form of a conclusive presumption to administer the constitutional operative proposition it had announced.
3. Congress’s Tax Power and the Regulatory Effects Problem
The Pearce decision rule was a response to the twin facts that the operative proposition turned upon a governmental actor’s purposes and
that the Court thought purposes hard to ascertain on a case-by-case basis.
It would be surprising if the conjunction of these two facts was rare. Thus,
whenever the Court has rejected an invitation to directly inquire into a
governmental actor’s purposes or reasons for action, there is a chance
that the resulting doctrine in fact reflects compound judgments: first, that
the true constitutional meaning does turn upon the actor’s purposes, and
second, that such meaning is best administered via a decision rule that
conclusively presumes the absence (or presence) of such purposes under
specified circumstances.212
Congress’s Article I power “to lay and collect taxes”213 is an illustration.
Early on, the Supreme Court seemed to interpret this provision to confer
upon Congress the power to impose taxes for the purpose of raising
revenue, but not for the purpose of regulating conduct that it could not
regulate under its other enumerated powers.214 As a test of constitutional
211

E.g., id.
The proper role of purpose scrutiny in constitutional analysis is controversial. For a recent introduction to the literature, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional
Analysis, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 297 (1997). Critics of the practice have voiced many objections which
this cannot be the place to rebut. I offer two points, though. First, claims that purposes are too
hard to discover and that such scrutiny risks disrespecting other branches of government provide reasons (whether or not ultimately persuasive) not to incorporate purposes into the decision rule, but they do not address whether the operative proposition should turn upon purposes. Cf. Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive Review, 15 San Diego L. Rev. 1141, 1142 (1978)
(“The principles underlying judicial review of unconstitutional motives are no less applicable
to legislative enactments than to other official decisions. If the motives underlying an administrative decision or a legislative enactment should be insulated from judicial review, it must be
for institutional rather than jurisprudential reasons—courts cannot properly undertake the
inquiry or act on its findings.”). Second, the claim that the very notion of a purpose or motive
is incoherent when applied to multi-member bodies would supply a reason not to interpret
even the operative proposition to include a reference to “actual” or “subjective” purposes but
provides no reason at all why the operative proposition could not constrain what are sometimes called “objective” purposes.
213
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
214
See, e.g., Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869) (“There are, indeed,
certain virtual limitations, arising from the principles of the Constitution itself. It would un212

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

64

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 90:1

meaning, however, this interpretation is difficult to adjudicate because all
taxes have regulatory effects. In not long, therefore, the Court announced
that “the motives or purposes of Congress are [not] open to judicial inquiry in considering the power of that body to enact” laws that take the
form of excise taxes.215 The key language, of course, is “judicial inquiry,” a
characterization that can be read to signal the Court’s determination to
implement a constitutional operative proposition that does depend upon
Congress’s purposes (the tax must be adopted to raise revenue) via a decision rule that conclusively presumes the presence of constitutionally
permissible purposes so long as the challenged measure actually raises
revenue.216
Indeed, this way of breaking apart the doctrine helps make sense of the
otherwise puzzling decision in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., in which a
nearly unanimous Court struck down the Child Labor Tax Act
(“CLTA”) precisely on the grounds “that the so-called tax” had a regulatory purpose.217 Although the Court attempted to distinguish the precedents that proscribed judicial inquiry into Congress’s purposes for imposing a tax, the effort was more lame than game. A better account is that
the Bailey Court understood that the doctrine which purported to make
Congress’s purposes immaterial was only a decision rule. And in light of
the extreme provocation—the CLTA was transparently adopted to circumvent the Court’s decision, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,218 that Congress
lacked power to regulate child labor—the Court thought application of a
deferential decision rule inappropriate. Rather than simply ignoring the

doubtedly be an abuse of the power . . . if exercised for ends inconsistent with the limited
grants of power in the Constitution.”). Admittedly, this is an ambiguous passage. The thought
could be either that certain purposes would render the exercise abusive albeit constitutional
or that such purposes, because abusive, render the exercise unconstitutional.
215
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 53 (1904); see also, e.g., United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (observing that the claimed presence of certain motives “does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject”); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28
(1953) (holding that if an excise tax produces revenue, its regulatory effects do not render it
invalid), overruled in other part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
216
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts 60 (1999) (“A key
term [in constitutional doctrine] is scrutiny. When you see it, you should know that the courts
are talking about themselves, and that it would be a mistake for legislators to think about the
constitutional implications of what they were about to do in the same terms.”).
217
259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922) (“[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and
regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and understand this. How can
we properly shut our minds to it?”).
218
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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doctrine tout court, the Bailey Court just administered the operative
proposition by the default preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule.219
4. Land Use Exactions
Takings doctrine provides another example of a decision rule designed
to adjudicate a purpose-oriented operative proposition.220 The Nollans,
owners of a California beachfront lot, wanted to replace their existing
bungalow with a three-bedroom house. California law required, however,
that they obtain a development permit from the state coastal planning
commission before proceeding with construction. The Commission
granted the permit but only on condition that the Nollans convey a public
easement across a portion of their private beach to allow beachgoers to
travel between a public park a quarter mile to the north and a public
beach to the south. The Nollans objected that the condition effected an
unconstitutional taking. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the
Supreme Court agreed.221
Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the
condition could not stand because it was not germane to the legitimate
purposes the Commission could have had for refusing the requested
permit. Assuming that the Commission might have constitutionally denied the Nollans a permit in order to advance a legitimate state interest
in, among other things, the public’s visual access to the beach, Justice
Scalia reasoned, the Commission could not threaten to withhold the permit in order to secure lateral access for the public to cross the beach.222
When the “essential nexus” between the purpose of the condition and the
purpose of the prohibition is eliminated, the Court explained:
[T]he situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting
fire in a crowded theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to
contribute $100 to the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can
be a core exercise of the State’s police power to protect the public
safety, and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of
speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one which,
219

For a more detailed discussion of Bailey, see Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a TooClever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 Ind. L.J. 459, 504–06 (2003).
220
The following discussion is borrowed from Berman, Commercial Speech, supra note 205,
at 733–35. A lengthier analysis, with citations to relevant cases and commentaries on takings
law, appears in Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205, at 89–98.
221
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
222
See id. at 836–42.
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while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban. . . . Similarly
here, the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose
of the building restrictions converts that purpose to something other
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but
without payment of compensation. . . . In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban,
the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out223
and-out plan of extortion.

This is a dense and puzzling passage, for the alchemical notion at its
heart that “the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose” of the development ban “converts” that original purpose “to something other than what it was” is more than a little mysterious. One thing
clear is that the Commission’s purposes matter. But how? Suppose that a
municipality imposes a building restriction for the bona fide purpose of
promoting the public’s access to light. Plainly the Constitution is not offended. Suppose further that a particular landowner subject to the restriction offers to transfer some valuable interest to the public in exchange for
a variance. The state may or may not accept. But whether it accepts can
have no bearing on “the original purpose of the building restriction,”
which, by hypothesis, was to promote the public’s access to light. And this
is true whether the landowner’s offer is to submit to a restriction that
would increase public access to light elsewhere or to convey an easement
that would reduce pedestrian congestion. It is part of the business of
planning commissions to make tradeoffs among these sorts of (arguably)
incommensurable public interests. All this being so, the original purpose
still cannot be converted to something other than it was if, during the
process of negotiations for a variance, it is a commission staff member
rather than the landowner who first hits upon the potentially efficiencymaximizing idea that the commission grant the variance in exchange for
the congestion-reducing easement. If, as we have supposed, the building
restriction was originally devised to increase light, none of these ex post
developments can render the original purpose something else.
Of course, I have asked you to assume the Commission’s original purpose was the legitimate one of promoting the public’s interest in light.
Perhaps the Commission, believing that city light was fully adequate, imposed the height restrictions just so it could use the variance carrot as a

223

Id. at 837 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

67

tool with which to extract other sorts of property rights from landowners
without having to pay compensation. Now, that would be a constitutionally illegitimate purpose. The operative proposition of takings doctrine,
then, must be something like this: The state may neither take property
without just compensation nor withhold a development right it would
otherwise provide for the purpose of discouraging exercise of a landowner refusal to waive her right to just compensation.224
How is a reviewing court to know whether the withholding of a development right was motivated by this unconstitutional purpose as opposed
to any one of the almost limitless purposes that the Court has held constitutionally permissible?225 Case-by-case resolutions under the preponderance of the evidence standard would be likely to tell us more about the
world view of the trial judge than about the historical facts. Nollan’s solution, in effect (though not in form), was to instruct courts to conclusively
presume that withholding of an offered development right would be for
the reason barred by the constitutional operative proposition “unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban.” Whether wise or foolish, the Nollan doctrine is a constitutional decision rule.
5. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Not all decision rules are responses to the problem of discerning constitutionally relevant motives or purposes.226 Indeed, one especially obvious (if little known) decision rule has nothing to do with the supposed
difficulties of engaging in purpose scrutiny.227
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that a bill does not become a law of the United States unless it “shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate” and either have been signed by the
President or, if vetoed, repassed by two-thirds majorities in each house.228
This is the Schoolhouse Rock version of legislation and accurate as far as
224

Indeed, this follows directly from my proposed concept of an unconstitutional penalty.
See supra note 205.
225
See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that a development
permit may be denied if doing so would substantially advance any legitimate state interest);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (identifying broad range of legitimate state interests).
226
Following prevailing practice, see Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205,
at 23 n.87, I am here treating “motive” and “purpose” as synonyms.
227
The following discussion draws heavily from the clear and illuminating discussion in Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review,
89 Va. L. Rev. 1105, 1172–82 (2003).
228
U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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it goes. One detail omitted concerns the “enrolled bill”: the document
that the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate both sign,
in attestation that the document has been approved by his respective
house, and then forward to the President. It is this document that, if
signed by the President, is forwarded to archives from which the Statutes
at Large are copied and the United States Code subsequently compiled.
This is a generally adequate system, no doubt, but not a foolproof one.
What if the enrolled bill was never actually passed by Congress? What if
by honest error or chicanery the document that makes it into the law
books is not the same document as that on which Congress acted?
The Court confronted precisely this question over a century ago in
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark.229 Marshall Field and other importers objected to tariffs levied by the President on the ground, among others, that
the enrolled bill pursuant to which the President acted was not the bill actually passed by Congress, and thus not a valid law. The Court agreed
that a bill:
[D]oes not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been
passed by Congress. . . . There is no authority in the presiding officers of
the House of Representatives and the Senate to attest by their signatures, nor in the President to approve, nor in the Secretary of State to
receive and cause to be published, as a legislative act, any bill not
230
passed by Congress.

But this, the Court said, was only half the question. “[I]t remain[ed] to
inquire as to the nature of the evidence upon which a court may act when
the issue is made as to whether a bill, originating in the House of Representatives or the Senate, and asserted to have become a law, was or was
not passed by Congress.”231
The importers hoped to make their case by relying on journals of the
proceedings of each house. Yet this the Court would not allow. Such an
inquiry, the Court concluded:
[I]s forbidden by the respect due to a coördinate branch of the government. The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle
that an enrolled act, in the custody of the Secretary of state, attested by
the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress,
and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was
229

143 U.S. 649 (1892).
Id. at 669.
231
Id. at 670.
230
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passed by Congress, according to the forms of the Constitution, would
be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the
validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which
the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate offi232
cers charged with the duty of keeping them.

This, then, is the operative proposition of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2: A
bill, to become law, must be passed by both houses of Congress.233 The
enrolled bill doctrine—directing that courts must conclusively presume
that a bill signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate in attestation of its passage was in fact passed by both houses—is
a decision rule.
6. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Although Marshall Field birthed the enrolled bill doctrine, it is more
often cited in connection with a different matter. In addition to contending that the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 was not the true law, the importers had argued that the Act was unconstitutional because, in delegating to the president authority to suspend tariffs under certain conditions,
it contravened the constitutional directive that “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”234 The
Court agreed “[t]hat congress cannot delegate legislative power to the
president,”235 but denied that any power delegated by the Tariff Act was
legislative. Justice Harlan explained:
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the lat236
ter no valid objection can be made.

Though often quoted, the passage offers little guidance on the critical
question—namely, what constitutes (permissible) execution. Thirty-six
years later, the Court supplied an answer: “If Congress shall lay down by
232

Id. at 673.
That there may be room for debate over just what “passage” entails, see Adler & Dorf,
supra note 227, at 1173 (noting that passage presumably means approval by a majority of a
quorum, but that this is perhaps arguable), shows only that the operative proposition could in
theory require further elucidation.
234
U.S Const. art. I, § 1.
235
Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
236
Id. at 693–94 (quoting R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs, 1 Ohio St. 88 (1852)).
233
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legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [make further rules] is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”237 This is the
nondelegation doctrine that governs to this day.238 What sense can be
made of it?
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine could be simply an operative
proposition: A decisionmaking or rule-making authority subject to an
“intelligible principle” is not a “legislative power” within the meaning of
Article I, Section 1, and therefore need not be vested in Congress. But
this view confronts difficulties. Consider some of the specific enumerated
powers contained in Article I. Congress is explicitly empowered, for instance, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”239 Surely this is an “intelligible
principle.” Were this language to appear not as a constitutional grant of
power from We the People to Congress but rather as a statutory grant of
power from Congress to an administrative agency, there can be no doubt
that the delegation would pass muster under the nondelegation doctrine.
So if cabining a decisionmaking power with an intelligible principle were
sufficient to make such power not “legislative” within the meaning of Article I, Section 1, then it would seem to follow that legislation enacted
pursuant to Section 8, Clause 8 is not the exercise of Congress’s legislative power. That would be a decidedly odd conclusion.
An alternative is to understand the nondelegation doctrine as consisting of an operative proposition to be administered by a non-standard decision rule. On this view, the decision rule directs that the operative
proposition should be deemed satisfied so long as the delegation contains
an “intelligible principle” that constrains the agency’s discretion. The
task becomes to identify the precise operative proposition that (implicitly) is being administered via this decision rule. There are several possibilities. One might think, for example, that the operative proposition is
something like this: “Except in a few areas constitutionally committed to
the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing [the nation]
237

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). In announcing this
rule, the Court relied directly on Marshall Field, see id. at 410–11, a case with which the author of J.W. Hampton, Chief Justice Taft, had reason to be familiar. As Solicitor General, it
was Taft who had defended the constitutionality of the 1890 Act against the importers’ challenge.
238
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
239
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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are to be made by the Legislature.”240 Alternatively, the operative proposition could be more context-dependent and standard-like, providing that
whether a delegation of legislative authority is constitutional depends
upon such considerations as the scope of the discretion delegated, the social importance of the decision, the feasibility of leaving the decision to
congressional resolution, etc.241
I have no strong opinion regarding how best to conceive of the implicit
operative proposition to which the intelligible-principle decision rule is
directed. It does seem to me, though, that to recognize that the nondelegation doctrine makes little sense as an operative proposition presses one
to think about what the operative proposition is. And one’s answer to
that question provides in turn a better vantage point from which to assess
the intelligibility of the intelligible-principle decision rule itself. Indeed,
Justice Thomas’s skepticism about the nondelegation doctrine seems to
follow just this path. Interpreting the Constitution to prohibit significant
exercises of rule-making authority by any body other than Congress, he
suggests that the intelligible-principle decision rule fits this operative
proposition too poorly to make for sound constitutional doctrine.242
7. Standing and the “Imminent” Injury Requirement
Turn, finally, from Article I to Article III. Relying largely on textual
and structural interpretive principles, the Court has interpreted Article
III to impose a variety of limits on the scope of the federal courts’ constitutional authority. The Court has operationalized or channeled these limits by means of rules going under such diverse headings as “standing,”
“ripeness,” “mootness,” and “advisory opinions.” It is unlikely, however,
that these rules are in all respects consistent with what the Court under240

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
This seems to be something like Justice Stevens’s view. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at
488–90 (Stevens, J., concurring) (intimating that Congress may delegate legislative powers so
long as such delegations are “adequately limited by the terms of the authorizing statute,” and
that courts should conclude that a delegation is adequately limited if it “provides a sufficiently
intelligible principle”).
242
See id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am not convinced that the intelligible principle
doctrine serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are cases in
which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply
too great to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”). Instead of just reading § 1 as providing that all basic decisions be made by Congress, Justice Thomas seems to reach that same
conclusion via two discrete steps: first, § 1 provides that all “legislative” powers must be exercised by Congress; and second, a power is “legislative” if it involves a basic decision. This twostep process strikes me as just a way to give a textual fig-leaf to an interpretive judgment
reached on structural grounds, but has no bearing on the basic point in text.
241
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stands to be the underlying constitutional meaning. Take, for example,
the standing requirement. The Court has “derived directly from the Constitution” (by a process that appears to be run-of-the-mill constitutional
interpretation) “[t]he requirement . . . [that a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”243 In addition, however, current standing doctrine requires—as part of what the Court asserts is the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,”244 rather
than one of its “prudential” add-ons—that the injury complained of be
“actual or imminent.”245
To be sure, a nonimminent complained-of injury is likely to be speculative and may, for that reason alone, fall outside of the federal courts’ constitutional authority. But it is surely possible that a complained-of injury
is both likely and nonimminent.246 Accordingly, the imminence requirement seems most fairly understood not as a command of Article III itself
(as judicially interpreted) but rather as a judicial invention added for an
essentially evidentiary purpose: “to ensure that the alleged injury is not
too speculative for Article III purposes.”247 The imminence requirement,
therefore, is part of a decision rule.
243

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
245
Id. (internal citations omitted).
246
This can be illustrated with a slight variation on the facts of Lujan itself. The Court
agreed that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes,
is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,” id. at 562–63, but concluded that
the evidence in the case did not “show[] how damage to the species will produce ‘imminent’
injury to [the plaintiffs]” because they had not alleged any specific present plans to visit the
endangered animals’ habitats. Id. at 564. Imagine, though, that the plaintiffs lived near the
animals and were challenging conduct that would almost certainly render the endangered
animals incapable of reproducing. In this circumstance, it could be very probable—and surely
not just “speculative”—that the challenged conduct would cause plaintiffs “injury in fact” by
making it impossible for them to “use or observe” the animal species after it became extinct.
But if the animals were themselves long-lived (like crocodiles or elephants), that particular
injury, albeit nonspeculative, would not be “imminent.” The basic point that threatened
harms could be nonspeculative—indeed, near-certain—even though not imminent has been
recognized in other areas of law. For instance, the recognition that use of deadly force can on
occasion be “necessary” to protect oneself from an injury that is not imminent provoked the
drafters of the Model Penal Code to relax modestly the traditional imminence requirement in
the law of self-defense. See Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) (1962) (justifying the use of force
“when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion”).
An argument for the wholesale elimination of an “imminence” or “immediacy” requirement
for self-defense is pressed in Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women
Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 371 (1993).
247
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2.
244
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IV. ELABORATING THE DISTINCTION: WHYS AND HOWS
Supposing that the nature of the proposed distinction between constitutional operative propositions and constitutional decision rules is reasonably apparent, we might nonetheless expect that classifying constitutional doctrine into its operative proposition and decision rule
components will often be difficult and contestable, perhaps unresolvable.
Indeed, not all readers will agree even with each of the examples presented in Part III. Take, for example, the taxing power. I have argued
that present doctrine is best understood as an operative proposition that
permits Congress to tax only for the purpose of raising revenue,248 implemented via a decision rule that directs courts to conclusively presume
that a challenged provision does issue from such a purpose so long as
some revenue is actually raised. But this characterization is not selfevidently correct. For example, one might prefer to view the doctrine as
merely an operative proposition that Congress may use the taxing power
to regulate behavior so long as the nominal tax raises some revenue, implemented by the ordinary preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule.
Furthermore, if examples that I selected, non randomly, because I
thought their use of a nonstandard decision rule (i.e., a decision rule
other than the simple preponderance-of-the-evidence rule) was relatively
obvious are in fact controversial, the effort to reverse engineer many
other doctrines might excite even more controversy. And the more difficult it is to reach agreement on the proper characterization of extant doctrines, the greater is the worry that the basic conceptual distinction between operative and decision rules would thereby be rendered, if not
illusory,249 then of precious little value.
Worries of this sort naturally lead to two questions: (1) What sort of
test or algorithm can we employ to properly classify aspects of doctrine as
248

This is an admittedly rough articulation of what I deem the better conceptualization of
the operative proposition. The basic point is that presence of a (substantial) revenueproducing purpose is necessary for the tax to be constitutionally valid, not that the presence,
in addition, of a regulatory purpose is necessarily fatal. So long as the operative proposition is
administered via a nonstandard decision rule, it is very hard to formulate the operative proposition with great precision.
249
The stronger claim that the distinction is illusory or vacuous depends upon the proposition that all doctrine could be plausibly classified either as “either operative proposition or
decision rule” or as “both operative proposition and decision rule.” This would be a difficult
claim credibly to maintain, for it requires the proponent to deny, for example, even that the
“any conceivable purpose” aspect of equal protection doctrine is more appropriately described as a decision rule than as an operative proposition. I suspect that few if any theorists,
even among the most committed “Pragmatists,” would be willing to bite that particular bullet.
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decision rule or operative proposition? and (2) What values are served by
undertaking the task? These questions assume a special urgency when
raised from a particular minimalist-inspired perspective.250 Constitutional
adjudication is hard. It is hard for even a single judge to do well, but the
dynamics of multi-member tribunals make the enterprise that much more
difficult. Judicial minimalists might protest, then, that an effort to taxonomize constitutional doctrine (along these or perhaps other lines)
threatens to frustrate rather than facilitate the project of constitutional
adjudication. To require, or even just to encourage, courts to sort constitutional doctrine into operative propositions and decision rules (not to
mention whatever additional taxonomic categories might be advanced
over time) would, on this view, demand more than can reasonably be expected.
I will address the first question first, because the answer to this is easy.
There is no algorithm or litmus-paper test for correctly sorting existing
doctrine into operative proposition and decision rule components. A constitutional operative proposition is the judicial statement or understanding of constitutional meaning; a constitutional decision rule states the test
for deciding whether the terms of the operative proposition are satisfied.
It follows, then, that whether a given piece of doctrine is an operative
proposition depends on one’s account of constitutional meaning, which in
part depends upon one’s theory of constitutional interpretation. Because
there exist different plausible theories of proper constitutional interpretation, there exist different plausible conceptions of constitutional meaning.
What one views as an operative proposition thus depends upon how one
proposes to derive constitutional meaning, a matter that cannot be resolved (though it can be informed) by taxonomic explorations.251
Again, an example will help. The Introduction showed how courts that
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to have a certain meaning could

250

See generally Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12 (describing judicial minimalism and suggesting that the practice leaves more issues open to democratic resolution, allowing for a more meaningful democratic debate).
251
To speak even of the meanings of discrete constitutional provisions, as I often will, makes
exposition easier, but at the risk of some misunderstanding I do not mean to convey that
meaning must be linked to the Constitution in any narrowly clause-bound, or even textualist,
way. It is precisely to avoid any such misconstrual that I do not speak of interpreting “the
Constitutional text.” Rather, by “the Constitution,” I mean only what Richard Fallon usefully
calls “the document denominated as ‘the Constitution’ in the National Archives.” Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 112. This way of putting things is intended to
maintain agnosticism with respect to the full range of interpretive modalities in potentially
legitimate play in our legal culture.
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craft a decision rule that takes the form of conventional strict scrutiny.252
But it did not claim that this particular path to strict scrutiny represented
the only logically possible way to reach it. So the question remains
whether the strict scrutiny component of existing equal protection doctrine is better understood as a judicial statement of constitutional meaning or, rather, as a judicial direction for how courts are to decide whether
constitutional meaning, itself articulated in different form, is satisfied.
Because the Court’s own stated rationales for strict scrutiny can hardly be
described as pellucid,253 this is a contestable matter of reverse252

See supra text accompanying note 37.
Consider, for example, the Court’s most recent defense of strict scrutiny:
[1] The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., Amend. 14, § 2. [2] Because the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not groups,” all “governmental
action based on race—a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [3] We are a “free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [4] It follows from that principle
that “government may treat people differently because of their race only for the most
compelling reasons.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S., at 227. [5] We have
held that all racial classifications imposed by government “must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” Ibid. [6] This means that such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. [7] “Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures,” we have no way to determine what “classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority
or simple racial politics.” Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). [8] We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Ibid.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337–38 (2003) (bracketed sentence numbers added).
Because the component ideas contained in this passage, along with the quotations from case
law, are all so familiar to a constitutional lawyer, the reader is likely to gallop along contentedly without pausing to consider whether this is really a coherent justification for strict scrutiny. I daresay, however, that were this explanation itself subjected to rigorous scrutiny, it
would fail.
Sentences [5] and [6] are true statements of existing doctrine, sentence [1] accurately quotes
the constitutional text, sentence [3] is just atmospherics. If this passage is to explain or justify
existing constitutional doctrine, the other four sentences must be doing the work. Sentences
[7] and [8] throw a strong decision-rule cast on the doctrine: that a racial classification is not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest does not itself entail that the
classification denies equal protection; rather, strict scrutiny serves to “smoke out” whether
there is a violation. Government violates equal protection if it makes “illegitimate use” of
race. What is an illegitimate use? Sentence [7] suggests that it is the use of race motivated by
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Here, then, is the picture painted by the
253
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engineering. Now, it is hard to imagine that the strict scrutiny test constitutes any part of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. An
originalist judge or theorist who accepts strict scrutiny doctrine is therefore extremely likely to view it as a decision rule. Likewise, say, for a textualist. But for those who advocate a common-law254 or historicist255 approach to constitutional interpretation, it is perfectly plausible to view
constitutional meaning in nearly organic fashion, just as the accretion
over time of interpretive judgments by relevant actors and communities
(especially but not exclusively judges). For such persons, the rule that racial classifications are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling state interest can be part of what the Equal Protection Clause means at this particular historical moment. It does not follow that they must or should deny the operative proposition/decision rule
second paragraph: A person is unconstitutionally denied equal protection if she is disadvantaged relative to others because the government is motivated by notions of racial inferiority or
racial politics. The implication is that a racial classification that is not so motivated and that
bears a rational relationship (in the sense of ordinary degrees of over- and underinclusiveness) to a legitimate (but not compelling) state interest does not actually violate the
Constitution. The twin prongs of strict scrutiny are evidentiary devices designed to ensure that
the judiciary does not accidentally permit to stand a classification that was in fact impermissibly motivated.
Yet the first paragraph, it seems to me, conveys a very different sense. Indeed, sentence [4]
has the tone of an operative proposition: Government is constitutionally forbidden from classifying persons on the basis of race without compelling reason. If so, why? If this passage supplies an answer to that question it must appear in sentence [2]. However, it does not. That
sentence contains two observations: (a) that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons not
groups—i.e., is a “personal right”; and (b) that race is “in most circumstances irrelevant” to
the pursuit of legitimate state interests. But almost every trait is “in most circumstances” irrelevant to a stated end, a fact that does not provoke a demand for compelling justification,
lest the personal right to equal protection be denied, on the occasions when the state claims
that it is relevant.
So this is not an entirely satisfying account of strict scrutiny. On the fairest reading, though,
strict scrutiny seems to rest on both evidentiary and justificatory rationales. Some demand for
heightened justification is part of the operative proposition; narrow tailoring is supplied by
the decision rule. Perhaps, then, the doctrine is best understood as follows. The operative
proposition of equal protection prohibits states from treating people differently unless the
public good pursued outweighs the harm to the disadvantaged persons. The decision rule directs that, because racial classifications generally produce substantial harm, and because fully
ad hoc balancing is cumbersome and unpredictable, courts should presume that the good does
not outweigh the harm unless the good is “compelling.” Furthermore, because our unfortunate history shows that states are especially likely to be pursuing illegitimate ends when employing racial classifications, the decision rule also directs courts to presume that the (putatively compelling) interest claimed by the state is not the real interest pursued unless the
classification is narrowly tailored to advance that (putatively compelling) interest.
254
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 3.
255
See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words (2002).
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distinction. The point is only that the mere fact that given doctrine is
crafted in terms that depart from original understandings and text does
not by itself entail that the doctrine is a decision rule.
You may think that this indeterminacy, my admitted inability to resolve all debates about how various doctrines are properly classified, is a
defect of the operative proposition/decision rule distinction. It is not a defect. It is a virtue. I am proposing a (partial) conceptualization of the logical structure of constitutional adjudication. We should expect it to be valid
over the range of plausible theories of constitutional interpretation.
However, to say that there is no algorithm for sorting doctrine into one
taxon or the other is not to say that there are no ways of thinking about
the problem intelligently, or that reasons cannot be given in favor of one
proposed classification over another. Those reasons, however, will themselves be dependent upon the values that the distinction promotes. So the
two questions I have imagined—what is the test?, and what are the values?—are really just one. To understand the values or functions that the
distinction serves is to understand how to classify. Accordingly, Section
IV.A sketches some anticipated values of attending to the operative
proposition/decision rule distinction. The discussion is brief and suggestive because firm conclusions are impossible at the outset. Some benefits
of treating the distinction seriously (as well, admittedly, as some costs)
are likely to be hard to envision before a judicial and scholarly practice of
doing so emerges. In any event, once armed with a fuller sense of the
functions that the taxonomy could serve, we will be better positioned to
think about how ambiguous doctrine could be most profitably classified.
Section IV.B illustrates how awareness of the values of the distinction
can help us apply it.
A. Some Values of the Distinction
At a high level of generality, we can identify at least two very broad
sorts of reasons why the operative proposition/decision rule distinction
can prove useful: because it can invigorate and enrich those aspects of
American political culture that are deeply informed and shaped by constitutional understandings but which depend little or not at all on the
prospect of adjudication; and because it can contribute to the development of more rational, efficacious, and legitimate constitutional doctrine,
whether crafted by courts or legislatures. These points are abstract. Let
me sketch what I have in mind.
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1. Extra-adjudicatory Constitutionalism256
a. Constitutional Culture
Why do we care what the Constitution means? On the Holmesian “bad
man” picture of law,257 the answer is simple: Knowing our judicially enforceable rights, duties, powers, disabilities, and the like enables us to
better plan our lives. That is a fine answer as far as it goes, but many
people doubt that it’s a complete one. In particular, many people suppose
that our Constitution plays a role in the construction of our political culture and even in the shaping of our identities as Americans that far transcends the Constitution’s operation in court.258 As Robert Post and Reva
Siegel recently elaborated, “The Constitution . . . does not live in our society as mere ukase. Disputes about the Constitution often raise deep
questions of social meaning and collective identity . . . . [A]lthough constitutional law may be useful for settling disputes, the Constitution itself
is not reducible to this function.”259 If this is so, then all of us—citizens,
256

A more familiar term is “extrajudicial constitutionalism.” As will be made clear, by “extra-adjudicatory constitutionalism” I will mean constitutionalism not dependent upon adjudication. Rules of constitutional law that govern adjudication are, necessarily, applied by courts;
but they could be made by other branches. So if courts chose to defer to congressional interpretations of the Constitution in the course of litigation, there is a plausible sense in which
such a decision would reflect extrajudicial constitutionalism (constitutional meanings put forth
by non-judicial actors) but would not be extra-adjudicatory constitutionalism.
257
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only
for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.”). I do not mean to claim here that the “bad man’s” reason for caring
about constitutional meaning exhausts Holmes’s. For representative explorations of Holmes
and his bad man, see Symposium: The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 989–1054 (1997); Symposium: The Path of the Law 100 Years Later: Holmes’s Influence on Modern Jurisprudence, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 1–278 (1997); Symposium: The Path of the
Law Today, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 691–960 (1998).
258
This is a recurrent theme in the work of James Boyd White. See, e.g., James Boyd White,
When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community 240–47 (1984); see also, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 216, at 12 (1999) (observing that the Constitution contributes to “the opportunity to construct an attractive narrative of American aspiration, and constructing such a narrative is an important constituent of
the human good”); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 127 (arguing that the founders who thought most seriously about the subject envisioned the federal courts as conducting “high political education” for the citizenry); Hans
Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 Yale L.J. 227, 251–56 (1972) (drawing attention to the conceptual priority of constitutional norms to judicial review); Post & Siegel,
supra note 191, at 17–30 (criticizing the Rehnquist Court’s § 5 jurisprudence for disregarding
the social and political dimensions of American constitutionalism).
259
Post & Siegel, supra note 191, at 28.
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legislators, and executive officials alike—might have reason to think
about what our Constitution requires or permits even when we think that
to run afoul of any such constitutional meaning will not provoke a judicial response.
For this reason among others, “[w]e need processes, formal and informal, by which our constitutional understandings and commitments can be
challenged, reinterpreted, and renewed.”260 Explicit announcements by a
federal court, and especially by the Supreme Court, of what it takes the
Constitution to mean constitute an obvious—indeed, the single most obvious—locus for such processes to unfold.261 Yet those who focus on what
we might call the extra-adjudicatory functions of constitutional law—the
Constitution’s role in structuring debates of political morality, in creating
national identity, and the like—are frequently critical of the performance
of the courts. Akhil Amar speaks for many in deriding the Supreme
Court for producing “a mindnumbing array of formulas, tests, prongs,
and tiers, often phrased in highly abstract legal jargon—
‘overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness,’ ‘narrow tailoring,’ ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ and so on—that insulates and anesthetizes.”262 It might
seem to follow (though Amar does not himself draw this lesson) that we
should strive harder to create constitutional meanings not dependent on
the courts’ handiwork. Perhaps we should, in Mark Tushnet’s evocative
phrase, take the Constitution away from the courts.263
260

Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 15 (2001).
261
This is a central theme of Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword:
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2003). See,
e.g., id. at 8 (arguing “that constitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn regulates culture”). It finds expression too, for example, in Barry S. Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L.
Rev. 577 (1993) (claiming that courts exercising judicial review are engaged in a “constitutional interpretive dialogue” with all segments of society); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986) (arguing that judicial review can invigorate republican self-government by modeling for the citizenry the exercise of “practical reason”).
262
Amar, supra note 3, at 46. An influential earlier critique of the modern Court's enthusiasm for awkward, cumbersome formulas was Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution,
84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985); see also, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution:
The Supreme Court’s Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People
Can Understand (1992) (maintaining that the Court is obligated to comprehensibly explain
the Constitution to those governed by it).
263
Tushnet, supra note 216. Among contemporary scholars, perhaps the most steadfast and
influential voice for a position of this sort has belonged to my colleague Sandy Levinson. See,
e.g., Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (1988). See generally Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of Sanford Levinson, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 553–794 (2003). For another

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

80

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 90:1

This, however, is an extravagant proposal. At the least, as Tushnet
himself acknowledges, even constitutional populists might accord judicial
interpretations “added weight because they come from experts who have
thought seriously about the interpretive questions over a long period.”264
If we can benefit from the courts’ expert judgments on constitutional
meaning, but if institutional and pragmatic concerns are likely to continue to produce constitutional doctrine that is abstruse and legalistic, a
partial solution is to separate that doctrine into its taxonomic components.265 In particular, to distinguish operative propositions from decision
rules will better enable the Justices to live up to their “professional obligation to articulate in comprehensible and accessible language the constitutional principles on which their judgments rest,”266 which will in turn enrich the Constitution’s political, cultural, and extra-adjudicatory value.267
Revealingly, even while deriding the taxonomic distinctions pressed by
Sager and Monaghan, Daryl Levinson recognized “that constitutional
rights that are announced but that carry no sanction when violated might
influence behavior by educating the public or shaping social norms.”268
contribution to populist constitutionalism, see Richard Parker, Here, the People Rule: A
Constitutional Populist Manifesto (1994).
264
Tushnet, supra note 216, at x.
265
For brief remarks in a similar spirit, see Klein, supra note 115, at 1070.
266
Goldstein, supra note 262, at 19.
267
Even if it is valuable for the Court to say “the Constitution commands X” while acknowledging at the same time that institutional considerations convince it to apply a different decision rule in the course of adjudication, one might doubt, with Hans Kelsen, whether the operative proposition in such circumstances truly is “law.” See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of
Law and State (1945). I am not sure what would turn on the answer. In any event, if as H.L.A.
Hart claimed, law has, or aspires to, an internal normativity, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of
Law (2d ed. 1994), then it would seem entirely appropriate to conceive of constitutional operative propositions as part of “constitutional law” no matter what form their corresponding
decision rules might take. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 216, at x–xi (suggesting that it is appropriate to call “constitutional decisions made away from the courts” law “because it is not in the
first instance either the expression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression of unfiltered moral judgments [and because, [i]n short, it is not ‘mere’ politics, nor is it
‘simply’ philosophy]”).
268
Levinson, supra note 27, at 887 n.123; see also id. at 906 (“To the extent that declaring
rights shapes understandings and preferences . . . there may be good reason for talking about
right and remedy as if they were two entirely separate issues.”). One might suppose that this
concession is in more tension with Levinson’s attack on the right/remedy distinction (and its
cousins) than he acknowledges. It is true, as Fred Schauer emphasizes, “that ordinary people
simply do not read judicial opinions.” Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1455, 1463 (1995). But I do not think that this observation undermines the instant point.
Judicial statements of constitutional meaning are just the sort of thing—unlike decision
rules—that should be able to seep easily into public discourse even absent widespread lay
readership of the opinions themselves.
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b. Conscientious State Actors
These comments have related and obvious implications for constitutionally proper behavior by state agents. A central theme from Sager’s
“Fair Measure” was that governmental actors should feel themselves
bound by the true constitutional norm even when the constitutional rule
that judges will apply in adjudication effectively underenforces that
norm.269 But the language of norm and rule, or concept and construct,
threatens to obscure a key point. As the operative proposition/decision
rule distinction makes clear, the question is not just whether a legislator
should follow her own interpretation of the constitutional norm in lieu of
the courts’ when she believes that the latter does not fully realize the
former. There is a middle ground between independence and slavishness,
between what Sandy Levinson dubbed the Protestant and Catholic orientations toward constitutional law.270 Constitutional operative propositions
and decision rules are both judicial products. Thus, a “conscientious legislator”271 who is not confident of her abilities as independent interpreter of
the Constitution may choose to follow the judge-announced constitutional operative proposition even if she believes that the full doctrine
would, because of an underenforcing decision rule, allow her greater latitude.
The same principle applies, mutatis mutandis, with respect to decision
rules that overenforce operative propositions. Even if government officials should or do feel themselves obligated to obey judicial interpretations of the Constitution at all (as opposed to being obligated to obey
their own good faith understandings of the Constitution), that obligation
extends only to judge-determined constitutional meaning, i.e., constitutional operative propositions, and not to those aspects of constitutional
doctrine that are properly understood as decision rules. Thus a governmental agent who complies with an operative proposition—but under circumstances in which she knows that her conduct would be adjudged to
violate that operative proposition by virtue of an overenforcing decision
rule—may be taking a risk, but violates no duty of constitutional obedience. That is, where a decision rule effectively overenforces the judicial
view of constitutional meaning, legislators who do not anticipate litiga-

269

Sager, supra note 5, at 1227.
Levinson, supra note 263, at 27–30.
271
See Brest, supra note 212.
270
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tion may, wholly honorably, choose to legislate to the full limits of the
constitutional operative proposition.272
2. The Making of Constitutional Doctrine
Think now about adjudicatory constitutionalism—how constitutional
law works in the courts. To distinguish operative propositions from decision rules can serve many values here, too. For example, it can help structure potentially productive debates about the legitimate judicial moves in
constitutional implementation, it can facilitate sounder judicial refinement of constitutional doctrine, and it can assist us to better understand
Congress’s appropriate role in the shared enterprise of American constitutionalism.
a. Legitimacy
When introducing the concept of “constitutional common law” nearly
thirty years ago, Monaghan was keenly aware that its legitimacy could
not be taken for granted. “Most writers,” he claimed, “view the Court’s
authority to fashion remedial rules admittedly not required by the Constitution as virtually self-evident.”273 But this complacency, he said, was
mistaken. As he fully acknowledged, the crafting of rules binding on
other departments of the federal government and upon the states “that
are admittedly not integral parts of the Constitution and that go beyond
its minimum requirements”274 threatens values of separation of powers
and of federalism.275
Despite the challenge, Monaghan ultimately concluded that the federal
courts do indeed possess legitimate authority to craft constitutional
common law.276 In reaching this conclusion, he was persuaded, in part, by
analogies to the federal courts’ common law powers with respect to such
areas as admiralty and foreign affairs law.277 But even in the arena of individual liberties, Monaghan deemed “the affirmative case for recognizing

272

I emphasize “may” because the fact that some action is constitutionally permissible does
not, of course, entail that its commission would be honorable or even permissible all things
considered. I am thinking, in particular, of cases in which a constitutional operative proposition underenforces our best understanding of political morality.
273
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 9.
274
Id. at 22–23.
275
Id. at 34–38.
276
Id. at 38.
277
Id. at 10–14.
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a constitutional common law . . . a strong one.”278 First, he explained,
“[t]he Court’s history and its institutional role in our scheme of government, in which it defines the constitutionally compelled limits of governmental power, make it a singularly appropriate institution to fashion
many of the details as well as the framework of the constitutional guarantees.” Moreover, in light of the importance of uniformity in this area,
“the desirability of some such undertaking seems clear.” Finally, “recognition of that power is the most satisfactory way to rationalize a large and
steadily growing body of Court decisions.”279
Monaghan’s thesis provoked substantial commentary. The most sustained and influential critique appeared three years later in an article,
also in the Harvard Law Review, by two political scientists, Thomas
Schrock and Robert Welsh.280 Despite having recognized the separation
of powers and federalism based objections to constitutional common
law’s legitimacy, they argued, Monaghan seemed to suppose that the desirability of constitutional common law provides an adequate basis for its
legitimacy.281 “[W]hat he is recommending,” Schrock and Welsh concluded, “is neither constitutional nor common law but pragmatism without either precedent or principle—judicial realism radicalized and rampant.”282 But because “mere utility” is not a ground of constitutional
authority, the constitutional principles of separation of powers and federalism demand rejection of “the idea that the Supreme Court should assume and exercise the power to impose on coordinate departments, and
especially on the states, rules developed at a subconstitutional level.”283
Notice that Monaghan staked himself to a fairly categorical claim, and
that Schrock and Welsh responded in kind. Reflecting a similarly categorical view of the problem, many contemporary metadoctrinalists—
proponents and critics alike—seem essentially to take for granted the
Court’s power to create doctrine that departs from interpreted meaning.284 Perhaps, however, the legitimacy of constitutional doctrine (con278

Id. at 19.
Id.
280
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154. There is some irony in the fact that this article appeared in the very same issue as Sager’s “Fair Measure,” supra note 5.
281
Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1126–31.
282
Id. at 1124.
283
Id. at 1171.
284
So, for example, although the recent Forewords by Amar and Sunstein reflect significant
hostility to constitutional doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 13 and 16, neither even
hints that the creation of doctrine is illegitimate. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 80 (“A
documentarian judge does not begin and end with the document. Rather, she begins with the
279
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ceived as something other than judge-announced constitutional meaning)
is not all or nothing. It could be, as commentators to the literature on supervisory and inherent powers285 seem to agree, that the legitimacy of the
document and then ponders how best to translate its wisdom into workable in-court rules, as
contemplated by Article III.”). Similarly, in an article dedicated to defending Supreme Court
constitutional decisions from criticisms that the Court has come to rely excessively on complex multipart tests, Fred Schauer never once addressed the possibility that such doctrinemaking exceeds the proper scope of judicial power. See Schauer, supra note 268. Indeed,
many commentators claim that doctrine-making is inescapable. See, e.g., Fallon, Implementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 26 (“The Court must craft doctrine as well as specify
constitutional meaning through interpretation.”); id. at 42 (contending that many constitutional norms “are too vague to serve as rules of law; their effective implementation requires
the crafting of doctrine by courts”); Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note
141, at 6 (“In order for the [constitutional] text to serve as law, it must be rulelike. . . . For the
Constitution to serve this purpose, it must be elaborated as a series of doctrines, formulas, or
tests. Thus, constitutional interpretation necessarily is the unfolding of constitutional law. Debates over constitutional meaning become debates over the proper formulation of relatively
narrow rules.”).
285
Valuable studies on “inherent” and/or “supervisory” powers include Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1433 (1984); Evan Caminker, Federal
Courts: Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1513, 1526–30
(2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Judicial Power and the
Rules Enabling Act, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 733, 754 (1984); James E. Pfander, Federal Courts:
Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78
Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1442–59 (2000); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1515 (2001); Robert J. Pushaw, The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735
(2001); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits of Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 761 (1997); William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in
Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on
the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 102, 128 (1976); Office of Legal Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Truth in Criminal Justice” Series: The Judiciary’s
Use of Supervisory Power to Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, reprinted in 22 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 773 (1989).
Although the distinctions between inherent and supervisory powers, and between those
powers and “constitutional common law,” are vague, a few general observations can be made.
While Monaghan suggested that constitutional common law was one of the federal courts’ integral powers, see Monaghan, supra note 4, at 10–26, courts generally use the term “inherent”
powers with reference to those powers that are either necessary or at least beneficial to the
exercise of integral powers. See Pushaw, supra, at 742–43. Inherent powers include the power
to control litigation, via such means as evidentiary and procedural rulings, as well as the
power to impose sanctions on parties and witnesses. Most commentators agree that the
courts’ inherent powers include the power not only to make discrete rulings but also to establish rules for lower federal courts, even in the absence of specific congressional authorization.
But see Office of Legal Pol’y, U.S. Dep’t of Justice report, supra, at 811 n.156 (“The proposition that courts have inherent rulemaking power is dubious at best.”). The federal courts’ socalled “supervisory” power, exercised expressly by the Supreme Court since McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), is the authority to supervise the administration of criminal
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power’s exercise depends upon the gravity of the need that calls it forth.286
Yet there are other possibilities. To divide doctrine into interpreted
meaning (“operative propositions”) and decision rules suggests that the
legitimacy of the latter might depend, at least in part, on the reasons that
underlie its creation. This is, of course, precisely the assumption that has
shaped the long-standing debate over constitutional interpretation. Just
as only some sorts of moves are supposed permissible when traveling
from the Constitution to constitutional meaning, then, maybe only some
moves (albeit different ones) can fairly be relied on to support a given
constitutional decision rule.
Metadoctrinalists tend to speak loosely, however, about the sorts of
considerations that courts do, or should, rely upon when creating doctrine.287 But if the legitimacy of decision rules may depend upon their reasons, some greater precision will prove useful.288 As a first pass, then, we
justice in lower federal courts, an authority that includes “the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.” Id. at 340. Most commentators and
courts classify the supervisory power as a species of inherent power. See, e.g., Beale, supra, at
1464; Pushaw, supra, at 779–83. Unlike the federal courts’ constitutional common law making
power described by Monaghan, the federal courts’ exercise of supervisory and other inherent
rulemaking powers bind only the federal courts, not their state counterparts.
286
While nearly all commentators acknowledge that the federal courts have an inherent or
implied rulemaking power (perhaps deriving from the Vesting Clause of Article III), they disagree regarding its scope; in particular, they disagree as to how “necessary” a claimed inherent power must be. Compare, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 285, at 128 (arguing that “[o]nly
when the particular assertion of privilege can fairly be said to be the least adequate power [a
federal court] clearly must have to perform express duties enumerated in the Constitution”
can the courts assume such authority), and Pushaw, supra note 285, at 847–50 (arguing that
federal courts may exercise “implied indispensable” powers without congressional authorization, but only Congress can exercise merely “beneficial” powers—those that are helpful or
useful in implementing Article III), with Beale, supra note 285, at 1468–77 (arguing that the
Supreme Court (but not the lower federal courts) may without congressional authorization,
exercise those powers that are “reasonably appropriate and relevant” to the exercise of its Article III powers).
287
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 3, at 79–80 (explaining that the concretizing of open-ended
constitutional standards “call[s] for strategic, pragmatic, empiric, institutional, and secondbest judgments as to which the document gives rather little specific guidance. Judicial doctrines, working alongside rules laid down and practices built up by other branches, properly
fill in the document’s outline, making broad principles workably specific in a court and in the
world”); Strauss, supra note 38, at 193 (observing that “[o]ne customary way” to describe judicial constitutional doctrine-making “is that the court will attempt to minimize the sum of
error costs and administrative costs,” and noting that “[t]his is misleading to the extent it suggests that all of these interests can be reduced to a single currency, or that distributional concerns are irrelevant,” but concluding that nonetheless “it is a useful shorthand”).
288
This suggestion resembles Fallon’s observation that “when we recognize that the Court
may sometimes under- as well as overenforce constitutional norms, we can appreciate the urgency of assessing the grounds on which the Court determines whether to do so.” Fallon, Im-
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might identify six analytically distinct factors or families of factors that
might appeal to a judge considering whether, and how, to form a constitutional decision rule—considerations I label adjudicatory, deterrent, protective, fiscal, institutional, and substantive. No doubt some of these considerations could be usefully subdivided and others could be added.289 But
for present purposes a start is good enough.
A decision rule of some sort is unavoidable because application of the
operative propositions confronts epistemic uncertainty. The most obvious
factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider, then, is how best to
minimize adjudicatory errors—i.e., the sum of false positives and false
negatives. Call this an adjudicatory consideration. It comes in two variants: A court could think that a particular decision rule is likely to minimize either the sum total of adjudicatory errors, or the sum total of
weighted errors, taking account of a difference in perceived social disutility between false negatives and false positives.290 Either way, it is not
inevitable that the more-likely-than-not burden of proof will best serve
this goal.291 Most of the decision rules identified in Part III are likely to
rest, at least in part, on adjudicatory considerations.
By minimizing adjudicatory errors, a decision rule is likely at the same
time to optimize compliance with the operative proposition. If addressees
of the operative proposition perceive or anticipate that adjudication of
that rule yields many false negatives, they may become less disposed to
comply with the judge-announced constitutional meaning. Just as a court
may craft constitutional doctrine to reduce the adjudicatory errors, then,
it may also be motivated to secure greater compliance. Call an interest in
plementing the Constitution, supra note 10, at 7. But Fallon does not pursue such an assessment very far. Although he does offer “[a] nonexhaustive list” of the sorts of “value arguments” that courts do in fact employ when constructing constitutional doctrine, id. at 47–52,
he does not explore the possibility that these features of contemporary practices are not all
(equally) legitimate. Instead, his argument on this particular score seems largely to reduce to
claiming that “[t]he measure of the soundness of constitutional doctrine—including ‘prophylactic’ rules as well as three- and four-part tests—is whether it implements the Constitution
effectively.” Id. at 42. Unfortunately, it’s not entirely clear what “soundness” means in this
context. Is this a synonym for legitimacy? If it is not, then Fallon has not responded to the legitimacy worry. If it is, then Fallon has responded, but not wholly satisfactorily because he
does not provide—let alone defend—any metric by which effectiveness is to be measured.
(One might suspect, though, that he has in mind the untheorized, common-sensical notion of
effectiveness and success characteristic of Posnerian pragmatism.) See supra note 161.
289
Cf. Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12, at 46–50 (partially unpacking the judicial interest in minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs).
290
Errors could come from good faith epistemic mistakes or from the danger that judges will
intentionally manipulate loose standards.
291
See infra text accompanying notes 404–07.
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reducing violations of constitutional meaning a deterrent consideration.
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is surely the most salient example.292 But the North Carolina v. Pearce decision rule that presumes
vindictiveness from the absence of stated reasons for a longer sentence293
might similarly be explained on grounds of deterrence.
Of course, errors in adjudicating claims of unconstitutionality can cut
two ways. Just as an excess of false negatives can water down the incentives for other governmental actors to comply with the constitutional operative proposition, an excess of false positives may produce overdeterrence or chilling effects. A protective consideration, then, is the obverse
of a deterrent consideration. It reflects a possible judicial concern to ensure that the adjudicatory process not render other actors unduly timid.
Protective and deterrent considerations are the two species of a broader
genus of considerations we might call guidance-promoting.294
In a broad sense, a decision rule is always designed to reduce “costs.”295
A protective consideration, for example, is the interest in reducing excessive timidity because such timidity is deemed socially costly. Among the
costs that a legal system might be concerned to minimize, however, are
some that involve direct monetary outlays—the monies that parties and
the judicial system itself expend to litigate disputes, as well as private expenditures to avoid litigation. A fiscal consideration drives a court to

292

See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (noting
that the exclusionary rule “is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated”); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915–22 (1984) (explaining that the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule does not justify its application when police officers conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance of a warrant later determined to be invalid); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the exclusionary rule as a “judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved”). If the exclusionary
rule is not a constitutional operative proposition then it represents a third category of constitutional doctrine, what could be termed, straightforwardly, a remedial rule. As I have emphasized, the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is only an introduction to the project
of doctrinal taxonomy.
293
See supra Section III.B.2.
294
Compare Hart and Sacks’s discussion of what they term a “self-applying regulation”—an
official directive “which is susceptible of correct and dispositive application by a person to
whom it is initially addressed.” Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 120–22 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994). Monaghan described Miranda and the lineup cases
as exercises of the “traditional judicial function” of “providing guidance to primary actors
(law enforcement personnel in these cases) in terms sufficiently specific to allow ‘self-applying
regulation.’” Monaghan, supra note 4, at 20–21.
295
For recognition, and caution, of this broad use of “costs” language in this context, see,
e.g., Sunstein, Judicial Minimalism, supra note 12, at 46–47.
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craft doctrine in such a way as to reduce these private and governmental
litigation-related expenditures.296
A fifth possible decision-rule-making consideration is famous from the
justiciability literature. Alexander Bickel justified the passive virtues in
large part as a way to conserve the court’s “moral authority” and to reduce interbranch friction.297 The very same considerations—what we
might call institutional—could influence a court’s decision of whether,
and if so how, to create a constitutional decision rule. Indeed, several of
the decision rules already canvassed, including the “any conceivable purpose” decision rule from equal protection doctrine, and the enrolled bill
doctrine, seem patently motivated by institutional considerations.
Suppose finally that none of the foregoing considerations singly or in
combination militate against the customary more-likely-than-not decision
rule. Nonetheless, judges could conclude, based on their own substantive
value or policy judgments, that a particular constitutional provision,
properly interpreted, carries its underlying norm or principle too far or
not far enough. And they might, as a consequence, create a decision rule
designed simply to better effectuate that norm. Call an interest in better
operationalizing constitutional norms or policies in this way a substantive
consideration.298 As an illustration, recall the nondelegation doctrine discussed earlier,299 and assume that a majority of the Court believed both
that Article I, Section 1, properly interpreted, means that Congress may
not delegate the authority to make “important” decisions and that to
permit such delegations would be wiser social policy. Adoption of the
“intelligible principle” decision rule might then have been adopted as a
way to effectively expand Congress’s power to delegate beyond what the

296

This includes many of the costs that courts and commentators often have in mind when
defending a particular course as a means to reduce “unpredictability.”
297
See Bickel, supra note 116; see also Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 33, at ch. 5
(discussing the “prudential” modality of constitutional interpretation). For a scathing criticism
of the Bickelian approach, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues: A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964); Herbert Wechsler, Book Review, 75 Yale L.J. 672 (1966).
298
Cf. Field, supra note 154, at 893 (positing that “constitutional common law” arises when
“the judiciary chooses the ‘best rule’ based upon its own notions of policy and upon whatever
policies it finds implicit in the constitutional . . . provisions it does have an obligation to follow”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1126–27 (“[T]he constitutional common law
claims for the Court . . . power . . . to overturn acts of the political branches when, though admittedly not unconstitutional, these acts violate some subconstitutional judgment of utility or
desirability.”); id. at 1153–58.
299
See supra Section III.B.6.
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Constitution allows. Were this an accurate account of the intelligibleprinciple decision rule, it would rest on a substantive consideration.300
This (nonexhaustive) catalogue of decision-rule considerations might
seem useless to someone who believes either that federal courts lack authority to create any constitutional decision rules or that courts enjoy
carte blanche to craft decision rules for any reason at all. But neither of
these positions is plausible.
To deny federal courts power to create decision rules is not, it must be
remembered, to maintain that constitutional adjudication should proceed
without the benefit of decision rules at all. It is to claim, instead, that all
facts made relevant by constitutional operative propositions (which is to
say, by judicial determinations of constitutional meaning) must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, without benefit of presumptions or other
adjudicatory devices, under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
of proof. However, it is late in the day to take seriously the claim that the
judicial creation of constitutional decision rules is categorically illegitimate. This is not (contrary to the view of many contemporary theorists301)
because constitutional doctrine that departs from judicial interpretations
of constitutional meaning is inevitable or ineliminable, but only because
it has staked a position that will be extremely costly to dislodge and because the most plausible test of legitimacy is not purely foundational but
is, instead, at least partly a function of existing practices.302 Moreover,
common law practice at the time of the framing authorized courts to create and adapt standard adjudicatory devices like rebuttable and conclu-

300

If it is not clear what about this example is fanciful, see infra text accompanying notes
304–05.
301
See supra note 284. That courts find it useful to concretize often vague constitutional
standards into doctrine cannot be doubted. That such doctrine is essential to “enabl[e] the
document to work as in-court law,” Amar, supra note 3, at 79, is something else entirely.
Courts could, after all, apply what they take to be constitutional meaning directly to the facts
of every case without the benefit of “implementing frameworks,” id., so long as they are prepared to rely very heavily on analogical reasoning. Indeed, this is much how constitutional law
operated for the better part of two centuries. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court,
1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13, 74 (1995) (“In many ways, the
Warren Court created modern constitutional law through its plethora of doctrines, rights,
tendencies, and expectations.”).
302
In this respect, an argument against the power to create decision rules runs into one of
the problems that confronts a stringent commitment to originalism—namely, that it “entails a
massive repudiation of the present constitutional order.” Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 727 (1988).
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sive presumptions and burden-shifting mechanisms when administering
statutes.303
At the other extreme, it is hard to credit that courts should enjoy effectively unconstrained authority to craft constitutional decision rules. As
even David Strauss has observed, constitutional doctrine that rests on “a
judgment by the Court that the world would be a better place” with it
“does indeed have a legitimacy problem” for “[j]udges do not have a
general authority to implement their visions of the best world.”304 True,
the bite of this concession depends on the amount of doctrine that rests
on substantive considerations, and that there exists much of it might be
doubted.305 Perhaps this is partly due to the widespread, if tacit, recogni-

303

See, e.g., 9 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 142 (3d ed. 1932); James Bradley
Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 315–16 (1898). Not surprisingly, federal courts today routinely “allocate burdens and levels of persuasion consistent with
perceived demands of policy if a federal statute does not control.” Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary
Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 892, 900 (1982).
304
Strauss, supra note 38, at 194.
305
To see why this might be, it helps to have in mind examples of decision rules that might
be claimed to rest on substantive considerations. So return to our brief ruminations about the
nondelegation doctrine. See supra Section III.B.6. Suppose that the Court concluded that the
Constitution, as properly interpreted, actually—but unwisely—forbids Congress from delegating the power to make any “important” policy choices. Suppose, too, that the Court then
adopted a decision rule directing that courts must find that a delegation did not implicate the
power to make important choices if it contained an “intelligible principle” as a sneaky way to
effectively allow broader delegations than it believed that the Constitution permits. But if this
example suggests the illegitimacy of making decision rules for substantive reasons, it also suggests how unlikely is such a practice.
It seems in this hypothetical that the Court chooses to realize its vision about the proper
scope of legislative delegations by resorting to a substantive decision rule only as a result of its
logically prior conclusion that the true constitutional operative proposition imposes severe
constraints. But what reason is there to believe that Justices who believe that broad delegations of law-making power are sensible would in fact interpret the Constitution to provide
otherwise? The fact is that what is and is not a valid method of constitutional interpretation is
not God-given, but chosen by the individual judge. Of course, such choices are constrained by
professional practices. But this constraint is not very constraining for purposes of the nondelegation example because a conclusion that constitutional limits on the delegation of lawmaking powers are flexible and context-dependent can be easily reached via familiar (albeit
contested) moves in constitutional interpretation. The more general lesson, I think, is that a
judge who would employ substantive considerations in the construction of constitutional decision rules is apt, in good faith, to interpret the constitutional operative proposition in a way
that makes resort to such substantive considerations unnecessary. But cf. Monaghan, supra
note 4, at 44–45 (designating, as “the most troublesome feature of constitutional common
law,” “its potential as a vehicle for reading into our law at a subconstitutional level values that
judicial activists have ‘discovered’ in the general substantive guarantees of due process and
equal protection”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 154, at 1125 (objecting that constitutional
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tion, even on the part of the most “Pragmatic” judges and scholars, that
resort to substantive considerations in the shaping of constitutional doctrine is improper.
If neither polar position in the debate over the legitimacy of constitutional decision rules appears promising, then it should become obvious
why it is helpful to think clearly about the discrete considerations that
might present themselves in the process of constitutional doctrinemaking. Very simply, most participants to the legitimacy debate are likely
to believe that the federal courts have constitutional power to rely upon
some sorts of instrumental considerations in the creation of decision
rules, but not others. The consideration that would seem to enjoy the
strongest claim to legitimacy is an interest in reducing adjudicatory error.
The practice of judicial review requires that courts have ways to reach
constitutional holdings even though they do not know, say, what constitutionally relevant conduct was engaged in, what the constitutionally relevant purposes were, or what the constitutionally relevant effects will be.306
Yet we should expect courts to try to resolve these constitutionally relevant questions as accurately as (reasonably) possible. Since it is more
than doubtful that the preponderance standard always best promotes adjudicatory accuracy,307 it is hard to imagine a convincing argument that
would allow courts sometimes to create constitutional decision rules, but
not for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error. From this premise,
reasonable people might argue that courts have legitimate authority to
create decision rules for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error but
for no other purposes. Or, somewhat more liberally, that legitimate decision rules may be designed to minimize adjudicatory error and to promote guidance to the addressees of the operative proposition, but not,
say, to reduce the incidence and aggregate expense of constitutional litigation. Other possibilities could be identified and argued about at great
length.308
common law makes it “possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cautious but subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist”).
306
I have argued elsewhere that these are the three relevant dimensions of constitutional
violation. See Berman, Coercion Without Baselines, supra note 205, at 19–29.
307
See infra text accompanying notes 404–07.
308
Insofar as courts craft decision rules to serve ends other than minimization of adjudicatory error, it may be appropriate for them to recast their holdings to convey when a given
judgment of constitutionality vel non may not reflect a court’s best judgment on the matter. In
particular, when application of an underenforcing decision rule yields the conclusion that a
challenged action is not unconstitutional, that should be the announced judgment—“not unconstitutional”—not that the action is “constitutional.” The obvious analogue, of course, ap-
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But not here. The critical point is that a willingness to think about constitutional doctrine in terms that divide it into (among other categories)
operative propositions and decision rules does not preempt normative
debates about the legitimate judicial moves in constitutional implementation. Rather, it helps structure the sorts of debates that taxonomic explorations cannot themselves dispose of. Although I have some views about
the propriety of conceivable moves in the construction of decision rules, I
am inclined to believe that the consistency of one’s answers to questions
of this sort is much more important than is their content. A judge or
theorist who would permit courts to rely on some considerations but
would rule others out of bounds must assume the burden of distinguishing the forbidden considerations from the permissible. As Herbert
Wechsler famously argued, “[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”309 Judges who
take this admonition seriously can ensure that they live up to it only if
they make clear, at least to themselves, just what the steps in their constitutional analyses are. This requires that they separate constitutional operative propositions from constitutional decision rules and think hard
about what might justify construction of the latter.
b. Doctrinal Refinement
In addition to helping to structure discussions about what sort of doctrine is permissible, distinguishing decision rules from operative propositions can profitably aid judges in seeing what doctrines are most sensible.
Constitutional doctrine is both fertile and mutable. Presumably, courts
should be sensitive, when elaborating, modifying, or fine-tuning doctrine,
to the particular considerations that underlay it in the first place. To take
a simple example, when a court comes to decide whether a given doctrine
should be applied retroactively (a question that might arise subsequent to
the case that had announced the doctrine), the right answer might vary
depending on whether that doctrine reflected interests in minimizing adjudicatory error as opposed, say, to providing better guidance for non-

pears in criminal cases. When a factfinder is unable to conclude that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict is “not guilty”—standing for “not found to be
guilty”—as opposed to “innocent.” This way of proceeding would better serve interests in
what I have called extra-adjudicatory constitutionalism.
309
Wechsler, supra note 50, at 15 (emphasis added).
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judicial actors.310 Classifying doctrine as either an operative proposition or
a decision rule is likely to aid courts in isolating precisely which sorts of
practical and institutional considerations generated the doctrine whose
contours are being manipulated.
To take another example, it is at least plausible—though not necessary—that stare decisis should apply with different force to operative
propositions and decision rules.311 Courts might feel themselves freer to
be more avowedly experimentalist312 when announcing doctrine candidly
described as decision rules. These comments are admittedly exploratory
but, I hope, suggestive. We will see additional ways that the concept of
decision rules can promote the more intelligent raising of doctrinal progeny in the next Part.313
c. The Congressional Role
The proper role of non-judicial actors, especially Congress, in the making of constitutional law is one of the hot topics in contemporary constitutional scholarship.314 The issue is often posed in terms of how much def-

310

In mentioning this, I do not mean to suggest that the proper solution to the problem of
retroactive application of judicial decisions will ever be reducible to a simple algorithm. However, the present jurisprudence of retroactivity is widely thought to be unnecessarily confused
and confusing. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055 (1997); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous
Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1075 (1999).
311
For example, the “traditionalism” that constitutes, for Strauss, one of the two basic normative foundations for common law constitutionalism (the other being “conventionalism”) is
based on a humility toward judicial innovation and a concomitant preference for incrementalism. It is plausible to think that a court disposed to abandon precedent in an Amar-inspired
manner might do less violence to the “traditionalist” interest in incrementalism by affording
greater stare decisis weight to operative propositions than to decision rules, even if each has
been a product of common law constitutionalism.
312
See generally Dorf, supra note 14 (arguing for a less “Socratic” approach to jurisprudence, one focused on finding “provisional, workable solutions”).
313
See infra Section V.D.
314
See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 123, 156 (1999) (describing the scope of judicial deference to constitutional
interpretation by Congress and the President as “perhaps the central question” of constitutional adjudication). Some of the more notable recent commentaries on the subject include
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights,
85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529 (2000); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political
Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 (1998); Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation,
50 Duke L.J. 1335 (2001); Frank I. Michelman, Living With Judicial Supremacy, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 579 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 Yale
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erence courts should give interpretive judgments reached by the other
branches. This is an appropriate question. Framing the discussion in
terms of relative “interpretive” competence and authority, however, risks
setting too narrow a focus. The more general subject, as Fallon has emphasized, is one of constitutional implementation.315 And the distinction
between constitutional operative propositions and decision rules makes
clear that courts could afford Congress a more substantial role in that enterprise even if they choose not to defer to congressional interpretations
of constitutional meaning. Let me identify two distinct ways that could
occur.316
Debates over judicial supremacy always return to James Bradley
Thayer and his famous proposed “rule of administration” that courts
should not declare an Act of Congress void “unless the violation of the
constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt.”317 It
is often thought to follow—certainly Thayer himself thought so—that
courts should defer to any reasonable interpretation of the Constitution
advanced by Congress.318 But neither Thayer nor most scholars who write
in this tradition explicitly recognize that the process of determining
whether a legislative act is permitted by the Constitution consists, at a
minimum, of two discrete steps: (1) determining what the Constitution
means, that is, what it permits, commands, or forbids, and (2) determining whether the legislation is consistent with that meaning. These are the
stages, respectively, of interpretation and application. To be sure, judicial
L.J. 1943 (2003); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State
and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 656 (2000); Whittington, supra note 118.
315
See supra text accompanying notes 10–11.
316
This is in addition to a point we have already seen. As the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett dissenters persuasively argued, when determining whether a
congressional regulation of the states is congruent and proportional to the constitutional harm
Congress claims to have sought to redress or prevent, hence authorized by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the scope of that harm should be measured by reference to the constitutional operative proposition alone, not to the operative proposition glossed by any accompanying decision rule. See 531 U.S. 356, 381–83 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); supra text
accompanying notes 185–92.
317
James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 140 (1893) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa.
1811)). For a sampling of commentaries on Thayer’s essay on the centennial of its publication,
see One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1–468 (1993). On its ninetieth anniversary, Henry Monaghan described it as “the most
influential essay ever written on American constitutional law.” Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury
and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1983).
318
E.g., Thayer, supra note 317, at 136 (contending that Congress, not the Courts, has “primary authority to interpret” the Constitution).
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deference to a congressional judgment could operate at both stages. But
it need not. A court could defer at the interpretation stage but not the
application stage, or vice versa. Put another way, Thayer’s proposed rule
of administration could be operationalized in two distinct ways: (1) when
setting forth their understanding of what the Constitution means, the
courts should respect all reasonable doubts in favor of an interpretation
hospitable to national power, or (2) when determining whether challenged national action runs afoul of the courts’ interpretation of constitutional meaning, courts should entertain all doubts in favor of the action.
This second possibility speaks to what the constitutional decision rule
should be.319
In fact, there is reason to think that Thayer’s goal is more likely to be
realized (if only partially) by deferential decision rules than by judicial
deference to congressional judgments regarding the constitutional operative propositions. Thayer himself imagined that critics might object to his
proposal on the ground that “the ultimate question here is one of the
construction of a writing . . . and that it cannot well be admitted that
there should be two legal constructions of the same instrument.”320 This,
he said, “begs the question” because “the ultimate question is not what is
the true meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not.”321 In other words, he resisted the effort to tease the stages of
interpretation and application apart, seeming to suggest instead that
courts could and should just announce whether challenged legislation
could stand without specifying what they took to be the constitutional
premise supporting such a conclusion.
Perhaps this strategy could work if the federal courts sat in judgment
only of other national actors. But, of course, federal courts review the actions of states too, and interpretive deference to state courts, legislatures,
and executives seems far less defensible. Indeed, Thayer himself made

319

According to Keith Whittington, “the most important implications of the debate over judicial supremacy may relate to the proper degree of deference the branches should show to
one another’s constitutional judgments.” Whittington, supra note 118, at 778. That is, he says,
“the debate over judicial supremacy focuses more squarely on the institutional problem of
who should make the final decision concerning contested interpretations.” Id. My point is that
Whittington’s first observation is not entirely captured by his second. The courts could afford
at least partial deference to another branch’s “constitutional judgments” not by deferring to
that branch’s judgments about what the Constitution is most properly interpreted to mean but
by deferring only to potentially contrary judgments about whether the constitutional meanings, as judicially determined, are satisfied.
320
Thayer, supra note 317, at 150.
321
Id.
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clear that his rule of reasonable doubt should govern coordinate branches
only, not state legislators.322 This limitation is a larger problem for
Thayer’s proposal than he recognized, because constitutional challenges
to state conduct are likely to produce two important consequences: First,
the federal courts will, not infrequently, adjudge the state action unconstitutional; second, and as a consequence, they will (rightly) feel compelled to provide more detailed explanations for such judgments than just
that “the legislation is not sustainable.” Constitutional litigation involving
state actors, in short, will force the federal courts to announce their views
about constitutional meaning—announcements that Thayer had hoped
would not be necessary in litigation challenging federal legislation. Once
such judgments are announced, however, it will become more difficult for
courts to defer to contrary interpretations put forth by Congress because
so doing would produce what Thayer seems to acknowledge would be an
323
embarrassment of “two legal constructions of the same instrument.” If
this is so, then deference to Congress, if it is to exist, will find a more hospitable home at the level of applying constitutional meaning, not deriving
it. Thayerians may therefore do well to shift their focus from arguing for
judicial deference to Congress’s constitutional interpretations—i.e., to
Congress’s judgments about the constitutional operative propositions—to
arguing for more deferential decision rules.
I have just explained why the usual arguments for judicial deference to
the interpretive judgments of Congress may find greater success if translated into arguments that courts should give greater deference to Congress’s judgments about whether given policies conform to judgeinterpreted constitutional meanings. The argument becomes that courts
should, on their own initiative, adopt more deferential decision rules.
There is an even more profound way in which full appreciation of constitutional decision rules could pave the way for a more robust congressional role in the enterprise of constitutional implementation: The Court
could permit Congress to substitute its judgment for the Court’s on just
what the applicable decision rule should be.
Recall our provisional catalogue of the considerations upon which
courts are likely to rely when creating decision rules: minimizing adjudicatory error, promoting greater compliance with the constitutional operative proposition, reducing the extent to which an operative proposition
chills socially valuable conduct, reducing constitutional litigation and its
322
323

Id. at 154–55.
Id. at 150.
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associated costs, etc. We noted that reasonable people might disagree
about which of these considerations courts should be permitted to rely
upon at all. Insofar as judges do believe themselves authorized to take
considerations like these into account in the shaping of constitutional decision rules, it remains a wholly separate question whether the resulting
judge-made decision rules should stand in the face of contrary factual or
evaluative judgments made by Congress. Suppose, for instance, that a
particular underenforcing decision rule rests on the Court’s conclusion
that adjudication of the operative proposition in question by the usual
preponderance-of-the-evidence decision rule is likely to chill a large
amount of socially valuable behavior. Congress might disagree with either or both of these judgments. It could think that the overdeterred behavior is not especially valuable (hence its chill not especially costly) or
that little of it would be chilled by a decision rule that does not underenforce the operative proposition. In either case, Congress might be moved
to legislate that courts should apply a different decision rule. The question for the courts would then become whether to allow the judge-made
decision rule to be replaced by the Congress-made one.324 An appropriate
analysis would no doubt be complex, depending on, among other things,
a relative institutional-competencies analysis more sophisticated than legal process armchair meditations.325
3. Summary
Here, to summarize, are some of the reasons why we should train ourselves to view judicial constitutional doctrine not as an undifferentiated
324

Miranda had stated explicitly that custodial statements could be admitted without warnings if Congress or the states created alternative methods to effectively protect the privilege
against self-incrimination. See 384 U.S. at 467. The point here is that neither Congress nor the
Court should stand on ceremony. Even without an explicit invitation, Congress has authority—which the Court should recognize in an appropriate case—to revise or supplant judgemade decision rules.
325
For views that are readily assimilable to this argument, see, for example, Robert A. Burt,
Miranda and Title II: A Morgantic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; Ross, supra note 190;
Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146. Note, however, this difference between Strauss’s view and mine. Referring to Monaghan’s distinction between Marbury-shielded constitutional interpretation and congressionally reversible constitutional
common law, Strauss argues in favor of a third category: congressionally reversible constitutional interpretation. Strauss, supra note 146, at 960 & n.11. Instead of viewing this possibility
as a middle ground between two poles, however, we could view it as the third box in a two-bytwo matrix. If so, a fourth possibility plainly emerges: doctrine that neither qualifies as constitutional interpretation nor is congressionally reversible. Some decision rules—perhaps a great
many—will fall in this box.
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mass but, rather, in terms of such conceptually distinct components as
operative propositions and decision rules. First, because our debates
about political morality are so thoroughly couched in constitutional
terms, being able to more clearly identify what the Supreme Court thinks
the Constitution means will provide us richer argumentative and educative resources than is supplied by a mere understanding of what the constitutional doctrine is. Second and relatedly, isolating judge-interpreted
constitutional meaning from within judge-announced constitutional doctrine better informs governmental agents of their true (judicially determined) constitutional responsibilities, and thus better enables us to
evaluate their performance. We might find that conduct that would, if adjudicated, be held constitutional nonetheless warrants criticism, or that
conduct that would, if adjudicated, be held unconstitutional does not.
Third, to focus on the process of decision-rule making as a conceptually distinct step in the logic of constitutional adjudication can enable
clearer and more reasoned analysis and debate about the legitimate
moves in the making of constitutional doctrine. It is not uncommon for
theorists or judges who espouse a strict variety of textualism or originalism to (claim to) reject tout court judicial reliance on what we might
loosely term pragmatic or institutional considerations in the exercise of
judicial review. However, to recognize the inevitability that constitutional
decision rules of some sort will exist and to acknowledge (as almost inescapable) that federal courts should have the authority to construct constitutional decision rules for the purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error
in the aggregate makes it impossible to maintain such a categorical
stance. Once we grant as legitimate some recourse to pragmatism in the
formation of constitutional doctrine, those hostile to a more thoroughgoing judicial pragmatism are compelled to adopt more realistic and nuanced positions.326
Fourth, by more clearly identifying the logic that undergirds particular
doctrines, the distinction will make courts better able to develop and refine those doctrines in more coherent and sensible fashion. Fifth, distinguishing decision rules from operative propositions creates more varied
opportunities for courts to accommodate other branches’ “constitutional
326

Some readers may notice that the argument here assumes the same shape as does Matt
Adler and Michael Dorf’s recent analysis of what they term constitutional existence conditions and constitutional application conditions. Adler & Dorf, supra note 227. In reply to absolutists who would urge wholesale abolition of judicial review, Adler and Dorf contend that
judicial review of what they term constitutional existence conditions is ineliminable, thus forcing judicial review skeptics to draw and defend finer lines than they might otherwise.
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judgments” (broadly construed) than does the debate over whether
courts should defer to other branches’ interpretations of constitutional
meaning, and thus facilitates development of more democratically legitimate constitutional law.
At bottom the point is this. The operative proposition/decision rule
distinction may appear at first blush to divide the terrain of constitutional
doctrine only slightly differently than had previous accounts. But this
tweaking has the great virtue of being less susceptible both to Straussian
doubts that the classificatory enterprise inevitably rests upon a false assumption that constitutional meaning can be derived through a process
divorced from practical and empirical considerations,327 and to objections
(perhaps coming from a Scalian direction) that all doctrinal outputs other
than judicial statements of constitutional meaning are illegitimate. And if
the distinction between decision rules and operative propositions better
tracks our experience of constitutional adjudication and better resists
some forceful critiques, then we should expect that adopting it will not
just mirror our reality more faithfully but will have consequences. That is
how conceptual frameworks work.
B. An Illustration
This Part began by acknowledging that trying to classify ambiguous
constitutional doctrine as either operative proposition or decision rule
could be either futile or pointless. The previous Section does not demonstrate otherwise. Nothing in this Article should be understood to advance
the strong claim that how constitutional doctrine is best classified can always (or even usually) be successfully divined from judicial opinions, or
that it would always be worthwhile even to try. Nor, looking forward, do
I argue that, when announcing doctrine, a court should always make clear
which aspects of that doctrine are operative propositions and which, if
any, are decision rules. I do contend, though, that courts, scholars, and
327

I have emphasized that this proposed start to a doctrinal taxonomy does not commit one
to anti-Pragmatism. Even one who believes that we cannot isolate two distinct sorts of judicial
processes (called, perhaps, “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional doctrinemaking”) based on the sorts of considerations that judges employ, can still endorse a distinction between operative propositions and decision rules in the belief that such a distinction
usefully serves some of the functions just discussed (and/or others). That is, the distinction is
consistent with the view that the formation of constitutional doctrine “is functional . . . all the
way up.” See supra text accompanying note 150 (quoting Levinson, supra note 27, at 873).
Consistent with, but not dependent upon. Indeed, this way of carving the domain of constitutional doctrine has the great virtue that it can be employed as well by self-described textualists
or originalists as by the Pragmatists.
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litigators ought to reflect on the possible values of doctrinal taxonomy,
and should think and speak in terms of operative propositions and decision rules when doing so would be productive. Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista,328 a case decided the same Term as Board of Trustees of the Univeristy of Alabama v. Garrett, provides a recent and illuminating example of
how appreciation of the values that the decision rule concept serves can
help courts and commentators make reasoned judgments about whether,
and how, to try to classify ambiguous doctrine.
The case arose after Gail Atwater, a mother driving with her two
young children in the small city of Lago Vista, Texas, was pulled over by
Officer Bart Turek and cited for the misdemeanor of driving without her
seatbelt, or those of her children, fastened. Although Turek could have
simply issued Atwater a citation, he arrested and handcuffed her and
transported her to the police station. Arguing that the arrest was an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Atwater sued Turek, the chief of the police, and the city.
Four Justices would have upheld Atwater’s claim, reasoning straightforwardly that a custodial arrest is a seizure, that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes “unreasonable seizures,” that whether a given seizure is reasonable depends entirely upon the particulars of the situation,329 and that
this particular seizure was patently unreasonable because legitimate state
interests could have been served just as well by the simple issuance of a
citation.330 A five-member majority disagreed, holding in an opinion by
Justice Souter that the arrest did not violate Atwater’s Fourth Amendment rights.
To paraphrase Justice Scalia’s Dickerson v. United States dissent, the
Atwater majority (which he joined) does not say that Officer Turek had
engaged in a “reasonable seizure.” That would have been “preposter331
ous.” Indeed, Justice Souter could hardly have made plainer that Officer Turek had acted unreasonably. “If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case,” the majority
conceded, “Atwater might well prevail . . . . Atwater’s claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City
328

532 U.S. 318 (2001).
“It is beyond cavil that the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is
always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of
a citizen’s personal security.” Id. at 360 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
330
Id. at 369–71.
331
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 448.
329
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can raise against it specific to her case.”332 But this was not the sort of inquiry the majority wanted adjudications of Fourth Amendment cases to
turn on, for
a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government
need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an
occasion for constitutional review. Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment,
and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to
draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair
prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after
an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable
Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an
333
essential interest in readily administrable rules.

In short, the majority wanted a rule not a standard. And, dissatisfied with
the rule Atwater proposed,334 the majority announced its own: “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a
very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the
Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”335
This is the Atwater doctrine. But is it an operative proposition or a decision rule? On its face, it looks like the former. That is, it purports to be
a statement of just what the Fourth Amendment demands. On this view,
it is per se reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for a
police office to arrest anyone who commits any criminal offense under
any circumstances, so long as the offense occurs in the officer’s presence.
Yet there is reason for doubt. Simply put, per se analysis seems inconsistent with the very concept of reasonableness.336 And in fact the Court had

332

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346–47.
Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted).
334
Atwater proposed that the Court declare it constitutionally unreasonable for police officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of “breach[es] of the peace,” a
category of nonfelony offenses “involving or tending toward violence.” Id. at 327. The majority rejected this suggestion largely on the grounds that it was inconsistent with historical practice. Id. at 326–45.
335
Id. at 354.
336
See Sager, supra note 5, at 1244 n.104 (illustrating his observation that some “constitutional provision[s] . . . simply do[] not lend [themselves] to under-enforcement analysis,” with
“the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment, which explicitly calls for case-by-case
balancing of state and private interests”); cf. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of
Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era
333
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previously suggested that Fourth Amendment reasonableness calls for
the all-things-considered exercises of judgment.337 For these reasons, the
Atwater doctrine might be better conceived as a decision rule that courts
should conclusively presume a full custodial arrest to be reasonable if
they conclude (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the officer had
probable cause to suppose that the arrestee had committed any offense in
his presence. This characterization of the doctrine can explain how Atwater lost, even though not a single member of the Court seemed to doubt
that she had been subjected to an unreasonable seizure.
Even to ask the classificatory question might strike some readers as
overly academic. What matters, the Pragmatist might insist, is to appreciate the sorts of considerations that the Court relied upon. Atwater is just
further confirmation that, as Strauss had argued, “courts create constitutional doctrine by taking into account both the principles and values reflected in the relevant constitutional provisions and institutional realities.”338 In particular, the Court worried that, absent mediation by rulelike doctrine, judicial implementation of the Fourth Amendment would
risk social harm by encouraging police officers to become unduly timid339
and would also generate excessive litigation.340 If it is proper for courts to
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239 (2002) (presenting a
blistering attack on the Atwater majority’s characterization of relevant historical practice).
337
See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990) (“[I]n order to satisfy the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the
many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. . . . Whether the basis for
[arrest] authority exists is the sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is
that they answer it reasonably.”).
338
Strauss, supra note 38, at 207 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of Strauss’s argument,
see text accompanying notes 71–75.
339
See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 (“An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to
warrant jail time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would not arrest, even
though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, the offense called for incarceration and the
defendant was long gone on the day of trial. Multiplied many times over, the costs to society
of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to defendants of being needlessly
arrested and booked.”). Notice that the majority offers no hint that the Atwater doctrine
(whether operative proposition or decision rule) rests on estimates about how best to minimize adjudicatory errors. The Court expresses no concern that courts do a bad job of separating the reasonable from the unreasonable on a case-by-case basis. The problem, rather, is that
police might do a bad job of assessing reasonableness “on the spur (and in the heat) of the
moment.” Id. at 347. And if they are unsure whether an arrest is unreasonable, they are likely
to err on the side of caution. This is an instance of what I have called a “protective” doctrinemaking consideration.
340
Id. at 350 (observing that the dissent’s approach “would guarantee increased litigation
over many of the arrests that would occur”). This is a “fiscal” consideration.
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advert to such considerations in the crafting of doctrine, Atwater was legitimate; if not, then it wasn’t.341 Surely we need not classify the doctrine
as an operative proposition or a decision rule to see that.
Surely. But the question is not whether we need the distinction; it is
whether access to these concepts could prove useful. One way into the
problem is to ask whether, had the distinction between constitutional operative propositions and constitutional decision rules been part of Justice
Souter’s conceptual toolbox, he might have perceived reasons to think
one or the other characterization of the doctrine preferable.
Consider these three reasons to favor the decision-rule characterization of the Atwater doctrine over the operative-rule alternative. First, it is
to be preferred on the dimension of social meaning. The Atwater decision
was roundly denounced.342 A recurrent theme in the criticism was that the
Court had condoned Turek’s behavior, a view of the case picked up even
in reports neutral as to the outcome.343 Certainly the majority did not
want to convey the impression that this sort of behavior was in fact “reasonable.” It is plausible to suspect that the Court would have been able to
more effectively communicate that message had it explicitly described its
doctrine as a decision rule adopted only to help ensure that wellintentioned officers in the future not be rendered unduly timid by fear of
being adjudged, after the fact, to have acted unreasonably.
341

For a debate long preceding Atwater regarding the propriety of bright-line judge-made
rules to administer the Fourth Amendment, compare Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth
Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982), and Wayne LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127 (defending many of the
same protective considerations endorsed in Atwater), with Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 227 (1984). For a recent and nuanced
endorsement of LaFave’s position, see Dripps, supra note 94, at 1.
342
See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 329, 331 n.4 (citing criticisms of
the decision from the media).
343
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View of the 4th Amendment, L.A. Times,
Apr. 29, 2001, at M1 (questioning the Court’s analysis of what constitutes “unreasonable”
conduct under the Fourth Amendment); Sandy Banks, Why A Mom’s Fate Should Worry Us
All, L.A. Times, Apr. 27, 2001, at 1E (stating that “the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the
cop, [agreeing] that even the most minor criminal offense can justify a trip to jail”); Mark
Cloud, Extreme Searches, Chi. Trib., May 4, 2001, at 25N (jesting that the Court “didn’t let
the 4th Amendment interfere with [the officer’s] good work”); A Decision Lacking Reason,
Investor’s Bus. Daily, Apr. 26, 2001, at 22 (observing that the Court “ruled the officer’s action
is allowed by the Constitution”); Municipal Court Practice Committee Report, New Jersey
Lawyer, Feb. 25, 2002, at 365 n.3 (“In Atwater, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a police officer in Texas acted properly in arresting a woman for the minor offense of failing to
wear a seatbelt.”).
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Second, the decision-rule characterization is likely to open up more
space for (appropriate) congressional involvement in the shaping of constitutional doctrine. Suppose that Congress disagreed with the Court’s
predictive judgment about how much well-intentioned police behavior
the ad hoc, totality of the circumstances approach to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness would chill, or with the Court’s evaluative judgment
about how much litigation on the matter was excessive. Which branch’s
judgments on these particular questions should prevail in determining
what shape constitutional doctrine should take? One might reasonably
conclude that Congress’s judgments on this question should trump those
of the Court. Again, it is plausible to suppose that announcing the Atwater doctrine as a decision rule employing a conclusive presumption would
be a particularly effective (though not essential) way to signal where and
how Congress could intervene if it so chose.
Third and relatedly, characterizing the doctrine as a decision rule
might make it easier for the Court to itself revisit the doctrine if appropriate. When balancing the costs of overdeterring police from engaging in
reasonable arrests against those of under-deterring them from engaging
in unreasonable ones, the Court expressly observed “a dearth of horribles
demanding redress.”344 But what if the Court substantially underestimated
the incidence of unreasonable warrantless misdemeanor arrests? Or what
if the Court was right at the time of its opinion, but facts changed? No
doubt the Court could revise the doctrine in light of experience regardless of how the doctrine was classified. But it is plausible to suppose that
the competing demands of stability and flexibility might find more effective reconciliation in the development of stare decisis practices that allow
decision rules to be modified or abandoned somewhat more readily than
operative propositions.
The claim, to reiterate, is not that these interests could not be advanced if we lacked the operative proposition/decision rule distinction
entirely, or if, possessed of the distinction, we classified the Atwater doctrine as an operative proposition. It is to suggest, though, that these interests could probably not be served as well. That you find these particular
arguments in favor of the decision-rule reading of Atwater convincing is
not critical. Additional arguments could lie in its favor; strong arguments
may militate for the operative-proposition reading. The essential points
are two: First, it is possible to give reasons for preferring one characterization of the doctrine over another even when the doctrine could be
344

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.
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characterized either way; second, those reasons do not depend upon implausible assumptions about the nature of constitutional adjudication.
V. DICKERSON REVISITED: MIRANDA AS A DECISION RULE
We are finally positioned to respond to Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent. The response, in short, will be that the Miranda doctrine consists of
a constitutional operative proposition directing courts not to admit into
evidence statements that had been compelled by the state, administered
by a constitutional decision rule directing that a court must conclusively
presume a statement to have been compelled if it concludes (by a preponderance of the evidence) that the statement was elicited during custodial interrogation not preceded by the requisite warnings or in which
the suspect’s invocation of a right to silence or to counsel was not respected. The Court chose this decision rule, furthermore, as a means to
reduce adjudicatory error because it believed that compulsion was common yet very hard to discover. On this account, the Miranda doctrine is a
legitimate exercise of judicial power on the modest (though not incontestable) assumption that courts are empowered to create errorminimizing constitutional decision rules.
Although the labels “operative proposition” and “decision rule” are
unconventional, the foregoing interpretation of Miranda is, in broad
strokes, familiar.345 But it has not been universally accepted. Regrettably,
a lengthy analysis is necessary to elaborate and defend the claim, and to
demonstrate some of what follows.
Section V.A presents the basic claim. In order to make vivid, or even
plausible, why the Court held as it did, and why the decision-rule interpretation is sensible, we need a reasonably firm grasp on the operative
proposition that the decision rule is intended to adjudicate. Accordingly,
Section V.A explains more clearly and fully than have most other accounts just what the operative proposition is and how the decision rule is
designed to administer it. Section V.B shows that, if the account of Section V.A is correct, then the charge that Miranda announced a prophylactic rule (in the sense intended by Miranda’s critics) fails. A decision rule
designed to minimize adjudicatory errors is not meaningfully character345

See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(d) (2d ed. 1999); Cox, supra
note 130, at 250–51 (concluding that “the thrust of the argument [in Miranda] seems to be that
unless prophylactic measures are employed there will be inadequate assurance that any confession obtained in secret is not procured by compulsion violating the privilege against selfincrimination”); Huitema, supra note 76, at 263.
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ized as “overprotecting” the constitutional operative proposition, or as
“sweeping more broadly” than the judge-interpreted constitutional
meaning. Perhaps, however, the account of Section V.A is not correct.
And perhaps the reason it is not correct has something to do with the fact
that the putative Miranda decision rule employs a conclusive presumption. Section V.C confronts and rebuts the argument, voiced often by Joseph Grano, that use of a conclusive presumption in a decision rule cannot be designed to minimize adjudicatory error. In short, if the Miranda
doctrine is properly classified in decision-rule terms, and if the decision
rule rests on adjudicatory considerations, the doctrine is not rendered illegitimate by being operationalized in the form of a conclusive presumption. Together, then, Sections V.B and V.C identify and defeat challenges
to the defense of Miranda put forth in Section V.A.
Section V.D turns from Miranda itself to its progeny, exploring how
sensitive attention to the operative proposition/decision rule classification
and to the actual considerations that could support the Miranda decision
rule, bear upon how the Miranda doctrine ought to be more fully fleshed
out, with regards, for example, to the propriety of an emergency “public
safety” exception and the admissibility of fruits of an un-Mirandized
statement. These inquiries are of more than academic interest as the Supreme Court will address the scope of the fruits doctrine this very
Term,346 while some lower courts have questioned whether the public
safety exception to Miranda survives Dickerson.347 Moreover, this discussion constitutes, in effect, another test of the utility—and therefore the
truth—of the conceptualization this Article advances. I will hope to show
that this particular way of dividing the conceptual terrain offers a more
satisfactory defense of Miranda’s legitimacy—while more clearly isolating
its assumptions and its vulnerabilities—than do other accounts.

346

See Missouri v. Seibert, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003) (granting certiorari to determine whether
the Oregon v. Elstad rule that a statement elicited during a warned custodial interrogation is
admissible despite the fact that the suspect had made an inculpatory statement in a prior unwarned custodial interrogation applies even when the police officer’s failure to issue warnings
in the first interrogation was intentional); United States v. Patane, 123 S. Ct. 1788 (2003)
(granting certiorari to determine whether Dickerson overturns the Elstad-Tucker doctrine on
fruits of un-Mirandized interrogations).
347
See, e.g., Dyson v. United States, 815 A.2d 363, 370 n.2 (D.C. 2003) (noting that “at a
minimum” Dickerson suggests that the New York v. Quarles exception be “narrowly construed and strictly applied”); Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The rationale supporting Quarles’ public safety exception has been, to some degree, called into
question by Dickerson.”).
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A. The Miranda Doctrine Taxonomized
As Stephen Schulhofer observed fifteen years ago, criticism of the
Miranda rule “usually obscures the fact that Miranda contains not one
holding but a complex series of holdings [that] . . . can be subdivided in
various ways.”348 Even today, much confusion remains concerning precisely what Miranda held. This Section explicates “the Miranda doctrine”
by distinguishing two outputs from that case: a constitutional operative
proposition containing two discrete elements, and a constitutional decision rule.
1. The Operative Proposition
The Fifth Amendment commands that “[n]o person . . . be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”349 Everyone agrees
that this means, at a minimum, that courts not “compel” defendants upon
pain of conviction or contempt sanctions to testify at their trials.350 In contrast, say, to the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and
seizures, this is a constitutional rule directed in the first instance to trial
courts, not to the police. The question logically prior to the Miranda
Court’s exploration of the need for specific warnings, accordingly, was
whether anything that happens outside of trial could implicate the SelfIncrimination Clause at all. Posing the question as “whether the privilege
is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation,”351 the Court

348

Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 436. Schulhofer himself carved up the decision as containing “three conceptually distinct steps” or “holdings”: (1) “that informal pressure to speak—
that is, pressure not backed by legal process or any formal sanction—can constitute ‘compulsion’ within the meaning of the fifth amendment”; (2) “that this element of informal compulsion is present in any questioning of a suspect in custody”; and (3) “that precisely specified
warnings are required to dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation.” Id. This
analysis has proven influential, see, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 58, at 942; George C. Thomas
III, Separated at Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases,
99 Mich. L. Rev. 1081, 1083 (2001), and surely has much to recommend it. Its greatest defect,
in my opinion, lies in the opacity of the second step. What does it mean for an “element of . . .
compulsion” to be “present”? Plainly it does not mean that every unwarned custodial interrogation constitutes compulsion “within the meaning of the fifth amendment.” But if the presence of an “element” of compulsion, or (what might be the same thing) the existence of some
“compelling pressure,” does not itself amount to compulsion in the constitutionally relevant
sense, then the justification for step (3) remains unclear.
349
U.S. Const. amend. V.
350
The Court had earlier described the right to remain silent in an official inquiry as necessary to avoid “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
351
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460–61.
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answered in the affirmative. Its first holding, consequently, was “that all
the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.”352
Unfortunately, this statement is ambiguous. It could mean either (a)
that any action by government agents—including police—that compels
someone to incriminate herself violates the Self-Incrimination Clause, or
(b) that introduction within a criminal case of a defendant’s compelled
statement violates that Clause even if the statement was compelled outside the formal criminal proceedings.353 Surely the latter is the better
reading. Legal historians have found much to debate about the origins
and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination.354 One point on
which they agree, however, is that the privilege against self-incrimination
was an evidentiary privilege.355 The Court’s first step, then, was to announce constitutional meaning. The constitutional operative proposition,
that is to say, is a command to trial courts: “Do not admit evidence about
statements made by criminal defendants that were in fact compelled by
the police.”356
352

Id. at 461.
The ambiguity has been retained in subsequent characterizations. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 352 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “by the time we decided
Miranda, it was settled that the privilege against self-incrimination applies with full force outside the chambers of ‘formal’ proceedings”); Kamisar, supra note 58, at 917 (“The Miranda
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies not only to the proceedings in a
courtroom or before a legislative committee, but to the ‘informal compulsion exerted by lawenforcement officers during in-custody questioning.’”) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461).
354
Valuable recent contributions include Katharine B. Hazlett, The Nineteenth Century
Origins of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist.
235 (1998); R.H. Helmholz et al., The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and
Development (1997); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth:
Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 Mich.
L. Rev. 1086 (1994).
355
This was clearly the Court’s view when, seventy years before Miranda, it first held that
the Self-Incrimination Clause barred admission in federal court of extra-judicially compelled
confessions. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 541–58 (1897).
356
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Reply—Self-Incrimination and the
Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Kamisar, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1011, 1012 (1995)
(“Rogue police can be cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized. Abusive actions in police stations,
squad cars, and crime scenes are themselves unconstitutional—they are paradigmatic unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. But, if a defendant’s coerced
‘confession’ . . . is never introduced in a criminal case, the Fifth Amendment, on our reading,
is not violated.”); Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 958 n.8
(“The Fifth Amendment is violated when compelled statements are admitted into evidence
against the speaker in a criminal prosecution.”). In a speech delivered after Dickerson, Justice
Stevens intimated a contrary position. See John Paul Stevens, How a Mundane Assignment
353
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For this statement to be useful, of course, we need some idea of what
compulsion means in this context. We need, that is, further elaboration of
the operative proposition. Criminal procedure scholars have debated for
decades what compulsion does mean, or should mean, or did mean for
the Miranda Court, and this cannot be the place for a full rehearsal.357 Let
us start instead with the Court’s own language. Recognizing that in the
three actual cases before it, the Court “might not find the defendants’
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms,” Chief Justice
Warren insisted that
concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment
rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. In each of the cases, the
defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through
menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully apparent. . . . To be sure, the records do not evince
overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains
that in none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the
358
statements were truly the product of free choice.

This passage is maddeningly enigmatic. Does the Court mean to announce that compulsion for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is
not limited to the “traditional” understanding of “involuntariness,” familiar from the Court’s due process jurisprudence? Or is the point that even
though the test of compulsion under the Self-Incrimination Clause is the
same as the traditional due process test of involuntariness, and even
though the Court might not find the statements at issue in the instant
cases involuntary, hence compelled, “safeguards” were necessary to protect against involuntary/compelled statements in the future?359 Again, although the question cannot be conclusively resolved, there are good rea-

Affected My Re-Examination of Miranda, 14 Oct. Chi. Bar Ass’n, Rec. 34, 36–37 (2000) (contending that the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause “is implicated the moment that
custodial interrogation commences” even if the suspect does not say a word). “Implicated” is
a sufficiently imprecise word that we cannot be certain just what Justice Stevens means. But if
he means that interrogation itself can violate the Clause, I think this is mistaken. The mistake
rests, I think, on Justice Stevens’s failure to distinguish due process from self-incrimination
constraints on police behavior.
357
A useful overview, including citations to a handful of authorities, appears in 2 Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2 (2d ed. 1999).
358
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
359
See, e.g., Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices
After Dickerson 56 (2001) (noting this ambiguity).
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sons to favor the former reading—including that such a position was
urged by petitioners at oral argument.360 Criminal procedure scholars, in
any event, have reached a fairly wide consensus. As Schulhofer put it:
“[C]ompulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for
due process purposes cannot mean the same thing.”361
Assuming this is so, we need to know what the difference is. The
Court’s due process cases were themselves far from pellucid, resorting as
they did to such empty metaphors as the famous “overborne will.”362 Still,
the root idea was adequately discernible. Most historians agree that the
common law ban on “involuntary” confessions was principally driven by
a concern to exclude confessions thought likely to be unreliable. However, the Supreme Court refused to fix the privilege on such a narrow

360

Victor Earle, counsel in one of the Miranda companion cases, readily conceded at oral
argument that there was “no sense” in which his client’s confession was coerced. Instead, he
urged attention to “a substantial difference between” Fifth Amendment compulsion and “coercing a confession,” which latter concern he attributed “to the generality of the totality of the
circumstances under the due process clause.” “It is true,” he continued, “that the word ‘compel’ is used in the Fifth Amendment with respect to the privilege, but it is quite different to
say that the privilege is cut down and impaired by detention and to say a man’s will has been
so overborne a confession is forced from him.” Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases-Comments-Questions 461 (10th ed. 2002) (quoting from unofficial transcripts of
oral argument).
361
Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 443. For an extended recent argument, see Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 941, 943–51 (2001) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence];
see also, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
“New” Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 65–82
(1966); LaFave, Constitutional Rules, supra note 115, at 858 (“[W]hat the Constitution protects against is not merely the more gross technique of police interrogation commonly the focus of attention under the old due process ‘voluntariness’ test . . . but also other circumstances
which produce ‘compulsion’ in the fifth amendment sense.”); Ritchie, supra note 69; Stone,
supra note 69, at 118 (contending that the Tucker Court’s “conclusion that there is a violation
of the Self-Incrimination Clause only if a confession is involuntary under traditional standards
is an outright rejection of the core premises of Miranda”); Thomas, supra note 348, at 1086–87
(arguing that the “due process protection . . . the Miranda Court thought it was creating . . .
substitut[ed] . . . Fifth Amedment ‘compulsion’ for due process ‘coercion’ as the relevant inquiry”). Strauss may be mistaken, therefore, in assuming that, to make adequate sense of
Miranda, the notions of due process voluntariness and self-incrimination compulsion “can be
equated.” Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 962; see also
Susan R. Klein, Essay, No Time for Silence, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1337, 1344 (2003) (“Regardless of
whether the Court frames the issue as one of due process or privilege, the voluntariness test
and the condemnation of coercive police practices should be identical.”).
362
This formulation was introduced in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1940). The
classic criticism is Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession? Some Comments on
Inbau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 728, 755–59
(1963); see also, e.g., Grano, Confessions, supra note 77.
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base, candidly explaining six years before Miranda that “a complex of
values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions
which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary.”363
And, according to Joseph Grano, “most commentators” have concluded
that this complex of values fundamentally reduces to two: “(1) a desire,
surviving from the common-law approach, to eliminate untrustworthy
confessions and (2) a desire to control offensive police practices.”364 On
the assumption that self-incrimination compulsion is more expansive than
due process voluntariness, it follows that a statement may not reflect a
“truly . . . free choice,” hence is “compelled,” even if the magnitude of
pressure exerted by the police was not so great as either to provoke worries that a resulting confession would be unreliable or to constitute a
morally offensive police practice.365 Regardless of whether this would present an attractive or persuasive vision of what represents (in an inescapably evaluative assessment) adequate freedom, it is a perfectly coherent
position to maintain.366
363

Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 65; see also, e.g., White, supra note 359, at 39–48;
Kamisar, supra note 362. One treatise identifies a third value of protecting the dignity of
criminal defendants by excluding statements secured under circumstances, even if not involving inherently obnoxious police practices, that significantly constrained the individual’s freedom of choice. 2 LaFave et al., supra note 357, at 446. As will be seen, I suggest that Miranda
makes most sense as treating the two concerns identified by Grano to undergird the due process “involuntariness” test, while locating something like this third concern only in the SelfIncrimination Clause.
365
In speaking of degrees of pressure, I am ignoring other circumstances, most notably (but
perhaps not exclusively) deception on the part of the police, that might be thought to render
subsequent admission of a resulting statement unconstitutional on either due process or selfincrimination grounds. For a characteristically careful examination of this problem, see
George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 275. My sense, which I will not defend, is that deception can make
out a due process violation but should not constitute compulsion for self-incrimination purposes. See, e.g., State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003).
366
For just one illustration of how this could be, consider Harry Frankfurt’s well-known theory of freedom grounded in the distinction between first- and second-order desires. Harry G.
Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in The Importance of What We
Care About 11–25 (1988). Very roughly, Frankfurt argues that a person’s choice is free when
it issues from a first-order desire that is itself consistent with a second-order desire. If I eat a
second piece of cheesecake without anyone having pressured me to do so, that is a free choice
in one sense: it is consistent with my first-order desires. But I may not really want to have that
second piece. Indeed, even as I reach for it, I may know that I do not “really” want it. I may,
in Frankfurt’s terms, have a second-order desire that I not have the first-order desire on which
I act. When my action is consistent with a first-order desire that is itself not consistent with my
second-order desires, that action may plausibly be said not to be “truly free” or to lack “free
will.” See, e.g., id. at 18 (contending that a drug addict who takes a drug in conformity to a
364
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first-order desire under circumstances in which his second-order desire is that he not act on
that first-order desire “may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements that the
force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own
free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take it”). It is not important
for present purposes whether an account of free will along these lines can provide a successful
response to the threat of determinism, as Frankfurt claimed for it. For doubts, see, for instance, Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. Phil. 205 (1975). The point is only that it provides an
account of free choice by which a choice can be unfree even if the phenomenology of the experience is such that the agent would not conclude that she “had no choice” or that her will
was “overborne.” In short, it illustrates how a statement can be not “truly the product of free
choice” without being “involuntary.” And it does so by conceptualizing human choice and action in a way that gives some content or substance to the Court’s evident (if largely unarticulated) intuition that differences in the magnitude of pressure a person experiences translate
into a more nuanced range of normatively meaningful distinctions than is implied by recourse
to a simple pair of opposites such as “free” and “unfree,” or “voluntary” and “involuntary,”
and that does not depend upon attributions of wrongful conduct by others. It is therefore a
plausible candidate for the account of freedom at work in Miranda. Indeed, I think it plausible (though not at all essential) that the Miranda Court did in fact have an image of true freedom something like this inchoately in mind. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 (“Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice.”); id. at 467 (“[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of
persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”).
Grano thinks such an account untenable. In his view, it is impossible to avoid
[t]he unremarkable conclusion that the Fifth Amendment, if properly applied to police
interrogation at all, prohibits coerced or involuntary confessions. That is, in the context
of police interrogation, to “compel” a suspect to become a witness against himself can
only mean to “coerce” a suspect to become a witness against himself.
Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 135; see also Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell
the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 662,
684 (1986) (arguing that due process “voluntariness” and self-incrimination “compulsion” can
each “be understood only as a synonym for coercion”). Furthermore, Grano argues that the
concept of “coercion” necessarily entails “a claim that the alleged coercer engaged in wrongful conduct.” Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 99. Grano grounds this latter assertion on
an important analysis of coercion by the philosopher Alan Wertheimer. See generally id. at
64–69; Alan Wertheimer, Coercion (1987). Wertheimer’s insightful and illuminating analysis
has influenced my own views on coercion. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions
of Coercion Claims, 8 Legal Theory 45 (2002). Nonetheless, that analysis does not support
Grano’s attempt to equate compulsion and coercion. As the Frankfurt example illustrates,
there is no reason why a view of what constitutes the normatively adequate freedom of party
A must be cashed out by reference at all to the wrongful character of the behavior engaged in
by some other party, B. That is, we could conclude that A’s conduct was “compelled” by B’s
conduct because (1) B’s conduct had some specified sort of causal relationship to A’s conduct,
and (2) A’s conduct was not sufficiently free in the sense of not cohering adequately with A’s
higher-order wants, or not being adequately integrated with more stable characteristics of her
personality, without believing that such a conclusion entails that B’s conduct warrants criticism.

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

113

This is not to say that every incriminating statement that is not “truly
free” is compelled within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.367
If I walk into the local police precinct determined to confess to a particular crime, my decision to do so could be not “truly free” in the Court’s
normatively freighted sense because, say, I’m in the grip of an uncharacteristically melancholic or self-hating mood or because I’m responding to
pressures exerted by private third parties. Yet it seems extraordinary to
conclude that that fact alone would make my statement compelled for
constitutional purposes.368 A second condition, then, must be that the
state has somehow brought pressure to bear for the purpose of eliciting a
statement. If this is right, then an out-of-court statement is compelled for
Self-Incrimination Clause purposes (according to the Miranda Court) if
two conditions are satisfied: The statement must be not “truly free” in the
sense that it issues from psychological pressures incompatible with the
Court’s vision of appropriate freedom or dignity, and it must have been
elicited by police pressure exerted for the specific purpose of overcoming
the suspect’s unwillingness to talk.369
Still, we need not press this objection to Grano too strenuously. For even while arguing that
the two clauses should be interpreted to prohibit the very same police pressures, Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 131–41, Grano agrees that the Miranda Court took the view “that
coercion for Fifth Amendment purposes should be a less demanding concept than coercion
for due process purposes and that, accordingly, involuntariness should have different meanings under the two amendments.” Id. at 135. Put another way, he does not deny that we
could—and that the Court did—“regard police practices as wrongful under the Fifth Amendment [Self-Incrimination Clause] that would be insufficiently wrongful to make out a due
process claim of involuntariness.” Id. at 138.
367
However, it does entail that refusals to confess (just like confessions themselves) can be
“not truly free,” for a first-order desire not to confess might be inconsistent with a secondorder desire that one be the sort of person who accepts responsibility. This observation (for
which I am grateful to Larry Alexander) does not undermine my effort to supply a possible
conceptual grounding for the Miranda Court’s apparent view that Fifth Amendment compulsion need not collapse into due process involuntariness, see supra note 366, but it might draw
even further into question the soundness of the Court’s impulse to interpret compulsion in
terms of something as broad as “true freedom.” Very possibly too much of noncoerced human conduct is not “truly free” to make that latter concept a plausible constitutional touchstone.
368
Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a statement is “involuntary”
for due process purposes only when the product of coercive police activity); Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 535 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is “no rational foundation” to conclude that
“accused persons [are] so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to the very first
question following the commencement of custody must be conclusively presumed to be the
product of an overborne will”).
369
See, e.g., id. at 457 (explaining that the “interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally
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2. The Decision Rule
Once this first holding of Miranda is properly understood we are better
positioned to appreciate its second holding—the holding that, I will
claim, announced a constitutional decision rule.
a. The Rule Itself and a Common Misconception
Casual references to the Miranda decision, by courts and academics
alike, frequently characterize it as requiring police to issue the warnings.
Kenneth Starr, for example, explained in a recent book that Miranda announced “the new rule . . . that police must give a person in custody certain warnings about his or her rights.”370 Certainly snippets from the majority opinion can be read to support this view. For example, the Court’s
declaration that, “[i]n order to combat these [inherently compelling]
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored,”371 appears to order police officers to issue the specified warnings
prior to interrogating a suspect. This reading gains additional support
from Justice Clark’s separate opinion where he describes the Court as
destructive of human dignity”). I am therefore agreeing with Schulhofer that “[t]he policy
served by the [Self-Incrimination Clause] is not limited to preventing inhuman degradation or
breaking the will, but extends to all governmental efforts intended to pressure an unwilling
individual to assist as a witness in his own prosecution,” Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 445, yet
claiming that he overlooks this critical first condition when contending that “pressure imposed
for the purpose of discouraging the silence of a criminal suspect constitutes prohibited compulsion whether or not it ‘breaks the will.’” Id. Such a statement is compelled only when the
state imposes pressure for the forbidden purpose and when the statement is not, in fact, “truly
free.”
370
Kenneth W. Starr, First Among Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life 193 (2002).
Judge Friendly’s influential critique of Miranda likewise characterizes the decision as “forbid[ding] the police” from questioning suspects “without first endeavoring to make it likely
that they will not be answered.” Friendly, supra note 52, at 277. For a large number of similar
examples, see Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 Yale L.J. 447,
449 n.4 (2002); see also, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 706 (1993) (“Miranda’s innovation was its introduction of the warning requirement: It commanded the police to issue
warnings (or establish other procedural safeguards) before obtaining a statement through custodial interrogation.”); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (“Miranda, of course,
required police interrogators to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and set forth a now-familiar set of suggested instructions for that
purpose.”); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (“Miranda’s holding has the virtue of
informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation.”).
371
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; see also id. at 471 (stating that the warnings are “an absolute
prerequisite to interrogation”).
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“fashion[ing] a constitutional rule that the police may engage in no custodial interrogation without . . . advising the accused that he has a right
under the Fifth Amendment to the presence of counsel during interrogation and that, if he is without funds, counsel will be furnished him.”372
Were this requirement part of the Miranda doctrine, it would not be a
decision rule. Perhaps it would be an operative proposition—though one
of dubious legitimacy. Or perhaps recognition of doctrinal rules of this
sort would provoke further taxonomic line-drawing. But it is unnecessary
to speculate because reliance on these stray passages is misplaced. Any
apparent commands to the police are much better construed to offer only
conditional guidance: Give these warnings, the Court’s opinion advises, if
you want subsequent statements to be admissible.
To begin, “[t]he constitutional issue” that called for decision concerned
precisely “the admissibility of statements,” and not the propriety of their
extraction.373 Yet more important is the language Chief Justice Warren
uses whenever the lengthy majority opinion pauses to offer what looks
like more formal statements of its holding. In the opinion’s introduction,
for example, the Court encapsulates the holding thusly: “[T]he prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”374 This rule from
Miranda, accordingly, would be addressed to the trial courts, not the police—just like the operative proposition itself.375 It is a direction that they
372

Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting in part, and concurring in part).
Id. at 445.
374
Id. at 444 (emphasis added). And after spelling out the required warnings in detail, the
Court summarizes the holding in even plainer terms: “[U]nless and until such warnings and
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant].” Id. at 479. To be sure, this articulation of the
holding differs from the one quoted in text in one significant respect: Whereas the latter
makes only the unwarned statement itself inadmissible, this seems to require suppression of
the unwarned statement as well as any fruits thereof. For present purposes, though, the important point is only that these two formal pronouncements similarly resolve the ambiguity of
whether the Miranda doctrine constrains courts or police; how best to resolve the new ambiguity that they combine to create is reserved for later. See infra Section V.D.3. As far as interpreting Miranda itself, though, I agree with Judge Friendly that this passage “can be better
read as referring only to the statements themselves, which are repeatedly mentioned in the
opinion, rather than as disposing of so large an issue in so casual a fashion.” Friendly, supra
note 52, at 279.
375
This is the core thesis of Clymer, supra note 370, and a point that several earlier commentaries had also taken pains to make clear. See, e.g., infra note 377; Susan R. Klein, Miranda
Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide,
143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 417 (1994). Understanding that the doctrine that Miranda created as a
373
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must not admit any statements given during custodial interrogation
unless the statements were proceeded by the specified warnings and their
protections waived.376 Appropriately, then, Dickerson itself begins: “In
Miranda . . . we held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect’s statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted
in evidence.”377
b. The Rationale
But why? On this score the Court is reasonably clear. At the very beginning of its analysis the Court cautions that “[a]n understanding of the
nature and setting of . . . in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today.”378 The critical feature, of course, is that “[i]nterrogation still
takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in
a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
means of implementing its interpreted meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause is not an order to the police to give the specified warnings prior to subjecting any suspect to custodial interrogation, but rather, an instruction to the trial courts not to admit certain custodial statements into evidence, has practical consequences. It is precisely this distinction between
Miranda as a rule governing the admission of evidence and as a rule commanding behavior by
police that led the Court to hold just last term that the mere fact of an un-Mirandized interrogation gives suspects no legal claim against the police interrogators. Chavez v. Martinez, 123
S. Ct. 1994, 2003–04 (2003). For a thorough discussion of the pre-Chavez case law, see
Clymer, supra note 370, at 486–93.
376
According to Schulhofer, “the heart of Miranda . . . lies not so much in the famous warnings as in the cut-off rule—that if at any time the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent, all
questioning must cease.” Schulhofer, Puzzling Persistence, supra note 361, at 954.
377
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32. In his dissent, though, Justice Scalia vacillated between
these two readings of Miranda, compare, e.g., id. at 446 (criticizing the majority for not
straightforwardly announcing “that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda
warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States”), with id. at 447
(describing, as “the fairest reading of the Miranda case itself,” “the proposition that . . . the
admission at trial of un-Mirandized confessions . . . violates the Constitution”), thus provoking some commentators to chide him for ignoring the difference. “[E]ven under Miranda,”
Strauss explained, “what the Constitution (arguably) prohibits is the admission into evidence
obtained by custodial interrogation without warnings. It seems doubtful that questioning a
suspect in custody without warnings would violate the Constitution if the statements were
never used as evidence, unless the interrogation were in some other way abusive.” Strauss,
Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 958–59 n.8; see also, e.g., Craig
M. Bradley, Supreme Court Review behind the Dickerson Decision, 36 JTLA 80, 81 (Oct.
2000) (characterizing the Miranda right as a trial right, not a right during interrogation). As
already indicated, Strauss’s point that Miranda is addressed to courts, not cops, is right and
important. The references, though, to “what the Constitution . . . prohibits” and what “would
violate the Constitution” are inconsistent with my thesis that the Miranda warnings are part of
the constitutional decision rule, not part of the operative proposition. They are entirely consistent, however, with the anti-taxonomic thrust of “The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules.”
378
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
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rooms.”379 And because courts cannot know what has occurred in the interrogation, they cannot know whether the resulting statement was compelled. This would be true no matter how compulsion were defined. But
the Court’s expansive construal of what compulsion means exacerbated
the difficulty in determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether any given
statement had in fact been compelled. Some statements would be truly
free, some would not be, and a trial court’s answer would be little better
than a guess.380
Under circumstances like these, how can a tolerable degree of adjudicatory accuracy be achieved? One obvious answer would be to presume
all custodial statements to be compelled. If interrogation exerts the sort
of pressures likely to elicit incriminating statements that are not “truly
free,” and if the accuracy of case-by-case inquiries is close to random,
then courts might maximize right answers simply by presuming all such
statements to have been compelled hence inadmissible. Sure, such a decision rule would yield many false positives, but conceivably fewer than the
sum of false positives and false negatives generated by a simple preponderance decision rule. The Court did not adopt this solution, and sought
instead to reduce the “inherently compelling”381 character of the interrogation. That is precisely what the warnings are supposed to do by making
suspects aware that they may remain silent or ask for an attorney, and
that the police know it.382 The hope was that issuance of the warnings
would reduce the proportion of custodial statements that were compelled
(in what the Court took to be the constitutionally relevant sense), thereby
making it plausible to suppose that a trial court could achieve greater adjudicatory accuracy by investigating compulsion case by case than by globally presuming it.383 In other words, the Court had concluded that trial

379

Id. at 448.
This was a common criticism of pre-Miranda efforts to determine whether an out-of-court
confession was “involuntary” for due process purposes. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—
Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 954–84 (1966).
381
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
382
See id. at 467–79.
383
A very first cut at formalizing these assumptions would go something like this. Let S1 be
the set of (possibly inculpatory) custodial statements in a pre-Miranda world; C1 is the set of
such statements that were compelled (in the constitutionally relevant sense); and F1 is the set
of such statements that were not compelled (in the constitutionally relevant sense), hence (in
the constitutionally relevant sense) free. S1 = C1 + F1.
Let the courts’ accuracy rate in determining (by application of the more-likely-than-not decision rule) whether any given statement was compelled or free be .x (.x > .5). Let C1/S1 = .y. If
.y > .x, then adjudicatory accuracy would be higher if courts conclusively presume any given
380
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courts would minimize errors in the adjudication of the constitutional operative proposition by (a) conclusively presuming that a given out-ofcourt statement was compelled if it was given in a custodial setting without the benefit of warnings, and (b) assessing case-by-case via a preponderance standard whether other out-of-court statements (non-custodial
or custodial-but-warned) were compelled.384 This is a complex rule instructing courts how to proceed so as to minimize adjudicatory error.
Notwithstanding its unusual form, conceptually speaking it is a quintessential decision rule.
Critics, and even some supporters, often describe the genesis of the
Miranda doctrine in alternative, or additional, terms as “designed to deter potential police overreaching.”385 Because a decision rule’s legitimacy
is likely to be most secure insofar as it is designed to reduce adjudicatory
error, and because Miranda’s correct doctrinal consequences (i.e., the

statement to have been compelled than if courts try to ascertain whether the statement is
compelled or free on a case-by-case basis.
If police issue warnings, then we may suppose that possibly inculpatory custodial statements
decrease, and, furthermore, that both sorts of statements decrease—compelled and free.
Thus: S1 > S2; C1 > C2; F1 > F2. Very possibly, though, the issuance of warnings results in a proportionally larger reduction of compelled statements than of free statements. If so, C2/S2 = .z,
where .y > .z. If .x > .z, then the Miranda decision rule reduces adjudicatory accuracy relative
both to case-by-case adjudications under the more-likely-than-not decision rule and to a decision rule that conclusively presumes all custodial statements to have been compelled.
This is, to be sure, a simplified and imprecise model. To note just one source of simplification, it does not incorporate errors in adjudicating whether the Miranda strictures were complied with. However, greater formalization would not, at this point, be worth the candle. I aim
only to explicate a little more clearly the basic assumptions that support reading the Miranda
decision rule as designed to minimize adjudicatory error.
384
As several scholars have observed, this second part of the rule has been ignored in practice. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 115, at 1070 & n.184 (citing other commentators).
385
Monaghan, supra note 4, at 20 n.105; see also, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the
Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 Ariz. St. L.J. 299, 300 (1996) (“[T]he Miranda mandate is not a constitutional requirement. Rather, the Court has held specifically that Miranda rules are only ‘safeguards’
whose purpose is to reduce the risk that the police will violate the Constitution during custodial questioning.”). Supreme Court Justices have often described Miranda in these terms.
Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, supra note 146, at 968 (explaining “another
of the problems Miranda sought to avoid” was creating incentives for the police “to try to coerce incriminating statements by subtle, undetectable means”); Strauss, supra note 38, at 200
(describing “the Miranda rules [as a] relatively rigid doctrine[] designed to reduce the likelihood that . . . the police . . . will violate the law, and designed to improve a reviewing court’s
chances of identifying violations when they occur”). See, e.g., infra note 452 (discussing Elstad
and Tucker).
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proper outcomes in its progeny) should depend upon the reasons that
undergird it, some thoughts on this claim are warranted.386
Even assuming, as I argue and as the Court’s recent decision in Chavez
387
v. Martinez supports, that the decision rule is addressed to courts and
not to cops, there is no reasonable doubt that it is intended to affect police behavior. The Miranda majority expected and hoped that police officers wanted inculpatory statements to be admitted and would, therefore,
issue the warnings (and respect their invocation by suspects). So it would
be foolish to assert that the Miranda Court was indifferent as to whether
cops issued the warnings. Naturally, the Court wanted the cops to issue
them. The Miranda doctrine is, as Grano says, “forward-looking.”388
Whether this means that the decision rule was designed “to reduce police overreaching,” however, necessarily depends on what police overreaching is taken to mean. If it refers to police behavior that violates the
Constitution, then Miranda is not designed to reduce police overreaching.
Miranda is presented entirely as a decision giving effect to the SelfIncrimination Clause, not the Due Process Clause. And the police just
cannot violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, no matter how hard they
try. If, on the other hand, “police overreaching” is shorthand for “police
behavior that compels suspects to confess,” then Miranda was designed
to reduce police overreaching. As I have conceived and defended it, the
Miranda decision rule could plausibly minimize adjudicatory error (relative to doctrines that would administer the Court’s announced operative
proposition either by means of a simple more-likely-than-not decision
rule or by means of a conclusive presumption that all custodial statements were compelled) only on the assumption that it would result in
fewer statements having been compelled.
It seems, then, that I am endorsing the view that the decision rule was
designed for two purposes: to minimize adjudicatory error and to reduce
386

I am grateful to Yale Kamisar and Susan Klein for pressing me on this point.
123 S. Ct. 1994, 2003–04 (2003); see supra note 375.
388
According to Grano, “[w]hether or not a rule is prophylactic depends entirely on how the
Court describes the rule and its underlying rationale.” See Grano, supra note 70, at 111. In
particular, a rule is prophylactic if it is designed either “to establish understandable per se
rules for [governmental agents] to follow” or to overcome “the difficulty of detecting constitutional violations on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 105. Put another way, “A prophylactic rule
may be intended to insure either that constitutional violations will not occur in the future or
that a constitutional violation did not occur in the case before the court.” Id. at 105 n.22. Although Grano treats both of these interests as amounting to prophylactic rules, it is telling
that he distinguishes between the two for purposes of legitimacy, noting, in particular, that
“[f]orward-looking prophylactic rules raise the most difficult legitimacy questions.” Id.
387
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“police overreaching” (in this narrow stipulated sense). In fact, however,
I believe that is a very misleading description. It is misleading because it
implies the wrong sort of relationship between these two purposes.
At bottom, the question is whether these purposes are independent or
causally linked. Consider the institution of criminal punishment. Some
people (call them “mixed theorists”) believe that it can be explained or
justified as serving two purposes: to make criminals suffer and to deter
the commission of crimes. Others will dispute this. No, they may say,
punishment is justified only for the purpose of deterring crime.389 Now,
one could say that these two camps do not disagree: Surely the deterrence theorists recognize that general deterrence would be served only if
persons considering crime believe that punishment inflicts suffering and,
moreover, that specific deterrence requires that those who are punished
do in fact experience the punishment as a form of suffering. Therefore,
despite their protests to the contrary, the deterrence theorists, like the
mixed theorists, endorse, as a purpose of punishment, that criminals be
made to suffer.
One could say this. But it would miss the critical point of distinction,
which is that the mixed theorists believe that punishment serves two independent purposes—the infliction of deserved suffering and the deterrence of crime—whereas our deterrence theorists believe that the infliction of suffering is only a mediate purpose in service of the more ultimate
purpose of deterring crime. Moreover, it is comfortable and familiar to
capture this distinction just as our deterrence theorist has—namely, that
she, unlike her opponents, does not describe or justify punishment as
serving the purpose of inflicting suffering.
With this contrast in mind, we should want to know whether the
Miranda decision rule is designed to encourage police not to compel
statements only as a means to achieve the end of increasing adjudicatory
accuracy or, instead, as an end in itself (by which we are likely to mean,
rather, that it is a means in a distinct causal chain).
There are powerful reasons, I think, to believe that the former characterization is more apt. To appreciate the first reason, suppose that, even
pre-Miranda, courts were very good at identifying which custodial statements were compelled and which were not. If so, then as far as adjudicatory accuracy were concerned, there would be no reason to require warn389

Obviously, this is a brutally oversimplified characterization of debates over the justificatory theories of punishment. The caricature is nonetheless adequate to illustrate the instant
point.
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ings as a precondition for admissibility. In contrast, there would remain a
reason to require the warnings if deterring cops from securing compelled
statements was an independent goal. Put another way, if deterring police
overreaching were an independent goal then there would have been no
reason for the Miranda Court to observe that trial courts were not good
at sorting the compelled from the not compelled because the doctrine
that the Court ultimately announced would be justified even were the
case otherwise. Therefore, the heavy emphasis that the Court placed on
trial courts’ inability to determine stationhouse compulsion on a case-bycase basis is itself evidence that deterring police overreaching was not an
independent purpose for the warnings rule but only a means to ensure
greater adjudicatory accuracy. More fundamentally, it is hard to see what
warrant the Court would have to seek to reduce compulsion by the police
if such behavior (contrasted, it must be recalled, with coercion by the police, which is a violation under the Due Process Clause) does not violate
the Constitution, and if courts can do a constitutionally adequate job of
determining, after the elicitation of a given statement, but before its admission, that the statement was compelled.
For these two reasons, I conclude that “deterring police overreaching”
is best understood only as a mediate purpose in service of the more ultimate purpose of increasing adjudicatory accuracy. It is the latter objective that determines the doctrine’s legitimacy, and contribution to that
latter objective is the touchstone by which Miranda’s progeny should be
measured. In short, then, it will be most perspicuous to continue to maintain that the Miranda decision rule is designed to reduce adjudicatory error—i.e., to improve the accuracy of judicial determinations of facts made
relevant by constitutional meaning—even while understanding that it
does so by the particular means of reducing the occasions on which
prosecutors seek to introduce against a defendant statements that had
been compelled by the police, by the means of reducing the incidence of
police-compelled statements, by the means of inducing police to warn
suspects of their rights.390 To characterize the Miranda doctrine as resting
390

Compare this explanation for the Miranda warnings from a unanimous Burger Court:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are [1] to ensure that the police
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, [2] to relieve the “inherently
compelling pressures” generated by the custodial setting itself, “which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and [3] as much as possible to free courts from the
task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (brackets added) (internal citations omitted).
This looks like at first blush like three independent rationales. But that is quite misleading.
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on deterrent considerations as opposed to, or more than, adjudicatory
ones likely reflects the misapprehension that some aspect of the Miranda
doctrine (either operative proposition or decision rule) is directed to the
police.391
B. Prophylactic Decision Rules? Understanding Overprotection
Supposing the argument of Section V.A is correct, does Miranda announce a “prophylactic rule?” To reiterate a point made earlier,392 although the answer depends on precisely which of the many possible definitions of “prophylactic rule” we choose, for present purposes the choice
is made for us. Justice Scalia, following Grano, argued in Dickerson as
Rather, by reducing the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogations, the
warnings make it less likely that a custodial statement will have been the product of coercion,
thereby making judicial determinations of whether particular confessions were voluntary
more likely to be correct than they otherwise would be.
391
That is so if the “deterrent considerations” that the speaker has in mind are akin to an
interest in discouraging police overreaching. But we can introduce yet a further complication:
Although the doctrine is not most usefully understood as designed to deter undesirable police
behavior, it necessarily is intended to deter constitutional violations. Many constitutional
commands apply to non-judicial actors (legislators and executive agents) and the judiciary sits
in judgment. As Hans Linde observed, “the Constitution is addressed to government, and
concerns judges only as a consequence.” Linde, supra note 258, at 255. But the SelfIncrimination Clause, like much in the Fifth through Eighth Amendments, governs the conduct of courts in the first instance. It is a conditional directive to trial courts that takes
(roughly) the following form: “if a criminal defendant’s extra-judicial statement was compelled, then do not admit it into evidence against him.” If, as I have just argued, the Miranda
decision rule is designed to reduce adjudicatory errors, the reduction of adjudicatory errors is
itself designed, in this context, to reduce constitutional violations. Furthermore, the very same
reasoning that leads me to conclude that we should view the Miranda decision rule as designed to serve the (relatively ultimate) purpose of minimizing adjudicatory error rather than
the (more mediate) purpose of deterring police overreaching should entail that we do even
better by viewing the rule as designed to serve the (yet more ultimate) purpose of preventing
constitutional violations.
I am going to resist this logic. Every doctrine designed to reduce errors in the adjudication
of constitutionally relevant facts is also designed to reduce constitutional violations whenever
the erroneous judicial findings sought to be reduced constitute predicates for some sort of
constitutional violation—i.e., with respect to all constitutional provisions that govern the conduct of courts in the first instance. In a case of that sort the causal relationship between “reducing adjudicatory error” and “reducing constitutional violations” is necessary, not contingent. More particularly, then, any device designed to reduce a trial court’s erroneous
determinations that a particular statement was not compelled is designed, ipso facto, to reduce the incidence of unconstitutional admissions of compelled statements. So to say that the
Miranda decision rule is designed to reduce the introduction, in violation of the SelfIncrimination Clause, of “compelled” statements is less revealing than characterizing it as
serving purposes that I have labeled adjudicatory.
392
See introduction to Part II, supra.
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follows: (1) Miranda employed a prophylactic rule; (2) prophylactic rules
are illegitimate; (3) therefore, Miranda employed an illegitimate rule.
The present question, then, is whether the Miranda decision rule is a
“prophylactic rule” in any sense of that term that would make the argument sound.
As already described, the proponents of this syllogism define a prophylactic rule as a judge-made rule that “overenforces” or “overprotects”
judge-interpreted constitutional meaning. Thus a decision rule is a prophylactic rule if it overenforces or overprotects its corresponding operative proposition. What I’d like to point out here is that, if constitutional
doctrine is divided into operative propositions and decision rules, the notion of overprotection is surprisingly complex. What can it mean for a decision rule to overenforce or overprotect an operative proposition?
One possible understanding of “overenforce” is to enforce “too
much.” On this view, a decision rule overenforces its operative proposition if its application yields “too many” erroneous legal judgments that
the operative proposition has been violated. But “too many” by what
standard or by whose lights? Obviously, the content of “too many” cannot be merely “more than would be legitimate,” for we would then need
to know the standard of legitimacy. Premise (2) above is just tautological
if “prophylactic rule” is defined as a rule that results in more false positives in the adjudication of operative propositions than would be legitimate. Put another way, if judgments of appropriateness or legitimacy are
incorporated by definition into the concept of “prophylactic rule,” then
Justice Scalia’s argument that the Miranda doctrine is illegitimate because
it is a prophylactic rule becomes vacuous.
So here is a second candidate for the baseline against which claims of
“overenforcement” are to be measured: A decision rule overenforces its
operative proposition (hence is a prophylactic rule) if application of the
decision rule yields more false positives in adjudication than would adjudication of the operative proposition by the “preponderance of the evidence” decision rule. We could define prophylactic rules in this way. But
then we would need an argument to establish that overenforcement as
measured against this baseline is illegitimate. Two sorts of claims seem
most likely. The first is that it is illegitimate for the courts to adopt any
decision rule for a specific context that is likely to yield more false positives or more false negatives in judicial administration of the corresponding operative proposition than would the preponderance decision rule
but must, instead, rely on a globally applicable preponderance decision
rule. But this claim is virtually equivalent to (and more straightforwardly
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expressed as) the claim that courts lack legitimate power to create decision rules. Although such a claim is not demonstrably false, it seems exceedingly implausible.393 The second claim is the slightly narrower one
that it is illegitimate for courts to adopt any decision rule that is likely to
yield more false positives in judicial administration of the corresponding
operative proposition than would the preponderance standard even
though courts may adopt a decision rule likely to yield more false negatives than the preponderance standard. In other words, a decision rule
can legitimately underenforce relative to the preponderance decision rule
but not overenforce relative to the preponderance decision rule. This position is a logically coherent position, but the path toward a successful defense of such an asymmetry will be far from smooth.394
Consider a third possibility: A decision rule is a prophylactic rule if it
results in more total adjudicatory errors than would the preponderance
standard. To say that this is what a prophylactic rule means (or, more
precisely, what a prophylactic decision rule means) in the context of a
broader argument that such rules are illegitimate, is just to maintain that
courts may not create decision rules for reasons other than minimizing
adjudicatory error. This strikes me as just the sort of proposition about
which reasonable people could disagree, and just the sort of disagreement
for which the operative proposition/decision rule distinction is intended
to clear space.395
Unfortunately for Miranda’s critics,396 this particular fleshing out of
what it means for a rule to overenforce or overprotect constitutional
meaning does not imperil Miranda. A decision rule designed to minimize
adjudicatory error is not, according to this elucidation of the ScaliaGrano account, a prophylactic rule. And, as shown in the previous Sec393

See supra Section IV.A.2.a.
Very briefly: The most plausible justifications for judicial review must depend to some
extent on the claim that courts are better positioned than are the more democratically accountable branches to protect certain valuable interests against infringement by temporal majorities. So to adopt a metarule governing its practice that would systematically privilege our
polity’s majoritarian commitments over our liberal ones by permitting the underenforcement
of rights but not their overenforcement borders on self-contradiction. For a similar (if arguably understated) observation, see Strauss, supra note 38, at 207.
395
See supra text accompanying note 326.
396
I am speaking here of those critics who deny Miranda’s legitimacy, not those who charge,
for example, that Miranda announced an erroneous operative proposition (because it should
have concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not bar introduction of statements compelled
outside of court by the police, or because it adopted an overly expansive understanding of
“compulsion”), or that the Court’s choice of decision rule was unwise. This Article takes no
position on the soundness of these or other such criticisms.
394
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tion, the Miranda decision rule is most plausibly understood as having
been intended to minimize total errors in the adjudication of the Fifth
Amendment operative proposition.397 Therefore, Miranda is not a prophylactic rule in the sense that Justice Scalia’s argument appears to require.398
C. The Conclusive Presumption Red Herring
Section V.A argued that the Fifth Amendment doctrine announced in
Miranda can be usefully and fairly broken into an operative proposition
directed to judges (do not admit a statement against a criminal defendant
that has been compelled) and a decision rule designed to minimize errors
in adjudicating the operative proposition (conclusively presume that a
statement has been compelled if given during custodial interrogation
without specified warnings or if given after warnings that had not been
waived). Section V.B showed that, if this is right, the Miranda doctrine is
not vulnerable to attack on grounds of its being a prophylactic rule. This
Section addresses a direct challenge to the description of Miranda that
397

No doubt Justice Scalia would deny this. In his Dickerson dissent, for example, Justice
Scalia pronounces that “what is most remarkable about the Miranda decision—and what
made it unacceptable as a matter of straightforward constitutional interpretation in the Marbury tradition—is its palpable hostility toward the act of confession per se, rather than toward
what the Constitution abhors, compelled confession.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 449–50 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The suggestion, perhaps, is that although the Justices in the Miranda majority
recognized that the Constitution prohibits only some subset of confessions—“compelled”
ones—they crafted doctrine to effectuate a disapproval of all confessions even though they
knew that such a disapproval rested on their own very different judgments of political morality. Put in terms introduced earlier, see supra Section IV.A.2.a, Justice Scalia might be claiming that the Miranda decision rule was based on substantive considerations. Cf. Strauss, supra
note 38, at 194 (speculating that Grano’s true objection to Miranda stems from his suspicion
“that Miranda reflects not a genuine effort to minimize the sum of administrative costs and
error costs but only a judgment by the Court that the world would be a better place if law enforcement officers were required to comply with Miranda”). Justice Scalia could be correct.
But the fairer reading of Miranda is that the majority Justices’ hostility to confession
(grounded in solicitude for the dignity of criminal defendants) undergirded the Court’s expansive interpretation of what constitutes compulsion. And no matter how open to criticism that
construal was (and, I repeat, I am not defending it), it is a statement of constitutional meaning, not a constitutional decision rule. Once the Court chose to interpret the SelfIncrimination Clause as broadly as it did, then, there seems to be slight basis to deny that it
turned to adjudicatory considerations at the stage of decision rulemaking. Surely the
Dickerson majority could reasonably have concluded that the Miranda doctrine rested on that
Court’s estimation of how best to minimize adjudicatory errors. But see infra Section V.D
(acknowledging that this interpretation is in tension with at least some of Miranda’s progeny,
notably Harris and Quarles).
398
The Nollan doctrine, however, might be. It depends on just what considerations support
the nexus decision rule. See supra Section III.B.4.
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Section V.A offered. According to that challenge, use of a conclusive
presumption by the putative Miranda decision rule demonstrates that the
decision rule is not designed to minimize adjudicatory error because conclusive presumptions cannot serve to minimize error in the adjudication
of an operative proposition.399
This Section responds to that charge in three steps. First (and wholly
unoriginally), it briefly considers and (provisionally) rejects the straightforward assertion that a conclusive presumption cannot minimize adjudicatory errors relative to feasible alternatives. Second, it addresses and rebuts the arguments that Grano marshaled from evidence scholarship to
support this superficially implausible assertion. This subsection is long
and can be skimmed or skipped by readers who are already persuaded after the first step that a decision rule that employs a conclusive presumption can serve the goal of error minimization. Turning last from the general claims of evidence scholarship to the more narrowly focused worries
of constitutional law, I entertain the argument that regardless of whether
federal courts generally have constitutional power to craft decision rules
to serve adjudicatory aims, and even if a conclusive presumption can be
designed to realize such goals, the courts’ legitimate authority does not

399

Even if true, this argument would not get its proponents very far unless married to the
additional premise that, as a matter of constitutional legitimacy, courts have power to create
decision rules to minimize adjudicatory error, but for no (or significantly limited) other purposes. As I have emphasized several times now, the taxonomic enterprise cannot resolve that
question. Accordingly, this Section proceeds on the assumption that that additional premise
could be true.
The conclusive-presumption objection could alternatively be broken down this way: (1) As
a matter of constitutional taxonomy, we should reserve the “decision rule” label for only
those doctrinal rules designed to minimize adjudicatory error; (2) courts have legitimate authority only to announce constitutional meanings and to craft constitutional decision rules,
but not to make other sorts of constitutional doctrine; (3) a conclusive presumption cannot be
designed to minimize adjudicatory error; therefore, (4) purported decision rules that employ a
conclusive presumption are illegitimate. I disfavor this way of proceeding because it can work,
if at all, only for people who accept premise (2). Scholars or judges who believe that courts
may have legitimate authority to craft doctrinal devices (beyond operative propositions) to
serve interests other than adjudicatory-error minimization could accept premise (1) only if
they are then prepared to develop a much richer doctrinal taxonomy in which each type of
rule is defined in terms of the consideration that supports it. But if multiple considerations are
legitimate, then it will become an inordinate challenge to articulate the principles needed to
classify individual rules that are supported by more than one such consideration. We can
avoid this challenge by allowing decision rules to rest, as a conceptual matter, on varied judicial considerations, and then leaving for separate normative argument which of the conceptually possible considerations are permissible. Simply put, clear thinking is aided by describing
the concepts in ways that are not hostage to resolution of the normative issues in dispute.

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

127

extend to the making of decision rules that employ conclusive presumptions. This argument, too, I conclude, is not persuasive.
1. The Argument Straight-Up
The gist of the critics’ argument is that conclusive presumptions “cannot be defended” on the theory that “they assist federal reviewing courts
in accurately resolving” contested factual disputes because they guarantee adjudicatory errors.400 As Schulhofer conceded, “one can imagine a
case in which a law professor-suspect knows his rights and is not in fear of
abuses, in which he tells all in response to the first question, not because
of any sense of pressure but simply because he wants the truth to come
out.”401 In such a case, directing lower courts to conclusively presume
compulsion from the absence of warnings produces false positives that
would be avoided were the court allowed to treat the presumption as rebuttable. The conclusive presumption is thus supposed not to be adopted
for the purpose of error minimization.
If this is all there is to the argument, it is fallacious. To see why, it
would be helpful to pin down precisely what sort of rebuttable presumption Grano thinks would necessarily yield fewer adjudicatory errors than
the conclusive presumption at issue. If the imagined alternative to the use
of a conclusive presumption is a presumption that merely shifts upon the
party against whom the presumption lies the burden to deny the presumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence,402 then it should be obvi-

400

Grano, supra note 70, at 145; see also id. at 141 n.271 & 144–45 (arguing that if the Pearce
rule is irrebuttable, then “[e]xcept in a pickwickian sense, [it] cannot be viewed as a procedural rule [a rule that ‘helps the reviewing court to determine correctly the constitutional issue before it’] designed to assist the reviewing court in accurately resolving the vindictiveness
issue”).
401
Schulhofer, supra note 139, at 448.
402
This was Morgan’s theory of how rebuttable presumptions should work. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation
74–81 (1956). However the dominant view, sometimes called the “bursting bubble” theory,
holds that a rebuttable presumption shifts only the burden of producing evidence with respect
to the presumed fact; if and when that burden is satisfied, the presumption disappears. For a
compact summary of the debate see, for instance, McCormick on Evidence § 344 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter Cleary, McCormick on Evidence]. The argument in text
is that a conclusive presumption does not necessarily produce more adjudicatory errors than
do rebuttable presumptions even as Morgan conceived of them. A fortiori the same is true
with respect to rebuttable presumptions that shift only the burden of production.
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ous that conclusive presumptions do not necessarily produce more adjudicatory errors.403
It is common to suppose that a preponderance standard yields roughly
equal numbers of false negatives and false positives and that any upward
departure from the standard increases false negatives more than it decreases false positives.404 But this claim crucially depends upon the assumption that the factfinder’s degree of subjective confidence regarding a
given factual proposition, given certain evidence, accurately corresponds
to the statistical probability that that proposition is true. Put more precisely, it depends upon the assumption that factfinders accurately assess
the probative value of different types of evidence. And this is simply untrue. Take one common example. Study after study confirms that factfinders substantially overvalue eyewitness testimony.405 Therefore, if factfinders could effectively be instructed to credit eyewitness testimony only
when convinced of its accuracy to some heightened standard of certainty
(say, sixty-five percent), such an instruction could actually reduce total
false positives as much as it increases false negatives, or more, thereby
reducing total adjudicatory errors.
All that this shows, of course, is that increasing the quantum of proof
can, perhaps counterintuitively, reduce total adjudicatory errors. It can
do so whenever factfinders systematically overestimate or underestimate
the probative value of a particular type of evidence, or are otherwise systematically biased for or against a particular class of litigant. Therefore a
conclusive presumption can minimize adjudicatory errors relative to a
403

For solid presentations of this argument, see, for instance, Schulhofer, supra note 139, at
450–51; Strauss, supra note 38, at 193.
404
Indeed, that is why the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in criminal law is justified
with the adage that it is worse to convict one innocent person than to allow ten guilty persons
to go free. This adage implicitly acknowledges that departures from the preponderance standard increase total adjudicatory errors. Having just introduced the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard, it is worth mentioning that this is part of the due process operative proposition; it is not a constitutional decision rule. That is, the court has interpreted the Due Process
Clause as requiring that a criminal defendant not be deprived of life, liberty, or property
unless the prosecution proves all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
405
See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness,
Psychology and the Law 181–96 (1995); Elizabeth D. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness
Testimony: Civil and Criminal 1–8 (3d ed. 1997); John C. Brigham and Robert K. Bothwell,
The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7
Law & Hum. Behav. 19, 19–30 (1983); Brian L. Cutler et al., Juror Decision Making in Identification Cases, 12 Law & Hum. Behav. 41, 41–55 (1988); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror
Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 Law &
Hum. Behav. 333, 333–39 (1989).
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presumption that is rebuttable by disproof of the presumed fact by a preponderance of the evidence. This does not by itself demonstrate, however, that a conclusive presumption can minimize total adjudicatory errors relative to an alternative presumption that can be overcome only by
disproof of the presumed fact to some very high standard of confidence.
Take the example of the law professor-suspect. We would have to assume
an implausible degree of systematic epistemic bias to believe that the
conclusive presumption that a non-warned confession was compelled
would reduce total adjudicatory errors relative to a presumption that
could be rebutted, for example, “only by evidence ‘so strong as effectively to eliminate all doubt whatever that the statement was voluntary.’”406 Therefore, the charge would go, a conclusive presumption cannot serve to minimize adjudicatory error relative to all conceivable
alternatives.407
This argument founders on an unrealistic assumption about human rationality and cognitive processes. Human beings are not calculating devices that can follow directions of this sort very well.408 That is why the
common law recognized only two quantum of evidence standards: the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for criminal offenses and the preponderance standard for everything else. Even the now-familiar “clear

406

Strauss, supra note 38, at 192. Compare the notion of “presumptive formalism” floated in
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 544–48 (1988).
407
A distinct but related objection is that, even assuming arguendo that conclusive presumptions can possibly minimize total adjudicatory errors, the conclusive presumption adopted in
Miranda cannot be said to do so, or is otherwise somehow illegitimate, because the Court
never “even considered, let alone tested,” a rebuttable presumption before taking “the more
drastic step” of making the presumption conclusive. Grano, supra note 70, at 154. It is not
clear just what to make of this observation. My best guess is that it is an evidentiary claim:
The fact that the Court did not test fashioning the warnings requirement into some form of
rebuttable presumption demonstrates that it was not really motivated by adjudicatory considerations. But even insofar as we should care about the explanatory reasons for the Court’s action as opposed to the guiding or justificatory ones, the Court’s failure to explicitly consider
use of a rebuttable presumption in lieu of the conclusive one it did adopt is only one piece of
evidence, and not, to my mind, a particularly powerful piece.
408
Consider Bentham’s proposal that witnesses be encouraged to describe their subjective
confidence levels in mathematical degrees instead of in terms of ordinary language. See 1 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice 73–80
(John Stuart Mill ed. 1827). To this, Bentham’s contemporary, the Swiss legal scholar Etionne
Dumont, responded: “I cannot deny that, where different witnesses have different degrees of
belief, it would be extremely desirable to obtain a precise knowledge of these degrees, and to
make it the basis of the judicial decision; but I cannot believe that this sort of perfection is attainable in practice. I even think, that it belongs only to intelligences superior to ourselves, or
at least to the great mass of mankind.” Id. at 106.
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and convincing evidence” standard was unknown at common law.409 Factfinders who are instructed on an “effectively no doubt” standard predictably will apply standards of rather greater leniency. So the fact, if
true, that a very high standard of proof for rebutting a presumption
would, if strictly followed, produce fewer adjudicatory errors than would
a conclusive presumption, does not prove that a rebuttable presumption
of near-conclusiveness would, in actual practice, yield fewer adjudicatory
errors than a fully conclusive presumption.410
2. The Argument from Authority
Instead of directly engaging the intuitively sensible contention that
conclusive presumptions can reduce adjudicatory errors (weighted or
unweighted) relative to any plausible adjudicatory alternative, Grano effectively shifts the ground of argument by invoking authority. “Conclusive presumptions differ in kind, not simply degree, from rebuttable presumptions. Indeed, conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary or
adjudicatory devices at all, but rather substantive rules of law . . . .”411 This
important conclusion rests upon the following passage, which Grano
quotes from McCormick on Evidence:
In the case of what is commonly called a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption, when fact B is proven, fact A must be taken as true, and the
adversary is not allowed to dispute this at all. For example, if it is
409

See, e.g., Zelman Cowen & P.B. Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence 244 (1956). Even
today, it is not entirely clear whether English law recognizes intermediate standards. See
Adrian Keane, The Modern Law of Evidence 83 (4th ed. 1996) (“The notion of a third and
intermediate standard of proof lying between the standards required in criminal and civil
cases has not found favour in the courts.”).
410
It is therefore not surprising to find that Grano has wavered on the significance of the distinction between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions. In a 1985 article he seemed to
concede, albeit grudgingly, that the federal courts do have power to create constitutional doctrine in the form of rebuttable presumptions. See Grano, supra note 70, at 148 (concluding
that “[t]he federal courts arguably have implied authority to promulgate rebuttable presumptions and rules allocating the burden of proof concerning constitutional questions”). By 1993,
however, he deemed it “far from obvious that the Supreme Court through the vehicle of appellate reversal should be able to force state courts to employ a rebuttable presumption they
prefer not to employ,” and admitted to a new belief that his 1985 views “ceded too much constitutional ground.” Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 196 & 294 n.176. Still, even in 1993
Grano took pains to insist that there did exist a critical difference between rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions. See id. at 294 n.181 (“The examples in the text make inexplicable
Professor David Strauss’s assertion that the alleged difference in kind rather than degree between rebuttable and conclusive presumptions ‘rings false’ and ‘proves false.’”) (quoting
Strauss, supra note 38, at 192).
411
Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 179.
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proven that a child is under seven years of age, the courts have stated
that it is conclusively presumed that he could not have committed a felony. In so doing, the courts are not stating a presumption at all, but
simply expressing the rule of law that someone under seven years old
412
cannot legally be convicted of a felony.

Although this passage has a certain, if hard to articulate, intuitive
force, it does not, on its face, support Grano’s assertion. For two reasons,
it does not obviously establish that a “conclusive presumption” cannot be
adopted for what I have called adjudicatory considerations—namely, error minimization. First, even assuming that this passage provides a good
example of a “conclusive presumption,” that it is not a “presumption”
properly so-called (as McCormick claims) does not establish (as Grano
claims) that it is not an “evidentiary or adjudicatory device” because
“presumptions” are either a subset of “evidentiary or adjudicatory devices” or a cross-cutting category. Evidentiary or adjudicatory devices are
not plausibly a subset of “presumptions.” Furthermore, if the (negative)
claim that a conclusive presumption is not a presumption cannot establish
that it is not an adjudicatory error-minimizing device, nor can the (affirmative) claim that a conclusive presumption is, instead, a “rule of law.”
After all, a constitutional decision rule supported by adjudicatory considerations likewise is a rule of law. Such a doctrine is a legal rule (not, say, a
hortatory norm or a rule of etiquette) that tells judges how to reach conclusions on disputed matters.
So we have reason at the outset to be suspicious of Grano’s argument.
But not too suspicious, for it turns out that Grano’s conclusion does in
fact reflect the orthodoxy of evidence scholarship. As one student hornbook puts it: “‘Conclusive presumptions’ are not evidentiary devices.
They are not evidence rules at all. They are new rules of substantive
law.”413 On its face, this is a more helpful statement for Grano than is the
412

Id. (quoting Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 402, § 342, at 966) (Grano’s
emphasis removed).
413
Roger C. Park et al., Evidence Law § 4.08, at 106 (1998); see also, e.g., Richard O. Lempert et al., A Modern Approach to Evidence 1299 (3d ed. 2000) (“Most authorities now recognize that so-called conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary presumptions at all, but
rather substantive laws making X, irrespective of Y, decisive of the parties’ rights and duties
through the irrebutable fiction that X’s existence always establishes Y.”). This passage says
much less than might first appear. The latter part of the sentence is undeniable, but also undenied. That conclusive presumptions make the basic fact decisive (for purposes of litigation)
of the parties’ rights and duties through an irrebutable fiction that the basic fact always establishes the presumed fact is not, I think, a proposition that authorities could even debate. It is
simply a definition of conclusive presumptions. The claim that conclusive presumptions are
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one from McCormick. So Grano is right to think his pivotal claim—that
conclusive presumptions are not adjudicatory devices—is supported by
evidence scholars. The question to address, then, is whether the evidence
scholars are right.
Strictly read, the passage from McCormick does not support the
proposition that conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary devices in
the sense (the only sense that presently matters) of being designed to reduce adjudicatory error. Although it is orthodoxy in evidence scholarship
that conclusive presumptions are not “true” presumptions,414 McCormick
happens to choose a particularly inapt example to demonstrate it.
McCormick defines presumption as “a standardized practice, under
which certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to
their effect as proof of other facts.”415 By this standard definition, a conclusive presumption differs from a rebuttable presumption only in that
the latter allows the party against whom the presumption lies to rebut the
particular facts that are presumed, whereas the former does not. The issue then becomes whether this difference warrants withholding the “presumption” label from its conclusive variant. An affirmative answer is
equivalent to the claim that the necessary conditions for something being
properly labeled a presumption are, in the first place, that it has the conditional form of “if [basic fact] then [presumed fact]”; and, secondarily,
that the linkage is rebuttable, not conclusive.
But by that definition, the passage from McCormick upon which
Grano stakes his claim still cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that a
conclusive form of a presumption is not a true presumption because
McCormick’s example does not contain a presumption that meets the
first requirement of presumptions. Here is one common example of a
presumption cited by McCormick: Proof that a person has disappeared
from home and whose whereabouts have been unknown for a specified
not evidentiary presumptions at all might look like a debatable claim, but this too the authors
resolve by definitional fiat. See id. at 1297 (defining “true presumptions” as devices that “give
the basic fact an influence beyond its normal probative value without having conclusive effect”) (emphasis added).
414
See, e.g., Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 105; 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials
at Common Law § 2492, at 307 (James H. Chadbourne ed., rev. ed. 1981) (“In strictness there
cannot be such a thing as a ‘conclusive presumption.’”).
415
2 McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 433 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter,
Strong, McCormick on Evidence]; see also, e.g., Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 102 (“A
presumption is a rule providing that proof of a designated fact has a predetermined effect in
establishing the existence of another fact. It thus expresses a legal relationship between certain facts (what we will call the ‘foundational’ or ‘basic’ facts) proved by a party and certain
other facts (what we will call the ‘presumed facts’).”).
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period of time (often seven years) raises a presumption under certain circumstances that she is dead.416 The foundational fact (“fact B” in
McCormick’s terms) concerns the person’s absence; the presumed fact
(“fact A”) is that she is dead. This presumed fact is legally material for a
variety of purposes, such as administering the person’s estate or determining the eligibility of the person’s spouse to remarry. If the Miranda
decision rule is construed as an adjudicatory device (by which I will mean
constitutional doctrine justified as a means to reduce adjudicatory errors), the foundational facts are that the statement sought to be admitted
was made during custodial interrogation not proceeded by warnings; the
presumed fact is that the statement was compelled. This presumed fact is
legally material because the Miranda operative proposition takes the
Fifth Amendment to bar admission of compelled statements.
In McCormick’s example, the foundational facts are that a given child
“is under seven years of age”; the presumed fact would be that she “could
not have committed a felony.”417 But here’s the rub: This “presumed fact”
does not mean that the child did not commit the acts in the world of
which she stands accused—such as stealing the candy bar or pulling the
trigger. It means, instead, that she “did not have criminal intent,” by
which McCormick really means, I think, that she is not legally competent
to have committed a felony.418 In contrast to the above examples, then,
this is not a fact that is made legally relevant by other legal rules; it is just
itself a statement of a legal rule: Children under seven cannot be convicted of felonies. To see this more clearly, imagine that we were to remove the presumptions in all three cases. In the first two examples, the
presumed facts—that an absent person is dead, or that a given statement
was compelled—would nonetheless remain facts that must be proven for
certain legal consequences to obtain. But were the presumption removed
from McCormick’s example, there would remain no (formerly presumed)
fact left to prove. Absent McCormick’s presumption, that is, it is not the
case that the child’s attorney would have to resort to other means to
prove that the child “could not have committed the felony.” In short,

416

Strong, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 343 at 441. For another example, see
id. § 344, at 444 (stating that if “plaintiff proves that a letter was mailed, that it was properly
addressed, and that it was never returned,” then “[s]uch evidence is generally held to raise a
presumption that the addressee received the letter”).
417
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 402, at 966.
418
But see infra note 422.
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“fact A” in McCormick’s example is not a “fact” in the relevant sense,
but only a statement of the legal consequence of “fact B.”419
The illustration, therefore, does not demonstrate that a conclusive (or
irrebuttable) form of what McCormick calls a presumption is not “really”
a presumption by virtue of its conclusiveness; it shows only that some
things that people—including judges—call a conclusive presumption do
not have even the minimum required attributes of what is properly called
a presumption, conclusive or otherwise.420 All this is true, but it has no
bearing on the debate over Miranda. Whatever else might be said of conceptualizing Miranda to set forth a conclusive presumption as a form of
decision rule, there is no question that it satisfies the fundamental requirement for presumptions, properly so-called: It provides that “certain
facts [(custodial interrogation without warnings)] are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts [(compulsion)].”421
This all might seem something of a quibble because McCormick’s example could be reformulated so as to satisfy the initial condition of presumptions. This is done in the margin.422 But this fact does not moot my
objection. It illustrates that when we confront examples employed to
pump our intuitions that a given “presumption” is not really an adjudicatory device or is otherwise somehow illegitimate, we must guard against
the fallacy of equivocation: The “presumption” that is thereby condemned might be a very different sort of thing than the “presumption”
that is at issue in the debate over “conclusive presumptions.”

419

See 1 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1, at 4 (Peter Tillers ed.,
rev. ed. 1983).
420
Indeed, hornbooks and treatises on evidence routinely criticize courts for referring to
burdens of proof and permissive inferences as “presumptions.” See, e.g., 2 Strong, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 342, at 433–37.
421
Id. at 433.
422
Suppose the law were that a person cannot be convicted of a felony if he is unaware of
the moral character of his actions (which may be a principle undergirding the criminal law but
is not itself a rule of positive law), and suppose further that a child under seven were conclusively presumed not to be aware of the moral character of his actions. This legal rule would
satisfy the threshold requirement for presumptions because it would now mediate (as it did
not in the initial example) between basic facts (that the child is under age seven) and the legally material facts that are to be presumed (that the agent is unaware of the moral character
of his acts). Therefore, if this presumption were, by virtue of its conclusiveness, not an adjudicatory device, but rather a substantive rule, perhaps Grano’s condemnation of Miranda would
stand. But the entire thrust of this Section is to demonstrate that the precedent is false: A presumption of this sort could serve to minimize adjudicatory error.
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This warning is important to keep in mind because, as it happens,
every single example that Grano advances in support of his contention
that conclusive presumptions are not adjudicatory devices suffers from
just this defect. Responding to Strauss’s charge that the distinction between rebuttable and conclusive presumptions “proves false” because
there is no practical difference between a barely rebuttable presumption
and a conclusive one,423 Grano turned to Faretta v. California424 to illustrate the difference. “In Faretta,” Grano explained,
the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment confers both the
right to have the assistance of counsel and the opposite right to proceed
pro se. Nevertheless, in effect creating a rebuttable presumption against
waiver of counsel, the Court emphasized that demanding waiver criteria
must be satisfied before the right of self-representation is triggered.
Had the Faretta Court gone further, however, and adopted a conclusive
presumption that an unrepresented defendant has not made a valid
waiver, its presumption would have been the equivalent of a rule of law
that waiver of counsel, and thus self-representation, is neither protected
constitutionally nor permitted. Unlike a rebuttable presumption against
waiver, a conclusive presumption against waiver could not have coexisted with a right of self-representation. Conclusive presumptions are
425
substantive rules of law, not adjudicatory devices.

Grano is right that “a conclusive presumption that an unrepresented defendant has not made a valid waiver . . . would have been the equivalent
of a rule of law that . . . self-representation, is neither protected constitu426
tionally nor permitted.” But this cannot support the conclusion that the
conclusive presumption at issue in Miranda is a substantive rule of law,
not an adjudicatory device, because the presumptions involved are entirely different. Recall the definition of presumption quoted above: “A
presumption is a rule providing that proof of a designated fact has a predetermined effect in establishing the existence of another fact.” Neither
the actual Faretta decision nor Grano’s hypothetical variant, however, involves a presumption in this sense; there is no foundational fact, and no
presumed fact. What Grano terms Faretta’s “rebuttable presumption
against waiver of counsel” is more properly understood as a rule estab-

423

Strauss, supra note 38, at 192.
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
425
Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties, supra note 77, at 187.
426
Id.
424
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lishing a heavy burden of proof on the defendant who seeks to represent
himself to establish that he knows the consequences of his waiver and
acts (in some normatively loaded sense) “voluntarily.” A heavy burden of
proof is not the same as a rebuttable presumption. Just as hornbook law
advises that conclusive presumptions are not true presumptions, so too
does it insist that neither are “[a]ssignments of the burdens of proof prior
to trial.”427 Consequently, the Faretta example simply does not speak to
the question Miranda raises—namely, whether a rule providing that
proof of a designated fact has a conclusive effect in establishing the existence of another fact is (whether called “presumption” or not) an adjudicatory device in the sense that, if sensibly chosen, it serves to minimize
error in the adjudication of the presumed fact.
Perhaps having an inkling that his other examples did not work, Grano
has offered, as a “final example” of the supposedly critical difference between rebuttable and conclusive presumptions,
a statute that adopts negligence rather than strict liability as the tort
standard for a particular activity. Perhaps because of a belief that accidents do not normally occur unless the operator of the activity is negligent, a court might adopt a (rebuttable) presumption of negligence triggered by the mere occurrence of an accident. (If X, an accident, occurs,
Y, the operator’s negligence, will be presumed barring proof to the contrary.) While such a presumption might be unwise and empirically unsound, and while it would impose on the operator the burden of disproving negligence, it would remain consistent, in letter if not in spirit,
with the statutory standard of negligence. The same could not be said
about a conclusive presumption of negligence triggered by the mere occurrence of an accident. Under such a rule, liability would exist regardless of what the operator could prove, were such proof permitted, about
lack of negligence. That is, Y, the operator’s negligence, would now be
legally immaterial. Such a “presumption” would really constitute a substantive rule of strict liability and, as such, it would represent a rejection
428
of the statutory standard.

At first glance, this example appears to rectify the error of the Faretta example, for the putative presumption now explicitly mediates between a
foundational fact (the accident) and the presumed fact (the operator’s
negligence). On second glance, however, the seeming difference evapo427
428

2 Strong, McCormick on Evidence, supra note 415, § 342, at 436.
Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 197.
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rates. Because the foundational fact is necessarily present in every case in
which the presumed fact is at issue—adjudication of negligence presupposes an accident—the rebuttable presumption predicated on proof of
the foundational fact is, again, not a presumption at all (in the evidence
scholars’ stipulative sense). Rather, it is merely a somewhat convoluted
way to (as Grano rightly put it) “impose on the operator the burden of
disproving negligence.” This is therefore merely the Faretta example in
different clothing. So while the example might justify the conclusion that
a rule requiring courts to find a statement given during custodial interrogation compelled if the defendant is a human being “would really constitute a substantive rule” that courts must find all statements given during
custodial interrogation compelled, it does not speak to the actual presumption at work in Miranda.429
My purpose in all this is not to reprove Professor Grano. After all,
“[t]he word ‘presumption’ has perhaps suffered from more misuse and
inconsistent use than any other evidentiary term.”430 The point, rather, is
that the conclusive presumption at work in Miranda has a precise struc429

The negligence example would have a true rebuttable presumption were the rule, say,
that negligence is presumed if the operator was using a cell phone at the time of the accident.
Parity with Miranda would then be achieved by asking whether making this rebuttable presumption conclusive would be inconsistent with its being an adjudicatory rule. Notice how this
differs from Grano’s original hypothetical. As we have seen, that hypo does not implicate a
true presumption because it does not mediate between a contingent basic fact and the presumed fact. However, there is another reason it is so effective at pumping an intuition that the
conclusive presumption is inappropriate. Not only is the putative judicially created adjudicatory device functionally equivalent to a substantive rule of law different from the one the legislature enacted, but that functionally equivalent rule is one that we may assume the legislature considered and specifically rejected. Perhaps something still could be said in the court’s
defense: Maybe the legislature had what proved to be a naïve faith in the ease with which ex
post judgments of negligence could be made. But this is a weak argument. Presumably legislators were aware that negligence assessments might prove to be harder than they assumed. The
fact that they nonetheless adopted a rule instead of leaving it for judicial law-making in a
common law style suggests that they were willing to take that risk. Besides, the wisdom of one
rule versus the other depends not only upon the relative frequency of Type I and Type II errors but also upon an evaluation of their relative social costs. It is the combination of these
circumstances that renders the hypothesized judge-made conclusive presumption such chutzpah. The propriety of a judge-made rule that negligence shall be conclusively presumed from
cell phone usage at the time of the accident might well turn upon whether the legislature considered making cell phone usage negligence per se and judgments about the ease with which
the legislature could do so if it wanted. Obviously, considerations like this tend to make the
case for the Miranda Court’s resort to a conclusive presumption look stronger.
430
Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.07, at 102; see also, e.g., 2 Strong, McCormick on Evidence,
supra note 415, § 342, at 433 (describing presumption as “the slipperiest member of the family
of legal terms”); Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
Mich. L. Rev. 195, 196–207 (1953).
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ture not shared by many of the other imaginable evidentiary devices that
tend—much too loosely—also to be called conclusive presumptions.
Without much more argument than Grano supplies, the fact (if true) that
they are not truly adjudicatory devices cannot be relied upon to demonstrate that the Miranda doctrine is not either.
So let us turn away from intuition-pumping examples and toward arguments. What reasons can be given for the proposition that a conclusive
presumption is not an adjudicatory device? Put another way, what could
the evidence scholars say in response to the tentative conclusion reached
in the previous subsection? Unfortunately, the evidence scholarship insisting that this is true is notably reticent in explaining the assertion.
The obvious reason is that administering any given rule by means of a
conclusive presumption is identical in effect to amending the rule itself
and administering it without a presumption at all. Take a “substantive
rule of law” (R) of the form “if y then z” served by a conclusive presumption (CP) of the form “if x then conclude y.” The presumption could always be mooted by recasting the legal rule to turn on fact x instead of, or
in addition to, fact y. That is, R could become R1: “If x or y, then z.” This
is plainly true. But so what? Why should this truth convert what we originally wrote as an adjudicatory device—“determine that the defendant
does not know the moral character of her actions if she was under
seven”—into a substantive rule? This is not so obvious. After all, if (R +
CP) is functionally equivalent to R1, the equivalence necessarily works in
both directions. Why could we not, with equal logic, conclude that every
substantive rule of law is “really” a different substantive rule administered via a conclusive presumption? More precisely, why must the transformation always work in the former direction, never the latter? Why is it
not enough to observe that (R + CP) and R1 are identical, without asserting too that the latter is more real than the former?431
Wigmore provides an answer. After distinguishing between two types
of adjudicatory devices based on the purposes they are designed to
serve—rules of auxiliary probative policy and rules of extrinsic policy—
Wigmore explained that conclusive presumptions always fell in the latter
category. Conclusive presumptions serve to exclude evidence of certain
kinds of facts “because its admission would injure some other cause more
than it would help the cause of truth and because the avoidance of that
injury is considered of more consequence than the possible harm to the
431

For a more fully developed argument along similar lines, see John M. Phillips, Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 449 (1975).

BERMANBOOKALTERED.DOC

2004]

4/7/04 10:46 AM

Constitutional Decision Rules

139

cause of truth.”432 And the Supreme Court deemed this view “obviously
correct” seventy years ago.433
It is not obviously correct. Notice how Roger Park explains his assertion that conclusive presumptions are rules of substantive law: “In virtually every case, they exist because of a policy-based determination that
the existence of certain facts should establish a factual issue and that society would not be served by permitting contrary evidence.”434 That this is
true in some cases can hardly be doubted. Take, following Park, the rule
that “the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.”435 Very
likely, such a presumption is adopted for policy reasons, particularly that
disputes over paternity would be harmful to the child. And yet, by observing, with greater care than did either Wigmore or the Court, that this
is true in “virtually every case,” Park has given the game away. Whether
“virtually every case” is accurate or an overstatement is beside the point.
The point, rather, is that, by negative implication Park concedes that it is
not true in every case. So the question becomes why a conclusive presumption is not an evidentiary device in those other cases. Moreover, absolutely no reason has been given why it is not an adjudicatory rule when
it exists—as arguably it does in Miranda—for the primary purpose of
minimizing total adjudicatory errors.
In sum, there appears no remotely persuasive argument to support
Park’s implicit assertion that even the exceptional conclusive presumption adopted for the purpose merely of accommodating epistemic doubt,
and not to achieve other policy goals, is not an evidentiary device but
rather a rule of substantive law. It turns out, ironically, that the standard
assertion that a conclusive presumption is not a true evidentiary device is
itself just a conclusive presumption—namely, that all conclusive presumptions should be conclusively presumed to be adopted for policy reasons, hence to be substantive rules of law. There may be good policy reasons to adopt this presumption, but as statement of existential fact it is
432

1 Wigmore, supra note 419, § 11, at 689.
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 285 (1934). Interestingly, the Court
had previously explained that “all presumptions as to matters of fact, capable of ocular or tangible proof, such as the execution of a deed, are in their nature disputable. No conclusive
character attaches to them. They may always be rebutted and overthrown.” Lincoln v. French,
105 U.S. 614, 617 (1881) (emphasis added). The negative implication seems to be that presumptions as to matters of fact that are not capable of such proof—matters that are not of
brute fact—might support a conclusive presumption.
434
Park et al., supra note 413, § 4.08, at 106.
435
Id. at 105 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
433
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false. Put simply: Rules that take the form of a conclusive presumption can
rest on the “adjudicatory” or “evidentiary” consideration of reducing adjudicatory errors. Wigmore’s assertion to the contrary is wrong.
3. The Argument from Constitutional Legitimacy
Although Grano relies on evidence scholarship for what appears to be
a conceptual claim—that conclusive presumptions just cannot serve to
minimize adjudicatory error—it is possible that his intended point is
more provincial—namely that, even if a given conclusive presumption
can actually minimize adjudicatory error relative to any plausible alternative, a decision rule that employs a conclusive presumption is nonetheless
an illegitimate exercise of federal judicial power. In other words, constitutional decision rules that contain conclusive presumptions are illegitimate because, “[r]egardless of how they are explained, conclusive presumptions pertaining to constitutional violations have the effect of
amending the Constitution, a task not assigned to the judiciary.”436
The language of “effects” is important. Compare this possible objection to Congress’s power to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment: Federal legislation predicated on Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits more conduct than do the
Amendment’s substantive provisions is illegitimate because, “regardless
of how they are explained, prophylactic rules have the effect of interpreting the Constitution, a task not assigned to Congress.” Yet as a long line
of Supreme Court decisions culminating in City of Boerne v. Flores437
makes clear, this claim would be false. Because bona fide prophylactic
legislation is perfectly valid despite having the same effect as invalid substantive legislation, the critical task is to distinguish the legislation on
grounds other than effect. So too for conclusive presumptions crafted by
the federal judiciary as constitutional decision rules: pace Grano, “how
they are [correctly] explained” is precisely what determines whether they
are legitimate.
Admittedly, we cannot always be certain how a given doctrine is correctly explained. A court might invoke adjudicatory considerations in defense of a given decision rule that takes the form of a conclusive pre-

436

Grano, supra note 70, at 154; see also Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 198 (“To explain, applaud, or defend Miranda in terms of a conclusive presumption rationale . . . is to assert for the Supreme Court the power of constitutional amendment. There is no other way to
describe it.”).
437
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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sumption when it was actually influenced by doctrine-making considerations whose legitimacy is less secure, including substantive ones. That is,
conclusive presumptions are dangerous because they may enable courts
to engage in illegitimate forms of doctrine-making under the guise of pursuing adjudicatory ends.438 What follows? Should constitutional scholars
seek to promulgate a norm that would forbid the judiciary from realizing
adjudicatory considerations in the form of a conclusive presumption?
Should the judiciary itself adopt such a “prophylactic rule”? If so, on
what authority? May the Court conclusively presume that any doctrine
which employs a conclusive presumption is not designed to minimize adjudicatory error? Would application of such a conclusive presumption
minimize adjudicatory error? This line of attack seems too rife with paradox to provide a promising route for Miranda’s detractors.
D. Miranda’s Progeny
The distinction between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and
constitutional decision rules has shown some of its worth by contributing
new insights and arguments to long-standing debates over Miranda’s legitimacy. The Dickerson majority (or some members thereof) could have
replied to Justice Scalia’s dissent as follows: (1) the Miranda warnings requirement was part of a constitutional decision rule designed to minimize
errors in adjudicating whether out-of-court statements had been compelled within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause (as Miranda
interpreted that particular constitutional provision); (2) constitutional
decision rules are ineliminable, hence cannot be categorically illegitimate;
(3) while the extent of the Court’s constitutional authority to craft decision rules may be reasonably debated, the creation of decision rules to
minimize adjudicatory error has the strongest claim to legitimacy; (4)
such a device is not a “prophylactic” rule in the Grano-Scalia sense because it does not overenforce constitutional meaning as measured against
the appropriate baseline; rather, it was adopted to optimally enforce constitutional meaning; (5) use of a conclusive presumption is common to
constitutional decision rules (including the decision rule adopted by Justice Scalia himself in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission), and is not
incompatible with an interest in reducing adjudicatory error. None of
this, it should hardly bear mentioning, is to extol Miranda. Like any other
judicial product, it might have been wise or foolish. But, on the reading

438

See Grano, Confessions, supra note 77, at 188, 194.
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thus far developed, it is not susceptible to the charge of judicial usurpation.439
There is more. I hypothesized earlier that attention to the distinction
between judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and constitutional decision rules might also assist the project of doctrinal development. This
Section pursues that idea by briefly examining what rooting the Miranda
doctrine’s legitimacy in adjudicatory considerations implies for some of
Miranda’s progeny.440
1. Retroactivity
Early questions concerned Miranda’s retroactive application. In Johnson v. New Jersey, the Court held that Miranda governed the admissibility of statements obtained prior to its announcement, but not if the trial
had already commenced.441 Yale Kamisar, among the most stalwart of
Miranda’s defenders, has concluded that “[t]he Court probably should
have held that Miranda affected only those confessions obtained after the
date of the decision.”442 This would be right if the purpose of the Miranda
doctrine were to deter “police overreaching.” But if Miranda is best explained as a decision rule resting on adjudicatory considerations—and
surely if such a description is deemed necessary to its legitimacy—then
unwarned custodial statements should be presumed compelled no matter
439

This is a response to the familiar contention (of which Justice Scalia’s Dickerson dissent is
just one example) that Miranda was an illegitimate exercise of judicial power. However, this
response does not fully resolve the issue presented in Dickerson because, even granting
Miranda’s legitimacy, it remained to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501 constituted a permissible exercise of Congress’s authority to displace a judge-crafted decision rule. Of course,
that question cannot be fully answered without articulating and defending a theory of the circumstances in which the judiciary should defer to decision rules put forth by Congress, tasks
that this Article does not even attempt. See supra Section IV.A.2.c.
With that caveat, I admit to skepticism that Congress is better positioned than is the Supreme Court to determine what decision rule would minimize adjudicatory errors. Largely for
this reason, I am strongly disposed to believe that had the Dickerson majority defended
Miranda’s legitimacy in the way I have described, refusal to give effect to § 3501 would have
been proper. I am under no illusion, however, that these brief remarks are adequate to resolve the question. Furthermore, even assuming that the Court was correct to refuse to give
effect to § 3501, that does not mean that Congress could not try again to craft an alternative
decision rule to replace the one announced in Miranda, or that—depending upon the particular rule proposed—the Court ought not acquiesce.
440
For an extensive discussion of the qualifications and exceptions to Miranda, see Alfredo
Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 461
(1998). This Section discusses only a few.
441
384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966).
442
Kamisar, supra note 58, at 937 n.278.
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when the custodial interrogation occurred. Indeed, because the pivotal
event for Miranda’s purposes is the admission of statements into evidence at trial and not their elicitation prior to trial, to apply Miranda to a
trial that commenced after it is not, properly understood, a “retroactive”
application even if the custodial interrogation had preceded Miranda.
2. Impeachment
Whether unwarned statements may be admitted against a criminal defendant for impeachment purposes should depend, in the first instance,
upon the scope not of the decision rule, but of the operative proposition.
The straightforward question is whether introduction of a compelled
statement for impeachment purposes violates the constitutional guarantee that no person be compelled “to incriminate himself.” The correct answer is not self-evident. But some language in Miranda suggested that the
answer was yes.443 In any event, thirteen years after Miranda the Court
made this answer explicit.444 If courts minimize adjudicatory errors by
presuming unwarned statements to have been compelled within the
meaning of the operative proposition of Fifth Amendment doctrine, the
error-reduction justifications for the Miranda decision rule would seem to
apply in the impeachment context too. Harris v. New York,445 which held
that unwarned statements could be admitted for impeachment, seems
wrong.446
3. Fruits
Are the evidentiary fruits of an un-Mirandized custodial interrogation
admissible? The Court has strongly indicated that they are. In Michigan
v. Tucker, the Court held admissible statements by a witness discovered
as a result of an interrogation during which police had failed to advise the
443

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477 (“[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement.”).
444
New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459–60 (1979) (prohibiting impeachment by immunized grand jury testimony). The Court had held the previous year that a suspect’s statements
made involuntarily for due process purposes were not admissible for impeachment. Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398–402 (1978). As I have emphasized, those are distinct inquiries.
445
401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971).
446
For similar criticism, see Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
Yale L.J. 1198 (1971).
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suspect of his right to free counsel.447 In Oregon v. Elstad the Court held
that evidence of a suspect’s voluntary statement made after complete issuance of the Miranda warnings was not rendered inadmissible just because the suspect had made an initial inculpatory custodial statement that
had not been preceded by the warnings.448 The full significance of these
decisions was doubtful: Tucker had engaged in a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis that emphasized, among other things, that the custodial interrogation preceded the Miranda decision,449 and Elstad had
questioned whether the second statement was in fact a consequential
“fruit” of the first failure to issue warnings.450 But lower federal courts
have routinely read these decisions as standing for the general proposition that fruits of a custodial statement not preceded by Miranda warnings were admissible even though the statement itself would not be.451
The Court’s analyses in these cases are far from satisfactory.452 Yet insofar as the Miranda decision rule rests on adjudicatory considerations,

447

417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974).
470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
449
See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (“We consider it significant to our decision in this case that
the officers’ failure to advise respondent of his right to appointed counsel occurred prior to
the decision in Miranda. Although we have been urged to resolve the broad question of
whether evidence derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be
excluded regardless of when the interrogation took place, we instead place our holding on a
narrower ground.”) (citation omitted).
450
See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310–14 (rejecting argument that “the psychological impact”
of having made an initial inculpatory statement compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent inculpatory statement on a “cat-out-of-the-bag” theory); id. at 347 n.29 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Notwithstanding the sweep of the Court’s language, today’s opinion surely
ought not be read as also foreclosing application of the traditional derivative-evidence presumption to physical evidence obtained as a proximate result of a Miranda violation.”).
451
See 3 LaFave et al., supra note 115, § 9.5(b), at 388 & n.37.
452
This is largely due, I think, to the Court’s failure adequately to distinguish the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule from the Miranda doctrine. Writing for the Court in Tucker,
then-Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the exclusionary rule serves a deterrent purpose: “to
compel respect for the [Fourth Amendment] guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it.” 417 U.S. at 446 (internal quotations omitted). Observing that “[i]n a proper case this rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment
context as well,” he explained that “[b]y refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of [willful or negligent] conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or
in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.” Id. at
447. This deterrent purpose would not be well-served, though, by excluding statements obtained prior to the Miranda decision. Furthermore, then-Justice Rehnquist continued: “When
involuntary statements or the right against compulsory self-incrimination are involved, a second justification for the exclusionary rule has been asserted: protection of the courts from reliance on untrustworthy evidence.” Id. at 448. But the Court found that this consideration did
not justify suppressing the statements at issue either.
448
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the general proposition for which Tucker and Elstad now stand—namely,
that Miranda does not itself bar admission of the fruits of an unMirandized confession—is probably correct, and certainly defensible.
The core premise, of course, is that the police violate no aspect of constitutional doctrine by failing to issue the Miranda warnings. This is true
whether the failure be inadvertent or willful. The cost is that any statement elicited will be inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief in a subsequent criminal trial of the suspect being interrogated. But the SelfIncrimination Clause has been construed not to protect a criminal defendant from being compelled to surrender nontestimonial evidence against
himself,453 much less does it protect the accused from the testimonial evidence of others. In short, then, admission into evidence of anything other
than the defendant’s own statements does not violate the SelfIncrimination Clause, nothing in Miranda being to the contrary. And the
mere fact that a custodial interrogation proceeded without warnings violates no other rule from Miranda, so there is no poisonous tree, hence no
poisonous fruit.454
Writing for the Elstad Court eleven years later, Justice O’Connor announced (claiming to
rely on Tucker, among other cases) that “a procedural Miranda violation differs in significant
respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a
broad application of the ‘fruits’ doctrine.” 470 U.S. at 306. And yet she proceeded to agree
with Tucker “that neither the general goal of deterring improper police conduct nor the Fifth
Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence would be served by suppression” of the
putative fruits before it. Id. at 308. However, a true appreciation of the differences between
the judge-made Miranda prophylactic doctrine and the judge-made Fourth Amendment exclusionary doctrine should have driven the Court to recognize that the Tucker analysis was
both mistaken and incomplete. It was mistaken because the former is simply not designed, as
is the latter, to deter bad conduct by the police. It was incomplete because the Court assumed
that the only other reason for the Fifth Amendment exclusion of “compelled” testimony was
to guard against untrustworthy evidence. Although historians debate whether this was the
sole or predominant original rationale for the Self-Incrimination Clause, Miranda had described the “one overriding thought” underlying the Clause as “the respect a government—
state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.” 384 U.S. at 460.
Analysis of the admissibility of evidence derived from an unwarned custodial statement could
not be adequate without considering how the Miranda doctrine was designed to serve that
value.
453
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
454
Justice O’Connor cogently advanced this basic argument in her separate opinion in New
York v. Quarles. See 467 U.S. 649, 665–72 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is developed at length in Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857 (1995). In
reply, Yale Kamisar has argued that this position is inconsistent with settled case law which
holds that the Self-Incrimination Clause requires that witnesses compelled to testify in noncriminal proceedings on pain of contempt be granted not just use immunity but derivative use
immunity as well. See Yale Kamisar, Response: On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Co-
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I anticipate at least two objections. First, allowing the admission of
fruits reduces police officers’ incentives to issue the Miranda warnings.455
That may be true. The short response, though, is that the Miranda decision rule is best conceived as an effort to minimize adjudicatory error in
the determination of whether an out-of-court statement by the accused
was compelled. So long as this objective is met, how police officers treat
suspects is a matter of indifference to Self-Incrimination Clause doctrine—even post-Miranda. This is not to say, of course, that how police
officers treat suspects is a matter of indifference to constitutional doctrine as a whole. The Due Process Clauses, for instance, have been interpreted to prohibit the police from engaging in certain egregious interrogation practices. But whether police conduct has violated due process is a
question separate from whether they have issued the Miranda warnings.
The second argument against the admissibility of fruits of unwarned
custodial interrogations, accordingly, challenges that this should be so.
Interrogation practices that “overbear” a suspect’s will so as to elicit “involuntary” statements violate substantive due process. The in-court admission of such statements against the accused violates procedural due
process. Admission of the fruits of such an interrogation should therefore
likewise be unconstitutional—on the theory either that procedural due
process itself proscribes the admission of fruits obtained in certain ways,
or that exclusion of such fruits by means of a constitutional remedial rule
is proper to deter substantive due process violations by the police. However, the argument continues, it is hard to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether any unwarned statement which has borne fruit was actually
“involuntary.” Therefore the very same reasoning that alone could justify
recourse to a conclusive presumption in Miranda justifies recourse to the
identical decision rule for purposes of vindicating a suspect’s due process
erced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 929 (1995). I think Professor
Kamisar is right, which compels me to conclude that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not
demand the derivative-use rule. At the same time, I think it plausible that the derivative-use
rule could be derived from the Due Process Clause, and that such a conclusion need not entail
that the Due Process Clause requires suppression of the fruits of a custodial statement that is
“compelled” (within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause) but not “involuntary” or
“coerced” (within the meaning of the Due Process Clause itself). However this is a digression
not worth pursuing here.
455
For this argument, see especially Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L.
Rev. 109 (1998) (documenting widespread police practices of questioning “outside Miranda”
and arguing that the practice is antithetical to the language and purposes of Miranda); David
Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 805
(1992); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 145, at 71 n.29 (asserting that “[t]here is simply no way
to interpret Miranda as a decision permitting such questioning”).
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rights: Courts should conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial
statement was involuntary for due process purposes, rendering any fruits
of such a statement consequently inadmissible.
The defect in this argument is simply that, as we have seen, due process
“involuntariness” is a different, and less capacious, concept than selfincrimination “compulsion.”456 So even assuming arguendo that the
Miranda decision rule (conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial
statement was compelled) can serve to minimize adjudicatory errors
when administering the operative proposition of Self-Incrimination
Clause doctrine, it need not follow that the same decision rule, mutatis
mutandis (conclusively presume that an unwarned custodial statement
was involuntary), would minimize adjudicatory errors for purposes of
administering the Due Process Clause. In sum, we can agree that fruits of
a custodial due process violation should be excluded without concluding
that the case-by-case approach to adjudicating claimed violations of due
process fails to minimize the adjudicatory error rate. Of course, if the
Court fails to recognize the difference between “compulsion” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause and due process “voluntariness,”457
then the proposition that fruits of unwarned custodial statements may be
admissible becomes much harder to reconcile with Miranda.
Notice that I have just defended what I have called the “general
proposition” for which Tucker and Elstad are thought to stand—that
Miranda does not bar the admission of the fruits of a statement that the
Miranda conclusive presumption renders inadmissible. That defense is
enough to justify the narrow holding of Tucker.458 It is not enough, however, to justify the result in Elstad. For even assuming that the Elstad
Court was correct not to exclude a subsequent confession on the theory
that it is the fruit of an un-warned, hence inadmissible, prior confession, a
separate question is whether the subsequent confession should be barred
on the ground that it was itself “compelled” within the meaning of the

456

See supra Section V.A.1.
It is therefore not surprising that the conflation of compulsion and involuntariness in
Tucker and Elstad was specifically objected to by astute contemporary critics. See, e.g.,
Kamisar, supra note 69, at 153; Ritchie, supra note 69, at 430–31.
458
To put the point in terms raised by a case that the Supreme Court is likely to decide by
the time this Article leaves the printer, United States v. Patane, cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1788
(2003) (mem.) (No. 02-1183), there is no good reason to believe that Dickerson undermines
Tucker.
457
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Self-Incrimination Clause.459 Instead of answering that the initial failure
to issue warnings necessarily rendered the subsequent statement inadmissible (or, for that matter, that the belated issuance of warnings necessarily
rendered the subsequent statement admissible), the Court held that the
trial court must engage in an all-things-considered assessment of whether
the subsequent statement was voluntary.
To reiterate a theme I have been hammering at, this last point was either wrong or, at best, imprecise, insofar as it conflates Fifth Amendment
compulsion with due process involuntariness. The Court should have said
that the existence of a prior unwarned statement (i.e., a statement that is
conclusively presumed to have been compelled) does not justify a conclusive presumption that the subsequent, warned, statement was also compelled but, rather, that whether the second statement was compelled,
hence inadmissible, should be assessed by the default more-likely-thannot decision rule.
If modified in this way, the Elstad holding seems consistent, if barely,
with the reading of Miranda I have put forth.460 If Miranda is justified as a
way to minimize adjudicatory error, the critical question must be
whether, when trying to determine whether a warned statement made
subsequent to an unwarned one is compelled, presuming compulsion in
such cases will enable courts to minimize adjudicatory errors in the ag-

459

As the Court aptly noted, this question implicates a different metaphor: not whether a
subsequent statement is a “tainted fruit of a poisonous tree” but whether it can be deemed
sufficiently free once the “cat is out of the bag.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303–04.
460
The holding would be consistent. Not consistent is Justice O’Connor’s repeated references to statements made during custodial interrogations that, albeit unwarned, were voluntary. See, e.g., id. at 303 (observing that “the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the defendant”); id. at 307 (“Failure to administer Miranda warnings
creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise
voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from
evidence under Miranda.”); id. at 318 (concluding that “there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect where the suspect’s initial inculpatory statement, though technically in violation
of Miranda, was voluntary”). If, as Justice O’Connor suggests, compulsion, coercion, and involuntariness are all synonyms, then to believe that courts can identify with acceptable accuracy those unwarned statements that are voluntary flies in the face of the theory that both explains, and can justify, the Miranda decision rule. Justice O’Connor rightly observes that
“[w]hen police ask questions of a suspect in custody without administering the required warnings, Miranda dictates that the answers received be presumed compelled.” Id. at 317; see also
id. at 307 n.1 (“A Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a brightline legal presumption of coercion . . . .”). But for her to then cavalierly describe statements
as, albeit unwarned, neither compelled nor coerced, marks a signal failure to appreciate why
Miranda created the presumption it did.
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gregate. This is an empirical question, one that Miranda itself simply cannot answer.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Elstad majority, thought not, seeming to repose faith in trial courts’ abilities to assess the “psychological impact” of the earlier statement case by case.461 Justice Brennan, in dissent,
derided the majority’s “marble-palace psychoanalysis”462 and purported
to rely more heavily on “the realities of police interrogation and the everyday experience of lower courts.”463 Quoting heavily from standard interrogation manuals, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) observed that “interrogators describe the point of the first admission as the
‘breakthrough’ and the ‘beachhead’ which once obtained will give them
enormous ‘tactical advantages.’”464 This being so, Justice Brennan thought
that courts would more accurately assess whether a given custodial
statement was compelled by presuming that it was if it followed a custodial admission not preceded by warnings. In Justice Brennan’s eyes, however, this presumption, unlike the one announced in Miranda, should not
be conclusive. “The correct approach,” he concluded, “is to presume that
an admission or confession obtained in violation of Miranda taints a subsequent confession unless the prosecution can show that the taint is so attenuated as to justify admission of the subsequent confession.”465 As an a
priori matter, all of these decision rules—the majority’s endorsement of
an all-things-considered, more-likely-than-not rule, the dissent’s preference for a weighty but rebuttable presumption,466 and even a Mirandainspired conclusive presumption—strike me as potentially defensible.
Perhaps significantly, though, even the Elstad majority assumed that
the cops’ initial failure to read the suspect his Miranda warnings was an
“oversight.”467 A case presently before the Court, Missouri v. Seibert,468
461

Id. at 311–14.
Id. at 324 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
463
Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
464
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
465
Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
466
In Justice Brennan’s view, the fact of an initial, unwarned, custodial confession should not
merely shift the burden onto the prosecution to establish by a more-likely-than-not standard
that a subsequent, warned, custodial confession was not compelled. Rather, the prosecution
should be required to “convincingly rebut[] the presumption.” Id. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
467
Id. at 316.
468
93 S.W.3d 700 (Mo. 2002) (en banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2091 (2003) (No. 02-1371).
Another case, United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
1480 (2003) (No. 02-6320), also raises the question of how an initial unwarned statement affects the admissibility of a subsequent warned statement. There is no indication that the cops’
462
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raises the question whether Elstad applies even when the initial failure
was intentional.469 The short answer to that question, I think, is no. Simply
put, it is hard to see how whether the police officer acts intentionally or
merely negligently when failing to issue warnings affects whether the suspect subsequently confesses freely in accordance with Miranda’s understanding of the operative meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause.470
But perhaps that is the wrong question. At the least, it is not the only
question that the facts of Seibert raise. The officer in that case did not
only deliberately refrain from issuing the Miranda warnings in the first
place. Additionally, after eliciting a confession from Seibert and only
then providing the warnings, the officer referred back to the earlier interview several times.471 In this respect, too, Seibert is distinguishable from
Elstad, for the Elstad majority had specifically noted that the officers did
not “exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into waiving
his right to remain silent.”472 This is a distinction with a difference. I have
claimed (admittedly, without elaboration) that an officer’s reasons for
failing to give warnings the first time have little bearing on whether a
statement given during a second interview was compelled in what the
Miranda Court intimated was the constitutionally relevant sense. The officer’s behavior during that subsequent interview, in contrast, bears
mightily on whether any statements thus elicited were “truly free” in the
thick sense that Miranda endorses. The Court might well conclude, acinitial failure to issue warnings was deliberate. That initial questioning did, however, occur
after Fellers had been indicted, thus implicating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (requiring knowing and intelligent waiver of right to
counsel for post-indictment questioning); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (suppressing post-indictment statements that had been deliberately elicited). Indeed, just as this
Article was going to press, the Court decided Fellers, holding unanimously that the lower
courts erred in applying Elstad by rote to hold Feller’s second statements admissible. Fellers
v. United States, 72 U.S.L.W. 4150 (2004). Explaining that it had not previously “had occasion
to decide whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards,” the Court remanded to the
Eighth Circuit “to address this issue in the first instance.” Id. at *12 (slip op. 6).
469
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2003 WL 21840372 (No. 02-1371) (“Is the rule ‘that a
suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings’ abrogated when the initial decision to withhold the Miranda warnings was intentional?” (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318)).
470
See supra Section V.A.1.
471
See Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 702.
472
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316. It is not distinguishable, though, from the Elstad-era practice. See
id. at 329–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cordingly, that trial courts must presume—conclusively or, at a minimum,
rebuttably—that a suspect’s statement was compelled, hence inadmissible
against him, if it was elicited during a custodial interrogation in which police officers had exploited any statements that the suspect had given during a previous custodial interrogation not preceded by the Miranda warnings. Such a decision rule would very possibly minimize adjudicatory
errors in the aggregate and would therefore be wholly consistent with
both Elstad and Miranda.
4. Emergency Exception
In New York v. Quarles,473 the Court announced “a ‘public safety’ exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted into evidence.”474 In that case, a police officer arrested a rape suspect in a supermarket and, after handcuffing him
and finding an empty shoulder holster, asked where the gun was. The
suspect nodded in a particular direction and responded, “the gun is over
there.”475 The trial court subsequently suppressed the gun and the statement, however, because the officer had not issued the Miranda warnings.476 The Supreme Court held the gun and the statement admissible,
reasoning that failure to issue warnings was justified by the compelling
public need “that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public area.”477
A public safety exception that makes a custodial statement itself admissible though unwarned would be defensible were the Miranda doctrine conceived of, and justified as, a remedial rule designed to deter “police overreaching.” In that event, the Court must be interested in how the
social costs of the conduct it wishes to deter balance against the social
costs of foregoing beneficial conduct that its doctrine might chill. It is perfectly sensible, then, to carve out an exception to the general rule for a
473

467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Id. at 655.
475
Id. at 652.
476
Id.
477
Id. at 657. Justice O’Connor rejected the majority’s newly hatched “public safety” exception, and therefore would have held the suspect’s statements inadmissible. Id. at 660
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But she agreed that the gun was admissible because, as mentioned above, she reasoned that the police officer had done nothing
wrong to warrant “poisonous fruit” analysis. It is perhaps revealing on the latter point that
Justice Marshall’s dissent challenged only the majority’s proposed exception, refraining from
debating Justice O’Connor’s analysis of the fruits question on the ground that the state had
not raised it below. Id. at 688 n.11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
474
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subset of cases in which the costs of that rule are likely to be especially
high. And perhaps the Quarles modification of the Miranda doctrine
would do just that. But insofar as the Miranda doctrine is a decision rule
justified on the strength of adjudicatory considerations, this reasoning
seems inapposite. If Miranda can only be defended as a means to minimize total adjudicatory errors, then crafting a public safety exception was
an error.478
CONCLUSION
Over the past dozen or so years, constitutional scholars have turned
with marked energy and enthusiasm to problematics of “constitutional
doctrine”—a collection of judicial work product more comprehensive
than what an earlier generation would have termed “constitutional meaning.” Central questions have concerned how doctrine relates to meaning,
and what implications might follow for debates over the legitimate methods of constitutional interpretation. The Court has itself begun to struggle with these questions in such important and disparate decisions as
Dickerson, Garrett, and Atwater.
Notwithstanding this notable metadoctrinal turn, the domain described
by the phrase “constitutional doctrine” remains, for the most part, a conceptually undifferentiated mass of “interpretations, reasons, principles,
and frameworks.”479 This is unfortunate. For, as Peter Birks has taught,
the law’s long-term coherence and effectiveness depend, in significant
measure, on taxonomic understanding. Law that does “not properly understand itself” will “be erratic and doomed to ridicule.”480 It is time, accordingly, to work toward a taxonomy of constitutional doctrine.
478

Again I am disagreeing with Dorf and Friedman, who argue that Quarles was rightly decided. See Dorf & Friedman, supra note 145, at 79 n.77 (“Few rights are absolute, and all
Quarles does is to acknowledge that some balancing is appropriate.”). To my mind, they have
Quarles and Tucker backwards. See id. at 80 & n.78 (deeming Tucker “dubious”). We come to
opposite conclusions because, failing to distinguish the Miranda operative proposition from
the Miranda decision rule, Dorf and Friedman read the decision as imposing a command
upon the police as a matter of constitutional interpretation. See id. at 78 (contending that, according to “Miranda’s core holding, . . . what the Fifth Amendment requires is . . . that an accused learn of the right not to speak with the police, and that the interrogation take place in a
manner that permits the suspect to exercise that right at any time”); id. at 106 (“Miranda establishes a constitutional right to procedures that are adequate to inform a suspect of his right
to remain silent in the face of custodial interrogation . . . .”). In contrast, my view, to repeat, is
that the warnings aspect of Miranda is neither judicial interpretation of constitutional meaning, nor a command to the police.
479
Amar, supra note 3, at 79.
480
Birks, supra note 1, at 3.
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Reasons for the relative poverty of our present taxonomic understanding of constitutional doctrine are no doubt multiple and complex. A major part of the causal story, though, is that early classificatory efforts, especially Henry Monaghan’s “Constitutional Common Law,” purported to
divide constitutional doctrine into domains of true constitutional rules
and of subconstitutional rules, where the former were understood as the
product of abstract, principled reasoning while the latter relied upon
messy inquiries into likely consequences and institutional realities. But
this, many scholars argued, presented a false image of constitutional adjudication, which was reputed to be instrumental “all the way up.” This
hostility to taxonomic projects that depended—or were perceived to depend—upon the assumption that some constitutional doctrine emerged
through a process uncontaminated by “policy, pragmatism, and politics”481 easily carried over into a hostility toward the taxonomic project itself.
In light of this background what we need is a taxonomy consistent with
Pragmatism. That is, we need a classificatory scheme that neither depends upon, nor rules out, the anti-Pragmatist assumption that there exists a meaningful sort of constitutional interpretation not involving practical, instrumental, interest-balancing considerations—or at least not
involving such considerations in quite the same way as do other sorts of
constitutional interpretation.
A first step toward such a taxonomy—and only a first step—is to distinguish statements of judge-interpreted constitutional meaning from
rules directing how courts should adjudicate claimed violations of such
meaning. I have called these constituents of constitutional doctrine “constitutional operative propositions” and “constitutional decision rules,” respectively. Attention to these two conceptually distinct species of constitutional doctrine can, I have maintained, pay a wide range of dividends.
For example, it could help courts craft better doctrine, it could promote a
richer and more meaningful popular constitutional culture, and it could
generate a more fully developed sense of Congress’s proper role in the
project of constitutional adjudication. That these hopes are not just idle
fancy is borne out by close examinations of the Court’s recent decision in
Dickerson and, through Dickerson, Miranda. Among other things, the
operative proposition/decision rule distinction has helped make clear
how the Dickerson majority could have better replied to Justice Scalia’s

481

Levinson, supra note 27, at 857.
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overblown attack on Miranda’s legitimacy, and how Miranda’s progeny
should be reshaped in light of Miranda’s reaffirmance.
Of course, even within the parameters that this Article defines for itself, there is much it leaves undone. It does not prove that courts enjoy
legitimate authority to create decision rules. It does not resolve which
considerations in the making of decision rules are legitimate and which
are not. It does not provide an algorithm for sorting operative propositions from decision rules. It does not conclusively establish that the most
controversial aspect of the Miranda doctrine is in fact a decision rule, let
alone a decision rule that is explicable or justifiable as a means to minimize adjudicatory error. And this is just a partial list.
All this is true. But, I daresay, to have hoped for much more would reflect inappropriate expectations for what constitutional theorizing of a
conceptual or analytical bent can accomplish. Rarely can it compel assent
to contested propositions. A conceptualization is a tool. Its truth lies in its
utility—its power to reveal possibilities and relationships that had lain
fully or partly obscured, to focus argument by identifying more sharply
the nature and extent of what lies in dispute, and to point us in the direction of more promising lines of inquiry.
This Article has endeavored to make clearer a conceptualization of the
practice of constitutional adjudication that, I believe, undergirds much of
contemporary constitutional theorizing and underlies many of the most
difficult cases that reach the Supreme Court, but which had desperately
wanted for a more complete and precise fleshing out. No doubt a very
long way toward completion and precision remains. Still, even incremental improvements in detailing the conceptual map of the practice of
constitutional adjudication can purchase large improvements in our ability to negotiate the terrain.

